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This project theorizes the relationship between ethos, situation, and 
identification at the site of organizations. Specifically, it focuses on the rhetoric's 
constitutive role in organizations. The study of rhetoric in organizations is 
longstanding, but little if any attention has been paid to the social consequences 
of this specific rhetorical relationship. 
The project's theoretical base employs frameworks from the fields of 
rhetoric, sociology, communication, and management science. Rhetorical theory, 
in particular the Aristotelian view of ethos and Burke's concept of identification, 
as well as structuration theory, dialogic theory, sensemaking theory, and actor-
network theory, all contribute to the project's conceptual structure and approach. 
The project uses a rhetorical analysis of public texts—documents, artifacts, public 
displays—to demonstrate how organizational rhetoric promotes direction, 
alignment, and commitment among organizational members and affiliates.  
This project finds evidence that motive in organizational rhetoric defines 
situations and thereby influences ethos, and that identification is a strategy of 
sustainability. The project also finds theoretical support for the claim that social 
forms, such as organizations, are instituted discursively. The project's theory 
promotes ethos as social recognition, which is extended, through a process of 
identification, to encourage the association of diverse interests and contribute to 
organizational durability.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During the 2012 U.S. presidential race, Republican candidate Mitt 
Romney’s claim that "corporations are people" drew derision from Democratic 
opponents, from the audience to which he spoke, and from several media outlets 
("Mitt Romney"). But Romney was only reiterating what the U.S. Supreme Court 
had reminded us of in 2010: "Corporations and labor unions have First 
Amendment rights" ("Bloomberg Law"). In fact, the court’s 2010 decision was a 
contemporary iteration of a legal concept that in the United States dates back at 
least until 1819, when the Supreme Court described corporations as persons. 
Charles Conrad’s overview of the rise of the American corporation describes a 
series of decisions, in lower courts and above, that developed, refined, and 
reinforced the concept of the corporate person (15-36).  
During that process, the courts expanded the concept of the corporation 
beyond its original purposes of protecting individual entrepreneurs from the risks 
associated with corporate activity and enabling judicial guidelines for the 
relationship between commercial organizations and the government (23-8). 
However, even if it is reasonable to grant corporations the right to enter 
contracts, to own property, or to sue (or be sued) for example, it does not 
necessarily follow that personhood attaches to corporations in terms of human 
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rights, voting, or other things that most people place in the realm of an individual 
citizen (Williamson). 
In their review of organizational rhetoric, George Cheney and Jill 
McMillan describe the long-standing concept of the corporate person as 
"explicitly designed to transcend the lives, energies, resources, and powers of the 
natural persons who created them" (96). Pragmatically speaking, an 
organization's collective agency is capable of generating consequences, and the 
profile of an organization's character and influence emerge from the meaning we 
make of its actions. Perhaps Mitt Romney will get the last laugh. Corporations are 
functioning as people. They do speak as if they were citizens. And they are among 
the most powerful rhetors in our midst.  
That organizations use rhetoric comes as no surprise to anyone who has 
seen a television advertisement, watched a press conference in which a company 
spokesperson (embodying the corporate person as rhetor) explains a 
corporation’s transgression, browsed a charitable organization’s Web site, or has 
read an annual report. These examples illustrate our everyday acceptance of 
institutional discourse as on par with our other conversations. One nonchalantly 
relates that "the school said" or "my company told me" without thinking too 
much, if at all, about what it means to believe that an organization talks or about 
what the consequences of that talk are. We should give some thought to the 
concept of agency as applied to corporate persons, especially since I have labeled 
them rhetors. We might start with Michael Reed’s overview of the agency 
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problem as manifest in organizational theory. Reed identifies four themes: the 
problem of agency as a dominant, recurring intellectual exercise that influences 
the field of organizational studies; a means of providing clarity to theoretical and 
technical debates within the field; an ongoing conversation about the complexity 
of organizations and in particular the ambiguity arising from the struggle 
between their individual and structural components; and a focus on the tension 
between collectivism and individualism (33-4). 
The last two themes in Reed's list are most relevant to my project. The 
division posed by the juxtaposition of individual choices (action) and normative 
power (structure) as a binary relationship calls for some remedy if we are to hold 
to the very idea of organizations. What are organizations if not a type of social 
collective comprised of individual members? Reed highlights this problem as the 
unsettling question of whether organizational members have "the primacy of 
individual ethical choice over the normative imperatives entailed in institutions" 
(37). 
Reed reports the work of Philip Abrahms as one answer. Abrahms’ 
argument conceptualizes the individual-structure binary as a persistent process 
marked by duration rather than a divided, ambiguous play of agency. In 
response, Reed writes, organizational studies should direct its attention toward 
the "social practices through which social structures are created, maintained and 
transformed over time" (42). Sociologist Anthony Giddens adopts a similar 
perspective, arguing for the adoption of a process model to remedy the division 
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between individual and organization agency. Agency is commonly linked to 
intent, he writes, but agency is not about intent but about capability (Constitution 
9). Given our common experience with organizations, either as members or as 
outsiders interacting with the organization, it’s plain that organizations create 
consequences that suggest agency. It is appropriate and theoretically useful to 
question the ontology of organizations as agents, but as a pragmatic 
understanding of what organizations say to us, we clearly respond to 
organizational discourse as we respond to individual speech.  
The Project at Hand 
In this project I use rhetorical theory to provide a different kind of 
response to the individual-organization division. Under the general concept of 
persuasion, I will look at the rhetorical situations shared by organizations and 
their members and their interested publics. In such situations, I will argue, ethos 
manifests as a process of social recognition—easing the development of trust 
among interlocutors and establishing credibility of the rhetor (an organization, in 
this case). My position aligns with Aristotle’s concept of ethos, drawing support 
from Aristotle’s principle that ethos is created during rhetorical encounters. With 
the stable support of social recognition, rhetors and their audiences can identify 
common interests, attitudes, and approaches. The process of identification is, as 
Kenneth Burke theorizes, persuasion itself. Identification does not exist without 
division, and rhetoric is the tool we use to engage with this inescapable dialectic 
(SS 186-88). If persuasion is successful, division dissolves, more or less, and for 
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some matter of time, and consensus permits organizations and the individuals 
affiliated with them to continue mutually constitutive activities.  
Ethos and identification do not operate outside of the situations in which 
we are called to use persuasion to reach a desired outcome—circumstances that 
occur regularly in organizations and, for that matter, in our lives away from 
organizations. In reaching consensus, the audiences affiliated with an 
organization—its members, clients, customers, government, and the general 
public—move toward identifying with the organization by judging it as altogether 
fitting and capable of addressing their common interests.  
In our social interactions, we must interpret situations on the fly. We may 
rely on habits of thought and past interactions to guide us, but there is never a 
guarantee that a situation will unfold as before or be very similar to past 
situations. Nor are the situations we encounter always unplanned. If you are 
invited to a wedding, for example, you know it was probably planned and that 
you can depend on your experiences attending previous weddings to guide your 
participation in the event. The invitation you received, the customs that dictate 
gift giving and congratulatory rituals, expectations of how you will dress—these 
are all elements of an invented situation. Organizations also invent situations, 
and they use them rhetorically. How an audience responds to a situation it 
creates, what audience is part of the situation, and other factors can be strategic 
components in organizational rhetoric.  
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The relationship between situation, ethos, and identification operates in 
and extends across any number of organized social forms, such as political 
parties, social movements, and corporate organizations. Organization scholars 
have for many years focused attention on organizational rhetoric as a force of 
influence, communication, and legitimacy. But the relationship at the heart of my 
project has received less attention. Practically speaking, this theory gap may not 
negatively affect the potential for individuals and the organizations with which 
they are affiliated to sustain mutually beneficial activities. Nevertheless, I believe 
the gap hinders our fully understanding the dynamics at play in the relationship 
between and among us and organizations.  
My project’s guiding questions ask: What is the nature of the situation-
ethos-identification relationship in terms of how it constitutes the shared 
common sense such as we find in organizations? And what are some of the 
consequences of that constitutive relationship? But before we contemplate a 
response to those questions, there is another question I must address first. What 
exactly do I mean by "organization?" A reasonable definition, upon which I will 
expand in chapter 2, might be this: An organization is a social entity formed to 
coordinate activity directed toward a goal. However, that reasonable definition 
masks assumptions, such as people naturally coordinate their actions toward a 
goal, people share decisions already made by others, or an organization’s 
representatives can influence other people to align their actions toward that goal 
by persuading them to "see" the same reality. 
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The genres of organizational discourse—the texts and talk produced by its 
members as policy, procedures, reports, memos, protocols, managerial speech, 
assembly-line talk, and so on—often operate in response to those assumptions. 
Organizational discourse is often rhetorical: it addresses an audience, it speaks 
with purpose, and it aims to affect belief and action. Organizational rhetoric 
achieves many outcomes, and one of them is to maintain the organization itself. 
Conrad underscores the compelling logic of organizational rhetoric in his 
investigation of organizational power, exercised internally with its members and 
externally with stakeholders (in the case of publicly owned corporations), 
government, and other affiliates. An organization's most important feature is its 
identity, he writes—the image of stability and permanence with which people can 
identify, even if that image varies among different audiences (171). Organizations 
use rhetoric to foster a persistent belief in their legitimacy and thereby ensure 
their sustainability. But how exactly do organizations use rhetoric to achieve 
those ends?  
Rhetorical theory gives us a lens on to how the human capacity to form 
alliances and community extends to constitute the institutions and affiliations 
that are predominant markers of contemporary life. Likewise, it also helps us 
understand how organizations recognize the power manifest in that capacity, and 
how they rely on it for their substance and sustainability. 
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Theories Past and Present 
Rhetorical theory, among other methods and theories that analyze and 
explain the use of language in organizations, opens useful examinations into a 
number of issues: for example, how organizations use language, how language 
operates within and transverses organizational boundaries, how meaning 
emerges from linguistic transactions, and how organizational language operates 
as a normative practice. Robert Westwood and Stephen Linstead, for example, 
acknowledge the centrality of language in organization studies. However, they 
write, scholars in the field generally view language as a transparent medium that 
carries ideas and positions back and forth between interlocutors (1). That potent 
view originates in C. E. Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication (fig. 1), 
which identifies communication’s salient problem as the challenge of accurately 
reproducing a message sent from one point to another. Shannon proposed his 
theory as a means for solving a vexing engineering puzzle: How can a particular 
message be distinguished from a range of messages and how can the noise of 
extraneous messages be reduced and even eliminated so that the message travels 
intact from one point to another? 
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Figure 1. Shannon’s Communication Model. Bell System Technical Journal 
(Short Hills, NJ: American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 1948) 2. 
 
 
What complicates communication, in Shannon’s view, is that "messages 
have meaning; that is, they refer to or are correlated according to some system 
with certain physical or conceptual entities" (1). The limits of Shannon’s theory 
are clear enough: He expresses less interest in the message’s meaning and its 
persuasive capacity than in its transmission. One might argue, however, that my 
summoning those limitations only repeats rhetoric’s old substance-versus-style 
debate: Is rhetoric a practical theory for how communicators reach common 
sense, or is it a grammar of style and delivery used to achieve dominance among 
competing discourses, without regard to substance? That critique is fair enough—
although we should remind ourselves that Shannon's attitude toward messages is 
an engineer’s attitude: He is interested in reducing technological impediments to 
communication. His theory is not rhetorical but technological. Even so, the 
metaphor in his text, the "noise in the channel," reiterates a profound, common, 
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intuitive, and utterly mistaken understanding that language represents how we 
perceive the objects of our experience.  
However, not all managerial theory falls prey to the siren of 
representation. In the years following the linguistic turn in social sciences 
(including organization studies), the idea that organizations are texts that we can 
read, that they can be classified as genres, and that we can investigate them as 
collections of narratives has gained intellectual capital. Many organization 
scholars seeking alternatives to the positivist accounts of social psychology that 
dominate their field recognize that language is not a package for ideas and 
perceptions and that communication is not a channel that delivers language 
whole from one person to the next, as depicted in Shannon’s model. At the very 
least, according to Mats Alvesson and Dan Kärreman, organization scholars 
recognize the complicated nature of language (136-37).  
As a result, scholars engage with organizational discourse on a number of 
fronts. David Boje, Cliff Oswick, and Jeffrey Ford categorize four approaches in 
their overview of discourse theory methodology: (1) making discourse the focus of 
study (treating organizations as sites of language investigations); analyzing 
different levels of discourse (conversations versus broad patterns of discourse, for 
example); practicing a particular mode of discourse analysis (a monological or 
dialogical perspective, for example); and selecting a method of discourse study 
(selecting a specific analytical type, such as conversation analysis, narrative 
theory, or deconstruction). However, they note, selecting from among these four 
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kinds of theoretical engagements is not simply an academic choice. Choosing one 
approach over another reveals a scholar’s stance toward the debate between the 
ontological and epistemological nature of organizations as constructed by 
language or represented in language (571-73). "At one extreme," they write, 
"authors assert that organizations are discursively and linguistically constituted. 
On the other side of the debate are important institutional and political economy 
situations beyond text and talk" (573). 
Choice and Consequence 
In the broadest sense, organizational discourse studies observe how text 
and speech operate and are practiced in and by organizations. Jonathan Potter et 
al. describe the analytical tools at its disposal as distinct strands that include (a) a 
cognitive perspective that examines such phenomena as recall and 
understanding; (b) speech act perspectives; (c) a perspective rooted in social 
philosophy and cultural consequences, in particular Continental semiotics and 
post-structuralism (Foucault’s work is an example); and (d) a focus on scientific 
discourse itself. These four strands produce three interrelated streams of 
research: (1) a functional approach to the workings of language; (2) research into 
the constructive mechanics embedded in the functional orientation; and (3) a 
critical awareness of the consequences and the variability inherent in discourse-
orientated investigations (205-6). Within such investigations, rhetorical theory 
operates as one of several analytical approaches brought to bear on 
organizational discourse. 
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Functional Orientation 
Examples of a functional discourse orientation can be found in the 
methodologies of discursive psychology. Because its theoretical roots draw from 
social psychology and sociology, organization studies is available to such 
methodologies. Discursive psychology challenges the empirical models and 
methods most favored in the sociological study of organizations. Discursive 
psychology takes a materialist position toward language, Michael Billig writes, 
using a "conception of language . . .  that it is rooted in the practicalities of what 
people say and do" (para 1). Rhetoric fits that description. It emphasizes 
argumentation and persuasion, including how interlocutors respond to one 
another in "particular discursive contexts" (para 5), or what Lloyd Bitzer defines 
as rhetorical situations ("Situation" 5).  
Constructionist Orientation 
Social constructionists conceive of discourse as drawing from an already 
existing system of grammar, syntax, and vocabulary. From that point of view, 
organizations construct discourse from those resources by selecting terms, 
tropes, and narratives to fashion a particular account of experience (Potter et al. 
207-8). Organizations strategically shape their discourse in order to encourage 
their affiliates to value one interpretation of experience over another.  
Rhetoric's persuasive power also relies heavily on selection, particularly 
the choices that a rhetor makes to demonstrate the advantage of one view over 
another, and the choices that an audience makes in accepting (or denying) and 
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aligning (or separating) itself with the rhetor’s argument. In the classical view, 
Aristotle's catalog of topics articulates a systematic review of the persuasive 
arguments common to justice, science, and politics. Persuasive arguments can be 
common to more than one area because they draw from the relationships 
common to different situations; for example, general to specific, or a hierarchy of 
best to worst. Specific relationships are those that do not cross disciplines; for 
example, a relationship important to physics—particles and waves, for example—
does not carry the same force in a political argument as it does in a cosmological 
one (1.2.1358a). Rhetors choose which of the relationships articulated in the 
scope of a topic to use so as to strengthen their logical appeals and influence 
audiences toward one position or another. If practiced effectively, rhetoric can be 
used to construct audience responses in an expected way. In contrast to the 
mechanics of constructionist discourse, however, rhetoric does not construct 
from pre-existing materials but responds actively and contingently to a situation. 
Because rhetoric holds that some topical relations are suited to specific situations 
and not to others, rhetors can guide, to some degree, the audience's perspectives 
by establishing the situation from which topical relations emerge and within 
which they are expected. As perspectives gather into general understanding, 
relationships are constituted and meaning settles for the time that it is useful—
which in the case of an organization may be a long period.  
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Critical Orientation 
 
Critical discourse studies focus on power relationships and their exercise, 
such as the normative influence discourse exerts on organizational members and 
on the language employed to maintain an organization's internal hierarchical 
structure and its public legitimacy. Further, critical theory carries a measure of 
emancipatory purpose. In practice, critics employ this critical attitude to 
deconstruct or otherwise dismantle assumptions and expose ideologies 
embedded in organizational discourse as a means of releasing organizational 
affiliates from the subservient positions they occupy relative to the organization. I 
would add another important critical investigation: the reflexive examination of 
discourse theory itself and its application in organizations. Although organization 
theorists recognize that relationships comprise organizations, that recognition 
can itself rest on functionalist or constructionist assumptions, which must also be 
subject to critical analysis. 
From a Burkean perspective, an important guide to the application of 
rhetorical theory in this project, symbolic interaction (discourse) does not simply 
pitch dominant and subservient positions against one another in a struggle over 
control and discipline as a critical position would have it. Instead, control and 
discipline arise as the joint action among any number of positions, including the 
positions of rhetor and audience. In rhetorical encounters, control and discipline 
express themselves as agreement and alignment. The ethical choices we make to 
produce those outcomes support and derive from our recognizing one another 
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and the situation we are part of and from aligning ourselves in response to that 
situation. Our responses may be temporary (albeit effective enough to move us 
from one situation to the next) or they may persist as lessons of experience—
results Burke refers to as dialectical and ultimate, respectively (RM 187). 
Alignment requires that we choose to negotiate consensual agreements to 
hierarchy, class, organization, and other manifestations of social order. Our 
guiding principles may appear to operate as preordained, objective, normative 
stances. But we dissuade ourselves from the limits of positivism when we 
recognize those stances as habits of experience, which we use to inform the 
choices we make when confronted by situations that call for a response. 
A Role for Rhetorical Theory  
Rhetorical theory brings a very specific analysis to organizational 
discourse. According to Loizos Heracleous, rhetoric is one of five interpretivist 
methods applicable to organizational discourse, joining hermeneutics, metaphor, 
symbolic interactionism, and critical discourse analysis. Heracleous defines 
discourse generally as "situated symbolic action" (177), and he argues that 
rhetoric's interpretive stance toward discourse puts scholars in a critical position 
from which to explore the "situation, the audience, the rhetor and textual 
features" of organizational texts (182).  
However, Heracleous's cognitive approach limits his argument for locating 
rhetorical theory as a distinct interpretive attitude. He describes the study of 
discourse as an examination of the schemata that link discourse to action. In his 
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view, discursive interactions construct scripts that guide action among 
organizational affiliates and contribute to their ongoing collective meaning 
making.  
Following the work of George Mead and Herbert Blumer, Heracleous 
correctly assesses that action depends on the meaning we make of situations, that 
meaning arises from our interactions with others, and that we modify meanings 
through further interactions. But in other important ways, Heracleous’s attitude 
veers sharply from Mead’s and Blumer’s interactionist perspective and takes a 
constructionist attitude. For example, to support his theory that rhetoric calls out 
the schemata that influence our perceptions of experience and propel us to joint 
action, Heracleous claims that rhetoric scholars share a presupposition that 
"rhetoric [is] a potent tool for constructing social reality" (182).  
Heracleous's take on rhetoric has limits. As James Berlin writes in his 
trenchant analysis of contemporary rhetorical theories, to claim cognitive 
constructivism at a social level implies that "structures of the mind correspond in 
perfect harmony with the structures of the material world, the minds of the 
audience, and the units of language" (480). Further, Heracleous does not clarify 
how interactionist and cognitivist positions support his constructivist claims 
about rhetoric or, for that matter, how those three positions relate to one another. 
If rhetorical theory is to provide an interpretive stance toward organizational 
discourse, then those relationships should be clear enough to provide line of sight 
between theory and practice. 
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When Heracleous draws on Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman to claim 
that "through discursive symbolic interaction, . . . meanings become 
institutionalized or 'objectified'" (185-6), he is arguing that rhetoric produces 
objects of knowledge and that those objects correspond to our mental models and 
stabilize persistent social forms such as organizations. However, it is not 
necessary for rhetoric to perform a cognitive function for it to be effective. 
Rhetoric deals with the potential and the probable; when we employ rhetoric to 
construct a useful order from any possible orders, one result is that we form a 
context out of which we can design solutions, fashion tools, and arrive at answers. 
As these things continue to be useful, the context persists. And in turn, the 
persistence of context supports the expectations we form from our experiences. 
The analogy of a rummy card game may help to make this point. In 
rummy, the persistence of context is comprised of the rules for that particular 
rummy game, the players, the cards, and so on. For two or more people to play 
rummy, all must understand that context in the same way. At the beginning, 
players agree to the parameters of the game; for example, how many decks of 
cards will be used, card values, and how discarded cards will be used.  
Armed with that understanding, our rummy players have an idea of how to 
play the cards they hold. Each player's actions are influenced by the actions of the 
other players and by the situation at hand, which is in flux (the cards played and 
discarded are not fixed; how many cards other players have in their hands varies; 
the decision to match, to hold, or to play off cards already played depends on the 
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player's evolving strategy). However, because each player's hand of cards is dealt 
from a randomized deck, it can be difficult to know the best play to make because 
one does not know which cards the other players hold. Players must take risks 
and depend on making their best guesses about what information they do not 
know and what the information of the current situation tells them about the 
overall state of the game. The context of the game defines what risks are more 
and less acceptable. If a player throws away two-thirds of a set (a set in this case 
being three cards of the same kind or a series of three cards of the same suit), the 
degree of risk depends on the information available and how the player interprets 
that information. 
In general, our rummy players move toward the same end: to order the 
random cards into sets that are counted as points. The context of gameplay 
persists even after a winner is declared and the cards are packed away. When it 
comes time to play again, the players rely on past experience to set the game's 
parameters and to play. It is this persistence of experience, buoyed by joint action 
(playing the game) and built from discursive (symbolic) interactions (reading the 
cards), that lies at the heart of social forms such as organizations and motivates 
the rhetoric that sustains them. 
Analogically speaking, the context of our card game is like that of an 
organization. Organizational members know the parameters under which they 
operate, which are determined by assigned roles, training, organizational goals, 
management, and other factors that members become familiar with over time—
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some of that knowledge is even carried from organization to organization. 
Organizational members deal with evolving circumstances and fluid situations, 
and in response make decisions based on incomplete information as how to get 
on with things together. Rhetoric is often employed in this work, as 
organizational members make claims, negotiate positions, and make common 
sense in willing cooperation, sustaining the organization's social context as a 
continual ordering of one set of circumstances to another.  
Scholars of many disciplines, including rhetoric, are of course familiar 
with how lessons of experience and the situations of symbolic interactions tend to 
reify social forms. Whether it is Pierre Bourdieu’s mapping the fields of cultural 
production or Michel Foucault’s genealogical studies of discursive formations, 
there is a strong and persistent school of thought regarding the capacity of 
human activity to constitute social forms. As part of the catalogue of human 
action, rhetoric's persuasive capacity plays an important role in sustaining social 
forms such as organizations. This reason alone is enough to encourage the study 
of organizational rhetoric, although scholars have described many other reasons 
as well.  
Mary Hoffman and Debra Ford, for example, point to the obvious: 
Organizations are powerful social forces and, quite simply, organizations produce 
a lot of rhetoric. If we examine the messages that organizations use to influence 
audiences, they argue, then we can more easily mark their responsible actions 
and strategies and challenge irresponsible ones (15-17). 
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Organizations provide sites of study for analyzing the nature of social 
groups and the systems that constitute and maintain them. Conrad encourages us 
to apply rhetorical theory to organizations as a means of gaining more insight 
into social systems in general. However, Conrad notes, the results of rhetoric 
cannot be predetermined but are ambiguous and can produce unforeseen 
consequences. Those results can become problematic, he writes, because 
complex, established social systems tend to restrict rhetoric to a supporting role 
(14-33). 
In terms of the contingent nature of the results achieved through rhetoric, 
I agree with Conrad. However, I take exception with his Platonic suggestion that 
rhetoric is reduced to a supporting role within social systems. In my view, we 
cannot separate rhetoric from the situations in which it is used or from the social 
outcomes that it produces. Rhetoric does not support social form—it is the social 
form. It is vital that we not trivialize rhetoric as a tool for asserting one 
interlocutor’s position over another, even as we recognize how organizing 
institutions and disciplines use rhetoric to define relationships of power. It is 
equally vital that we recognize that beneath the veneer (as omnipresent as it 
seems) of the social systems that Conrad correctly emphasizes, the organizations 
(social systems) with which we affiliate ourselves interact among themselves, 
with us, and with their world in profoundly adaptive and generative ways and 
with powerful consequences. 
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Whatever our reasons for studying organizational rhetoric, we can hope 
from our efforts to gain insight into the nature of a particular kind of social 
system. If we can more clearly understand the rhetoric of organizations, then we 
can more fruitfully respond to and participate in situations in which 
organizations are prime actors. And we can more fully appreciate the role 
organizations play when they take their places among the dominant rhetors of 
our times. 
Methods 
In this project, I rely on rhetorical theory to frame my examination of 
situation, ethos, and identification as evident in a selection of organizational 
texts. These texts include publically available work and a sample of archival 
material gathered from a single organization: Center for Creative Leadership. 
[Author Note: I was employed by the Center for Creative Leadership in 1999 and 
at the time of this writing serve as a book editor in its publishing program.] My 
focus on the interplay of situation, ethos, and identification draws a key 
assumption from E. Hartelius and Larry Browning: "Identity is a rhetorical 
construct: It is a continual negotiation and performance that take place in a social 
context. . . . Rhetoric resolves and retains the tension" between individual 
identity and organizational membership (27). 
Hartelius and Browning avoid functionalist assumptions that often define 
rhetoric as a tool of manipulation and control. Instead, they write from the 
perspective of exploring rhetoric as a promising tool for analyzing organizational 
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work. Rhetoric is first a means of "persuasion that is in some way available to 
every symbolic being—every human being. As such, it is a practical art and the 
faculty of theorizing" (19). In management research, they write, scholars 
generally work within five themes in using theories of rhetoric as interpretive 
tools: rhetoric as dialectic (theory and pragmatic action); as the substance that 
maintains and/or challenges organizational order—especially in employing 
enthymemes to create organizational identities; as constituting individual and  
organizational identity; as a strategy for persuading in that managers employ the 
same techniques and strategies as classical rhetors; and as a framework for 
organizational discourses in that rhetorical theory is ground for the debate 
between common sense and rationality. Because the environments in which 
organizations operate and because organizations themselves are in constant flux, 
they argue, the flexibility and artfulness of rhetoric makes it suited to studying 
how organizations and their members respond to their environments and to one 
another (19-33). 
Of these five themes, those dealing with the constitution and maintenance 
of identity are most salient to my project. In regard to identity, my starting point 
is Aristotle’s triad of rhetorical essentials—ethos, logos, and pathos—of which he 
argues that ethos (a kind of constituted identity) is the most effective tool for 
persuasion (1.2.1356a). Burke’s concept of identification extends ethos beyond 
the set of shared values at the core of Aristotle’s idea to the mechanics of 
persuasive power inherent in shared interests and motives. Neither of these 
 
23 
concepts can be separated from the situations in which they are expressed, 
recognized, interpreted, and acted on. 
In terms of analysis, I rely on the work of Hoffman and Ford and their 
model for analyzing organizational rhetoric in terms of creating and maintaining 
identities, responding to issues, dealing with risk and crisis, and creating a path 
for identification among organizational audiences. Organizations exist, they 
write, only if members agree on what its goals are and believe those goals are 
worth achieving by joining and participating in the organization's activities (6). 
As a point of critical emphasis, I do not believe that goals are distinct objects but 
that they are contingent processes of discursive action. Organizational members 
share their organization’s goals insofar as they are persuaded to share them. 
In a critical survey of applied rhetorical theory, Cheney and McMillan 
describe the strong desire among organizational members to identify with the 
organization of which they are part. Rhetorical theory broadens the array of 
critical tools at our disposal for studying that phenomenon. We can use those 
tools to examine the persuasive actions of organizations and their members and 
other affiliates (94). The study of rhetoric and its uses is critical to understanding 
organizations, they argue, just as it is critical to understanding other kinds of 
social forms and the beliefs and actions of individual people. Rhetorical theory 
speaks to the "centrality of persuasion in human society" (96). 
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CHAPTER II 
ORGANIZING RHETORIC 
 
 
We might accept, following the judicial history and consequent 
implementation of regulatory and statutory corporate governance, that 
organizations in the United States represent themselves as persons. We might 
acknowledge that such a representation is essential to the operation and the 
sustainability of organizations even as we recognize that the corporate person has 
no foundational position of its own outside of the historical discourse that 
constitutes it. Second to that premise, we might also accept the ways in which the 
concept of the corporate person represents organizations to us as actors in the 
public sphere—actors who, at the time of this writing, are legally granted certain 
rights and capabilities, including the capacity of individual speech. Finally, we 
might conclude from those premises, and from our observations, that the 
discourse of organizations exercises such force and effect that organizations 
occupy a privileged position among contemporary speakers. But how do we 
account for organizations in the first place? Common sense and historical 
evidence say that economic, judicial, and governmental forces produce and 
sustain organizations. However, none of those social forces can be separated from 
the discourses that they produce and that recursively constitute them. 
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This chapter gives a rhetorical accounting for organizations. Rhetorical 
theory is not the only way to examine organizational discourse. Neither is 
rhetoric the only means of generating order in organizations, although it is so 
pervasive that it is hard to imagine any other organizational practice operating 
outside its domain. Applying rhetorical theory to organizational discourse 
generates questions such as, Who speaks when we hear organizations in the 
media? How do we read or hear texts emitted by an organization? How far does 
the inclusiveness of such pronouns as "we" or "our" extend? Who does 
organizational speech represent? Cheney, whose rhetorical analysis of a papal 
letter describes how U.S. bishops in the Catholic Church managed multiple 
identities in composing that text, deploys such questions in his observation of the 
problems inherent in organizational rhetoric: "We are perplexed by the practical 
and theoretical aspects of messages that cannot be easily identified with 
individual persons" (ROS 3). 
Whether we think of organizations as individual entities speaking with a 
single voice or as a collective that manages multiple voices, the use of rhetoric 
plays a constitutive role that is as necessary to organizations as governmental, 
judicial, and economic forces. As a collecting and collective practice, 
organizational rhetoric follows what is described as constitutive rhetoric, a 
rhetoric that claims a common, shared identity for its audience, that 
demonstrates that identity through narrative, and that calls the constituted 
audience to act in ways that affirm its identity (Charland "Politics" pars. 2-3). 
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If we follow the lead of Kenneth Burke, David Proctor, and others, we can 
formulate an idea of rhetoric as communication that engenders and maintains 
social forms. In Burke's view, social groups form around collective symbols; what 
is shared among group members is experience, requiring a common use of 
symbols and common meanings. Symbolic transactions are natural, human 
acts—as Burke emphasizes by defining humankind as symbol-using animals (LSA 
3, SS 32). Burke’s argument suggests a systems view of organizations, which 
tends toward a functionalist view of rhetoric, rather than toward a constitutive 
one. However, Burke emphasizes the idea of shared experience over a system of 
symbols. He treats our use of symbols as rhetorical and motivated by purpose, 
rather than a means to access linguistic structures or as a component of cognitive 
psychology.  
Social groups are sites of shared experience. As John Dewey puts it, 
human experience is social because it involves contact and communication. 
Experience embodies two principles: continuity and interaction. In terms of 
continuity, each experience changes us in some way and so modifies our 
experiences going forward. The principle of interaction holds that we live in a 
series of situations, and that the concepts of situation and interaction are 
inseparable (33-50). Social groups, as a continuity of situations, are spaces in 
which the collective’s use of symbols generates common meanings among people 
associated with the collective.  
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In organizations, as in other social situations, common meanings do not 
arise from a representational system of signs but rather from the common 
experiences and relationships shared by organizational members and affiliates. 
Those common experiences and relationships enable the people in an 
organization to form expectations about what others in the organization are 
experiencing and to respond to actions that others take. The mutuality of social 
context calls for rhetoric because any individual’s experience can’t reduce to 
another individual’s experience—we must take or be persuaded to take the other 
person’s point of view.  
In his theory of the dynamic spectacle, Proctor suggests that rhetors use 
symbols to "transform some event into enactment of their social order" (118). In 
other words, the rhetorical use of symbols constitutes social form, such as we find 
in an organization. To apply rhetorical theory to social forms is to move "beyond 
recognizing that symbols create, sustain, and destroy community to discuss how 
symbols accomplish these social functions" (117). Rhetoric's organizing force, 
Proctor argues, can be regarded as a dramatic reconstruction of experience. 
Audiences recognize in that dramatic presentation the salience of an event and 
from that recognition move to see the event from the rhetor’s position (119).  
The production and reconstruction that Proctor singles out as rhetoric's 
organizing force imply arrangement. We cannot personally experience every 
event; so, we rely on others' discourse to fill the gaps. Often, the discourses we 
rely on are produced by organizations. Taking Proctor's perspective, we can see 
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organizational rhetoric as the means by which an organization constructs the 
spectacle of itself as a dramatic event. Further, we can look at how an 
organization’s members and affiliates connect themselves to the organization by 
communicating their shared experiences. Other than the legal and economic 
forces that organize, the kind of constitutive rhetorical activity Proctor describes 
contributes to the sustained social form we know as organizations. 
Organizations Defined 
In 1939 Chester Barnard described an organization as "a system of 
consciously coordinated activities of two or more persons" (qtd. in Cheney ROS 
3). Mary Hoffman and Debra Ford draw out the implications of Barnard’s 
definition, focusing on three characteristics to establish the basis for their own 
method of rhetorical analysis. One, organizations and communication are 
inseparable (system); two, there is common purpose (coordinated activities), 
implying that organizations work only if its members agree on what its goals are 
and believe those goals are worth achieving; and three, there is willing 
cooperation (conscious activity)among a voluntary membership in that people 
join an organization if they believe it will benefit their individual goals and, to 
secure that benefit, they are willing to pass some individual control over to the 
organization. The interchange of interactions embedded in those three principles, 
write Hoffman and Ford, means that "members must communicate with one 
another and the leadership in order to negotiate understanding of the common 
purpose" (6).  
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 Cheney's research demonstrates how such interchanges produce 
consequences. He extends Barnard’s common definition to issues of identity in 
his analysis of the production of the Catholic Church’s 1983 pastoral letter on 
nuclear disarmament, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response. 
Cheney describes an organization’s crafting a rhetorical appeal that manages 
multiple identities and in the process produces a more-or-less shared identity 
from common purpose. "The challenges of achieving, maintaining, and 
transforming identity bring one simultaneously into the realms of persuasion and 
organization" (ROS 15), he writes. When Cheney connects organizational order 
and rhetorical appeals, he defines identity as a relationship between individuals 
and the social structures to which they belong or with which they otherwise 
engage. A group isn't a collective mind or a collective agent, he writes, but a 
display (or, in Proctor’s terms, a spectacle) of shared identity arising from shared 
interests—even if in some particular cases interest is faked (13-18).  
One of Cheney’s goals here is to escape identity essentialism so that he can 
give a rhetorical basis to collective identity. From reading his study, we can 
conclude that an organization is rhetorical, and rhetoric is organizational, 
because the relationship between people and the organization with which they 
affiliate themselves relies on negotiation and position taking, both of which figure 
in persuasion. However, we still do not have a complete picture of an 
organization’s use of rhetoric as a means of producing the organization itself, nor 
do we have precise insights into the symbolic mechanics underlying those 
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discursive transactions. Cheney may persuade us that we can identify an 
organization as rhetorical, but we might still ask how it came to be so.  
 That is precisely the dilemma inherent in studying social forms such as 
organizations and defining them as systems. Analysis of individual interactions 
or of group dynamics too often separates individual from group without 
acknowledging, let alone explaining, the practical relationship between them. 
Alternatively, as Anthony Giddens has argued with his theory of structuration, 
social study should focus on the processes by which the practices of individual 
agents bind to general principles aligned with the structures inherent in the 
general application of routine to experiences (Constitution 14). Those general 
guidelines, which Giddens calls "rules," are no more or less than products of 
ongoing practice, or everyday routine (22-3; 281-84). Giddens’ theory explains 
how sociology might refocus its interest in social groups, such as organizations, 
toward the practices, discursive and otherwise, used to generate and maintain 
systems as a consequence of their use. A system, in Giddens’ formulation, is not a 
set of interrelated objects but is the "reproduced relations between actors or 
collectives, organized as regular social practices" (25). Similarly, we might apply 
rhetorical theory to examine the discursive activities that constitute and sustain 
organizations as relational activities: acts that establish roles and class, acts that 
exercise power, acts that produce consensus from division, and so on. 
What Giddens is arguing here is that viewing social practices as either 
isolated interactions or as the outcome of hierarchical, discursive, or judicial 
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power does not account for the way relations among and between social forms 
are constituted, reproduced, and organized. His position makes us 
understandably skeptical of reifying "system" as Barnard understands it: a whole 
defined by the interdependence of its parts and isolated from its environment. 
Given that skepticism, we find ourselves facing the dilemma Cheney highlights in 
his work: the difficulty of assigning a single voice to an organization. When we 
speak of organizational rhetoric, who is the agent of that discourse? 
To answer that question, we rely on the work of the Montreal School, a 
tradition of communications scholarship that takes the position sympathetic to 
Cheney's: communication is not an activity in organizations; organizations 
themselves are communication (Taylor). Of particular relevance in the Montreal 
School's work are the theories of Daniel Robichaud and François Cooren, both of 
whom draw from actor-network theory (ANT) to advance relational views of 
agency that argue for it as an organizational capacity. As Cassandra Crawford 
explains, ANT is most often attributed to the work of Bruno Latour, Michael 
Callon, and John Law. At its simplest, ANT explains agency as the effects of 
relationships in the social and natural worlds. Its nonessentialist consideration of 
agency provides an alternative to the agent-structure dichotomy prevalent in 
social theory. Relevant to my project, ANT argues that nonhuman actors (texts, 
animals, machines, and so on) produce consequences and so exercise agency in 
the same way that human actors do (1-3). 
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Robichaud defines agency as a "relational configuration . . . , a 
situationally embedded connection of connections between heterogeneous 
entities" (102). Rather than attributing agency to a single actor, Robichaud 
follows Latour in emphasizing that agency occurs through a network of human 
and nonhuman actors. Robichaud is careful to insist that a relational view of 
agency does not dismiss questions about intent and power, both of which we 
might assume lie under the domain of single or collective actors. ANT frames 
intent and power as continually shifting in a network of action and actors. Given 
this formulation, Robichaud argues what we consider agency is best described as 
the result of action, not as the source of action (105-6). In other words, we 
recognize agency in its consequences, not in its generation. 
How might we further extend the relational view of agency to understand 
organizations as rhetors, as collectives with discursive agency? For one, we might 
take the ANT view that agency occurs in a network of actors, including 
nonhuman actors, to explain some what is meant when we say that our company 
did something or that the government said something. However, we must still 
account for the idea that acts attributable to a singular actor can also be assigned 
to an organization. Cooren bridges that gap with what he calls "logic of agency" 
(88). Because actions are shared between human and nonhuman actors (for 
example, the author of a memo, the memo, and the memo’s reader) human 
actions can extend outside of their local situation. Cooren uses the phrase 
"telecast action" to describe the transfer of action in one locale to another (90). 
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"If we can indeed dislocate the local, is it because things that happened in the 
past can be transported (by memory, by machines, by documents, by wires, etc.) 
from one locality to another" (91). 
Such chains of action represent the organization as a single agent, Cooren 
writes (91). To be clear about what he means here, we must pay careful attention 
to how Cooren intends the term represent. The term does not indicate, for him, 
the sense of "standing in for." Rather, it indicates a chain of events that transfer 
the corporeality of an entity from one location to another. Imagine, for example, 
that your co-worker, a person at the same level of the organization as yourself, 
tells you that her supervisor told her that the organization is considering layoffs 
to compensate for revenue losses. Your co-worker is not a representative of the 
organization in the sense that what she says can be officially attributed to 
organizational policy. She is representing the action of her supervisor (his 
mentioning layoffs) to you. The supervisor’s action has traveled from a past 
interaction of which you were not aware to the present interaction, where it 
produces consequences—you feel panicked, or disappointed, or angry. Likewise, 
it is probable that your co-worker’s supervisor was representing to her an 
interaction he was not part of. All of these acts of communications are linked 
(along with the building that houses the organization, the protocols and policies 
of the organization, the working habits of organizational members, and so on), 
forming a logic of action that we can describe as "the organization." 
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ANT's nonessentialist view of agency responds to the questions embedded 
in Barnard’s definition of organization, which is based on the modernist view of 
agency as a capacity of individual human actors. In Barnard’s formulation, 
individual actors join in a system of willing cooperation that coordinates activity 
to achieve organizational goals. We might ask: Does coordination arise from the 
interaction of individuals or does the organization set coordinating acts in 
motion? How, exactly, do actions by one person or among more than one person 
become coordinated? How aware are those actors of such coordinating actions? 
What are the consequences of such orchestrated actions? What responses do the 
coordinated actions of some provoke in others, and what is the role of those 
responses in furthering a system of consciously coordinated activities?  
We might ask similar questions of rhetoric. What rhetorical practices 
reproduce social context such as an organization? Are organizations legal and 
economic entities only, or are they also—perhaps more so—spaces for 
interpretive and communicative action? Is it more helpful for us to understand 
organizations as systems, in Barnard’s sense of the term, or is it more practical to 
see organizations as persistent fields of relations that constitute and are 
constituted by a network of rhetorical actions? Such questions imply that one 
might observe and participate in organizations, but that without rhetorical 
actions, organizations are anything but organized. 
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Organizing Communication 
Given the perspective ANT gives us, we might read Barnard’s list of 
organization characteristics as emphasizing that activities are coordinated by 
communicative acts, which are not isolated from the organization in which they 
occur. Cheney’s investigation into an organization’s construction and 
management of rhetorical identity suggests such—organizations cannot be 
treated as objects separate from individual social interactions (ROS 2-3).  
Acknowledging the structurating effect of discourse has become 
commonplace in organizational theory, despite the relative mystery regarding the 
practicality and intent of utterances that we cannot associate with specific 
speakers as originators of organizational discourse. Outside of the academy, 
however, the consequences of organizational discourse include granting 
organizations voice. As we go about our daily activities, we accept the idea that 
organizations speak, that they have points of view, and that the talk of 
organizations resembles and works like ours. 
However, questions do arise regarding discourse's constitutive effect 
relative to organizations. Norman Fairclough takes a realist position, for example, 
writing, "Organizing is subject to conditions of possibility which include 
organizational structures" he writes (918). Practices and norms and 
communicative possibilities already exist as constituents of the organizational 
form, he writes, prior to any discursive activities. "Texts are points of articulation 
and tension between two causal forces: social practices and, through their 
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mediation, social structures; and the agency of the social actors who speak, write, 
compose, read, listen to, interpret them" (925). Even if we were to take 
Fairclough’s position, which separates agency from the tools of agency (counter 
to ANT), the tension he addresses—between what is possible for an organization 
to achieve by way of discursive activity and what is constrained by preexisting 
social practices, rules, and resources—resolves only through strategic actions and 
intent. Strategic and intentional organizational activities take many forms, 
including the use of rhetoric and its capacity to establish a collective identity 
among individuals by removing the divide between an organization and its 
members and affiliates. 
Charland’s framework for understanding the rhetorical mechanics of this 
process, in which collective identity and individual identities are merged, brings 
ideology, Althusser’s concept of interpellation, and Burke’s theory of 
identification to bear on the question. Charland takes Quebec’s independence 
movement as his example, and in particular how the movement's rhetoric creates 
the idea of a unique Quebec identity independent of the identities of Canada's 
other provinces and independent of the collective identity "Canadian." Rhetorical 
theory makes a fundamental mistake when it assumes that there is an audience to 
be persuaded, Charland writes. Much of what rhetorical theorists regard as the 
consequence of discourse is actually outside of the realm of persuasion, and 
"rhetorical theory usually refuses to consider the possibility that the very 
existence of [an audience] is already a rhetorical effect" ("Constitutive" 133). 
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From that premise, Charland argues that persuasion is ineffective unless 
an existing audience with an identity and ideology is already in place. Drawing 
from Althusser’s concept of interpellation, Charland describes how an audience 
comes into a rhetorical situation already defined as possessing a certain social 
identity comprised of shared experiences and beliefs about those experiences. 
Interlocutors are constituted in a system of signs, within an ideology. 
Interpellation occurs the moment a subject encounters a rhetorical situation and 
recognizes that it can be addressed (138). 
Although Charland regards an extra-rhetorical audience as conceptually 
(fatally) compromised, he also thinks that Burke’s theory of identification offers a 
way out of that impasse. [I discuss identification more closely in chapter 5.] Two 
aspects of Burke's theory play critical roles in Charland's case. One, identification 
can occur instantly and without provocation, which separates it from our 
traditional understanding of persuasion (133); and two, our identity is integrated 
into our nature as symbol-using animals (137). Charland describes the 
consequences of Burke’s theory of identification as "collapsing the distinction 
between the realm of the symbolic and that of human conceptual consciousness." 
Furthermore, Burke presents identification as an ongoing socialization process 
achieve by rhetorical action. Given Burke's theory, Charland writes, we have to 
account for "the textual nature of social being" (137). 
Charland’s framework helps us to understand more clearly how an 
organization, as a communication system, establishes an identity from its 
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discourse. We can see how an organization’s rhetoric constitutes its members, 
who in turn constitute the organization by responding as a collective social 
identity. This is precisely the picture that structuration theory presents when one 
projects it through the lens of rhetoric. [I revisit structuration theory in more 
detail in chapter 6.] Speech and texts are objects of study; they are outcomes of 
discursive practices, and they produce durable organization by means of 
persistent, ongoing reciprocal acts marked by rules and routines. Just as 
organizational members speak as they align with their organizations, so 
organizations speak as they organize. 
Common Purpose 
Organizations are designed and constituted to serve a purpose. They are 
used to direct activity toward a desired effect, and they are sites of common 
sense. Organizations constitute a field of negotiated meaning and are not 
themselves intrinsically meaningful objects. In short, organizational rhetoric 
sustains the recursive relationships among itself and its members and with others 
outside of the organization but connected to it as customers, vendors, clients, and 
so on. Richard Crable argues that organizational rhetoric occupies a place along 
rhetoric’s development trajectory, following classical, prescriptive, and social 
rhetoric as a fourth historical movement. In this fourth movement, rhetoric "is 
produced by organizations, not individuals; it is organizational rhetoric" (117).  
An organization’s rhetorical activity is not simply the discourse that 
individual people engage in to reach consensus, overlaid on collectives. Rather, 
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says Crable, organizational rhetoric represents the organization’s interests and 
masks individual speakers in order to exercise, with minimum distraction, 
discursive power on its audiences (117). However, we might ask whether or not 
his claim only restates the old argument about the use of rhetoric to deceive 
rather than to communicate. If we grant that organizational rhetoric’s purpose is 
to mask individual speakers, then how does it organize? What role does 
organizational rhetoric play in making it possible for organizational members to 
interact with the aim of reaching common ground? 
We might be challenged to identify a speaker from an organization’s 
rhetoric, but that does not mean necessarily that we are being deceived. Nor does 
it mean that applying rhetorical theory to organizational discourse falls short in 
analyzing the invention, presentation, and effect of collective speech and text. To 
gain an understanding of how organizational rhetoric constitutes the 
organization itself, our investigations must go beyond analyzing the organization 
as rhetor to consider the mechanics of common sense and the circumstances and 
the consequences of organizational discourse. For us, Crable's question shifts 
from why rhetors engage in deception to why audiences respond to being 
deceived. For example, why did so many U.S. citizens leave their money with 
banks after 2008, when it became clear that many banks and other financial 
institutions had defrauded (or at best, misled) them about the shaky financial 
environment that those same organizations had created with speculative 
investment schemes (Conrad 4-5)? By attributing an individual agency to 
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organizations, Cheney does not fully investigate what it means for a collective to 
speak with common purpose. Nor does Barnard’s concept of an isolated and 
independent system of coordinated activities explain the rhetorical basis of those 
activities other than to acknowledge the essential role of communication as an 
information conduit.  
The idea of a corporate voice seems the logical starting point for analyzing 
rhetoric’s role in constituting common purpose. We should first distinguish the 
corporate voice from the individual voice and from the clamor of many different 
voices speaking at once. Burke’s exposition of rhetorical motives provides us with 
some valuable assistance here, especially his typological approach to our use of 
positive, dialectical, and ultimate terms. Positive terms name tangible objects and 
concern motion and perception. Absent from this formulation, Burke writes, is 
the answer to whether positive terms apply to the relationships that objects have 
with one another and the world in addition to the objects themselves. For 
relational concerns we have dialectical terms that, according to Burke, refer to 
concepts and concern actions and ideas. However, those vocabularies are 
insufficient for describing the rhetorical motives alive in organizations. For that 
work we need ultimate terms, which Burke says arrange dialectic’s competing 
concepts in a developmental order that coalesces around a guiding principle, a 
unifying concept (RM 184-7). Setting aside the limitations of positive terms, the 
dialectic and ultimate vocabularies generate different organizing consequences—
those produced by individual voices and those produced by a collective voice. 
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Dialectical relationships, focused on action and ideas, compel competition 
between positions as a consequence of taking one position or another. This 
competition between views is reasonable, Burke writes, in that human beings 
naturally compete to achieve some advantage or another (RM 61). Dialectical 
exchanges, Burke writes, "leave competing voices in a jangling relation to one 
another" (187). In organizations, those clamoring voices compete for resources, 
work out differences, and generate public and hidden conversations that the 
organization cannot control and may even be unaware of. 
Consider as an example the ideal of political wrangling in the U.S. 
Congress. To advance their interests, politicians may compromise on their 
principles. One party may not get all that it wants, but it can get enough to satisfy 
the demands of the position it represents. Without a give and take there is no 
clear alternative for accomplishing legislative work. Likewise, without a 
competition of views among its members, an organization cannot invent, 
strategize, or step toward its goals, to name a few consequences. [At the time of 
this writing, the process Burke describes is noticeably absent from the legislative 
branch of the U.S. government. We are challenged to think of it as organized.] 
Willing Cooperation 
In the arrangement of organizational voices, we recognize coordination as 
an outcome of organizational discourse. Organizational rhetoric persuades 
audiences to take one position over another, to adopt one belief over another, to 
determine the best course of action in given circumstances, and to take that 
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action together. Willing cooperation operates as discursive transactions, 
contributing to the organization’s emergence and persistence. Burke's insight 
into the mechanics of cooperation as discourse—as the use of symbols—can 
provide support for this position.  
Burke argues that symbols are not reflections or representations; rather, 
symbols are tools for interacting with our environment, "a set of labels, signs for 
helping us find our way about" (LSA 5). Our capability to share experience 
depends on our nature as the "symbol-using animal" (LSA 3). However, Burke 
writes, our use of symbols produces positive and negative consequences, linking 
us to our world while simultaneously screening us from it (5). Burke relies on a 
distinction between the verbal and nonverbal (symbols and reality) to make his 
point, veering toward a social constructionist take on symbolic interactions. 
"What is our 'reality' for today . . . but all this clutter of symbols?" he asks (5). 
Nonetheless, I believe we can pull Burke back from a purely constructionist 
attitude by focusing on the consequences of symbolic interactions (such as 
discourse) in terms of how it constitutes a sense of shared experience that 
supports willing cooperation.  
Burke uses the terms substitution and transcendence to characterize 
symbol use as something other than the summoning of a grammar to explain our 
experiences to ourselves and to others. He builds his framework from Freud's 
work on the symbolic nature of dreams, particularly the processes of 
"condensation" and "displacement." As manifest in dreams, condensation refers 
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to how a single idea represents a series of cognitive associations. Displacement 
refers to the defensive redirection of emotions from one object to another object 
related to the first by a chain of associations (Colman). 
In regard to symbols, Burke relates condensation to substitution, which he 
describes as a "natural resource to symbolism" (LSA 7). To use symbols is to use 
the property of substitution. We can describe one thing by describing something 
else (as with metaphor), we can paraphrase, we can translate (Burke does not 
refer to Lacan, who worked along these same lines at about the same time.) 
Burke's transcendence is a correlative to displacement, and it is grounded in the 
idea of substitution: "Substitution sets the condition for 'transcendence,' since 
there is a technical sense in which the name for a thing can be said to 'transcend' 
the thing named" (LSA 8). In other words, the name we give an object is beyond 
the object itself.   
In Burke's definitions of substitution and transcendence, we can find 
support for a view of symbols as the means of sharing experience rather than 
simply the means for representing experience. Here it is useful to review Burke's 
position about the formative quality of symbols, which is grounded in the idea of 
patterns of experience. Burke describes experience as "a relationship between an 
organism and its environment" (SS 108). That relationship is marked by 
adjustments—the adaptations an organism takes in response to its environment. 
Adjustments simply means, Burke writes, that the organism takes the conditions 
of its environment into account. Broadly speaking, there are universal 
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experiences (dislike, hope, mourning)—universal states into which any human 
being is capable of arriving, barring a malady that prevents it. Burke does not 
claim that we all experience the same thing when we participate in similar 
environments. Rather, he writes, a universal experience includes many modes of 
that experience, each mode corresponding to our relationship with the 
environment at hand (108). For example, fear is a universal experience, and the 
mode of fear associated with a roller coaster ride differs markedly from the fear of 
finding oneself in the woods without a light when the sun sets. Nevertheless, we 
have access to the universal experience, and we can use symbols to evoke that 
experience in others. 
We should remember here that Burke does not argue that a rhetor asserts 
an experience as a persuasive device. The rhetor does not need to convince the 
audience to accept a "proper" interpretation of an experience to persuade the 
audience to a particular point of view. Rather, the rhetor evokes an experience 
toward which the audience can identify and, in fact, the audience anticipates in 
and completes the rhetor's evocation of experience (RM 58). Rhetor and audience 
work together, drawing from what they know about patterns of experience to 
align their attitudes toward the current situation. Their patterns of experience 
may be quite different because the mode in which each has encountered a pattern 
(universal)of experience differs from one another. If that is the case, it may take 
longer for the rhetor and the audience to align; nevertheless, rhetor and audience 
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collude in using symbols as tools for making their way toward consensus and 
order.  
In Burke's idea of symbols as the tools we employ to make our way to 
shared experience, we have a rhetorical substitution for Barnard’s organizational 
requisite of willing cooperation. As consciously coordinated activities, the 
collusion of rhetor and audience is not an intentional grasp at truth, argues 
Burke, but rather represents the principle of hierarchy, which constitutes social 
order as natural when in fact it is comprised of rituals and belief structures that 
form the field within which we make sense of ourselves and which enable us to 
make sense of others (RM, 137-41). [I return to this theme in chapter 6 in a 
discussion of Burke's rhetoric of form.] Burke’s claim of collusion partially 
answers Conrad’s question as to why audiences respond to deceptive rhetoric as 
they do. Such rhetoric relies on the acceptance of common principles; for 
example, many people interpreted the 2008-2009 credit crisis as an opportunity 
to invest at rock bottom prices and not as a call to withdraw money to guard 
against fraudulent money managers who had turned public investments into 
private gains: "buy low, sell high."  
Social interactions in the form of symbolic actions and the tendency to 
organize are important components to the willing cooperation that organizations 
foster. However, we are cautious about Burke’s insights into the nature of 
symbols and the organizing consequences of our using them. On the one hand, 
one might read Burke’s theory as a representational perspective that emphasizes 
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symbols as objects to be manipulated. That position is not out of line with how 
many scholars approach organizational rhetoric (see, for example, Westwood and 
Linstead). Or, in another instance, Hoffman and Ford posit that organizations 
use symbols in order to influence thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. When 
audiences respond to an organization’s rhetoric, they acknowledge their 
suitability as the targets of rhetoric, even if different audiences respond 
differently to the same message (6-8). 
If rhetorical encounters are nothing more than transactions—using 
symbols to purchase influence, to spur emotion, to change behavior—we might 
ask how horse trading of this kind generates willing cooperation. Certainly, at 
that level, rhetorical encounters are as likely to generate resistance or compliance 
as creating the commitment inherent in willing cooperation. Where might we 
look for a link between what Burke describes as the transcendent nature of 
symbols and the pragmatic need for willing cooperation? In defense of Burke's 
ideas, as discussed previously, Burke argues that symbols operate in a 
transcendent field based on the principle of substitution. That principle makes it 
possible for us to use symbols to evoke in others and to recognize in ourselves 
universal experiences in particular circumstances—to access experience as an 
"associational cluster" (PLF 30). 
Our willing cooperation arises from our use of symbols as the means by 
which we can identify the experiences of others and share our own experiences. 
When we use symbols to constitute shared experience, Burke notes, we are doing 
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no more than fulfilling the pragmatic intent of our species. We might object that 
the idea of transcendence removes us from rhetoric’s concrete, pragmatic 
interactions; however, Burke reminds us that "much pragmatic behavior itself 
has symbolic elements" (RM 186). We use symbols to align our experiences with 
each other and to constitute identification with one another because 
"participation in a collective, social role cannot be obtained in any other way" 
(ATH 266). The symbolism embedded in our language use depends on the social, 
not on the representational: 
 
The symbolism of a word consists in the fact that no one quite uses the 
word in its dictionary sense. And the overtones of a usage are revealed "by 
the company it keeps" in the utterances of a given speaker or writer (PLF 
35). 
 
 
The rest of the answer to how transcendence and pragmatics jointly foster 
willing cooperation lies in the nature and in the motives of our symbol use. Here, 
a somewhat unlikely source suggests itself: Susanne Langer’s philosophical 
approach to the subject of human development. The human capacity to produce 
symbols, she writes, displaces the instinct we find in other species and which 
drives their actions. We acknowledge instinct as an animal’s way of knowing; 
without it, an animal cannot maintain its involvement with the continuing 
process of its species nor preserve itself as an individual. Likewise, Langer 
continues, the human capacity to produce symbols calls us to see symbolic value 
in the world around us. We produce meaning (use symbols) to know the world, 
not in response to it but in the act of perceiving it. We augment our world using 
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symbols, and although our habit of using symbols breaks what Langer calls the 
strongest bond a creature has with its kind (a shared set of instinctual traits), that 
habit also binds us to a "greater life of mankind." Our responses to the world are 
not instinctual but interpretive—our way of knowing our environment. As we 
make meaning in this way we signal our "lifelong commitment to the ways of 
[our] kind" (131). 
We gain some advantage from Burke’s argument, then, if we regard what 
he labels the constituents of symbols—substitution and  transcendence—as 
pragmatic extensions of what any one person knows about the world. Insofar as 
people willingly cooperate to extend their relationship to one another and to the 
organizations to which they belong, they extend the discursive fields that 
comprise organizations. The willing cooperation of organizational members 
emerges in language. In this case we do not take language in the sense of specific 
signs (isolated symbols), but as a process that produces different outcomes under 
different situations (Langer 125). Here we pause to recognize Langer’s 
description as an echo of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric: a process of 
determining the best means of persuasion in a given circumstance. 
Now that we have a pragmatic perspective on Burke's treatment of 
symbolic action, we might ask whether Burke’s theory of the ultimate order is a 
teleological stance that excludes change in its assumption of a final outcome. Can 
Burke's terms of ultimate order, the ground that rhetoric works, fully account for 
how organizations adapt to changing circumstances in their bid for 
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sustainability? Or is ultimate order only the progression of a foregone enterprise 
constituted and sustained by rhetoric? (I note that Burke accommodates change 
in his concept of identification, which I discuss in chapter 5.) 
In support of making a rhetorical accounting of organizations, it is 
reasonable to take Burke’s logical and terminal typologies of positive, dialectical, 
and ultimate as suggestive of the order such as one finds in an organization. The 
hierarchy of the organization chart, the separation of worker and executive ranks, 
naming and separating professional from trade, the division of labor that 
accompanies mass production of goods, services, and knowledge—these are 
simultaneously acts that divide and yet coordinate voices into a single speaker 
with an identity and a recognizable stance. An organization’s members and its 
other affiliates attribute its rhetoric to that collective voice, whether or not the 
organization’s discourse emerges from a diversity of voices or dampers voices 
into a single, low hum of corporate assent. As a consequence of ordering many 
voices into one, an organization’s members see themselves as included, and 
outside affiliates recognize the organization as an individual entity with the 
capability and the right to speak. The result is that organizations can refer to "we" 
and "our" without evoking questions about how inclusively or how broadly it 
applies those terms. The ultimate order of members, clients, customers, the 
public, government, and regulators coordinates the willing cooperation of those 
organizational affiliates to accept organizations as social actors, capable of speech 
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and possessing the capacity to use rhetoric to constitute and sustain themselves 
as organizations.  
Rhetorical Genres in the Organizational Context 
It is hardly radical to claim that organizations emphasize social 
regularities and that order arises from discursive (and other) interactions among 
organizational members. Likewise, it is not unexpected that, when participating 
in rhetoric, organizational members draw from an ordered common sense at the 
same time that their rhetoric constitutes that order. However, despite the 
influence of constructionist and critical theories that establish that organization 
arises from the use of language, "most institutional theory has been dominated by 
realist investigations in which the examination of organizational practices has 
been disconnected from the discursive practices that constitute them" (Phillips, 
Lawrence, and Hardy 635). The clash of critical positions occurs along this 
implacable front: community as communication versus community as required 
for communication.  
However, only the first of those two positions supports the idea that before 
organization there is disorganization. When Fairclough writes that  
 
research on organizational discourse [tends] . . .  to distance itself from 
more conventional work in organization studies by rejecting conceptions 
of organization as organizational structures in favor of conceptions of 
organization as an interactive accomplishment in organizational discourse 
(916),  
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he criticizes analytical approaches that question whether organizations exist 
independently of human activities. We might ask Fairclough whether there is a 
motivation for people in an organization to communicate other than their motive 
to organize. We ought not to assume, as Fairclough does, that the organization 
with which we align ourselves remains isolated from the actions we take to 
accomplish that alignment. If that were the case, there would be no need to 
communicate because the organization’s interests and the interests of its 
members would never intersect and the contrast between the two would be 
insignificant, to put in Burkean terms (SS 184). Disorganization (the division 
between individual and organization in this case) is our motivation to 
communicate. 
Overcoming division is not the same thing as achieving common goals, 
however, nor is it altogether necessary. Organizations can forge common sense 
without an overt appeal to shared identity. For example, as Hoffman and Ford 
describe, rhetoric also operates as a "strategic use of symbols by organizations to 
influence the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of audiences important to the 
operation of the organization" (7). In terms of creating order, organizational 
rhetoric enables interaction between actors (institutional and individual), 
cultural predispositions, and social structures—what Conrad calls "a complex 
process through which people develop and refine their beliefs, values, and views 
of reality by communicating with others" and a means to "create distinctive 
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social, political, and economic structures that are legitimized through strategic 
discourse" (x, 2-6). 
In our use of symbols to align interests and to share experiences, we have 
at hand a rhetorical basis for Barnard’s definition of organization, unfolded as 
communication, common purpose, and willing cooperation. Beyond these, we 
can recognize other characteristics of organizational rhetoric that invite scholarly 
investigations. Hoffman and Ford mark situation and audience for special 
attention: (11-12). Neither of those characteristics comes as a surprise to rhetoric 
scholars. However, the nature of organizations complicates what we can 
otherwise read as two components of the traditional rhetorical triangle. For 
example, situation in the organizational context refers to the open-system nature 
of organizations, which take in information from outside and reproduce that 
information as products and services. [See my discussion of situation in chapter 
3.] In terms of audience, organizations address diverse audiences with different 
and sometimes interrelated interests, who sometimes compete with one 
another—quite different from how classical rhetoric operated among hegemonic 
audiences (10-14). 
Organizational rhetoric shares with classical rhetoric the concept of form, 
the idea that different rhetorical forms, or genres, can be applied to different 
audiences and to different effects. By genre, I refer to Carolyn Miller’s 
definitional argument for genre as social action. When we refer to genre, Miller 
argues, the idea of specific forms does not apply to substance but to purpose and 
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audience: "the action [genre] is used to accomplish" (151). Because we can 
interpret human actions only against the background of their historical and 
physical circumstances, genre also accounts for motive and situation in 
representing action. In citing motive, Miller works from Burke: motives are not 
simply a source of behavior, as much of mainstream psychology would have it. 
Rather, motive is a way to make meaning and so is inseparable from action and 
response. Burke describes this relationship as part of a single situation (SS 11). 
We use texts (symbolic action) to respond strategically; to "size up the situations, 
name their structure and outstanding ingredients, and name them in a way that 
contains an attitude toward them" (PLF 1). As a strategic response—moreover, as 
a constitutive response—organizational rhetoric adopts forms according to the 
situation in which it is used and in light of the audience it addresses. We are, so it 
seems, a long way from Aristotle’s three rhetorical forms: political, forensic, and 
ceremonial—or perhaps not. The classical genres, like their contemporary 
counterparts, take their distinctive forms from the purpose, the situation 
(including whether the situation is past, present, or future), and the audience that 
each addresses. The sampling of organizational rhetoric's genres that follows 
describes how they operate, for whom, and in what circumstances.  
Identity genre: addresses how an organization is known. 
Audience: organizational members, affiliates, and the general 
public. 
 
54 
Rhetorical situation: an ongoing need to maintain credibility and 
manage how it is perceived. 
Critical and Theoretical Views  
Used to persuade audiences . . .  who an organization is, what 
it does, and what its values are (Hoffman and Ford 122). 
Presents the organization as a whole and "connects 
individual identities to that . . . collective identity" (Cheney 
ROS 14). 
Projects the "central, enduring character" so as to be 
perceived and interpreted by others" (Kuhn 199). 
Example: A nonprofit organization's response to reports on 
financial malfeasance highlights its history as one of service and 
trust. 
Issues genre: persuades audiences to perceive the environment in which 
the organization operates in such a way that its interests are 
accounted for and its actions are perceived favorably. 
Audience: regulators, government, shareholders, and the general 
public. 
Rhetorical situation: pending or existing regulations and legislation 
threaten or interfere with organizational operations or 
strategy. 
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Critical and Theoretical Views  
"Strategies used in issues rhetoric . . . often feature logical 
argument and evidence" (Hoffman and Ford 152).  
Issues rhetoric draws on existing cultural assumptions to 
make defensive or offensive statements about 
particular policies (Cheney et al. 90). 
"When . . . a tension exists between ‘the way things are’ and 
‘the way things should be,’ the resulting situation 
becomes a focus for deliberation and decision" (Kuhn 
195). 
Example: Wall Street's responses to the impact of implementing the 
Dodd-Frank Act on U.S. financial institutions. 
Risk genre: addresses the perception of risk based on the organization’s 
anticipated actions. 
Audience: regulators, government, shareholders, and the general 
public. 
Rhetorical Situation: the organization wants to begin or expand 
operations in ways that affect communities or are perceived 
to affect communities. 
Critical and Theoretical Views  
The "challenge is to convince audiences that either the risk 
does not exist or the risk is not as significant as it is 
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being perceived or presented" (Hoffman and Ford 
170). 
Risk rhetoric "has at its goal the creation of consent, either 
via belief in the truth of the information or a range of 
persuasive strategies" (Grabil and Simmons 426) 
A discourse employed to "engage in risk communication to 
inform and educate the public, to improve and correct 
their perceptions, and to persuade them to change 
their behavior" (Katz and Miller 116). 
Example: Transcanada’s 2012 proposal for constructing the 
Keystone XL Pipeline. 
Crisis genre: generates good will and support.  
Audience: the general public, shareholders. 
Rhetorical situation: to repair organization’s image (identity) in the 
wake of events that negatively impact its credibility and 
sustainability. 
Critical and Theoretical Views  
Crisis rhetoric "co-creates a meaning that benefits the 
organization as well as people who hold and seek 
stakes from it" (Millar and Heath 15). 
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In analyzing crisis rhetoric, "suggestions for effectiveness can 
be derived from our understanding of persuasion 
generally" (Bennoit 183). 
"Identifying a debate's core issue – can provide a hierarchical 
structure for crisis response strategies" (Marsh 41). 
Example: BP and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
Depending on the circumstances surrounding an instance of 
organizational rhetoric, a genre might manage identities, as Cheney suggests, or 
energize a dialectical exchange in the constitution of hierarchical order, as Burke 
claims. An organization’s rhetoric may mark it as a participant in a global 
economic system or exercise political, judicial, or governmental power. To 
whomever its genres are addressed and in whatever situation those situations 
manifest, organizational rhetoric is inseparable from motives that manifest in 
symbolic actions. Consequences of organizational rhetoric include the 
organization itself: a discursive field comprised of organizational members, the 
public, the government, and other social entities, all of which take positions and 
participate in rhetorical activities as they negotiate toward common sense. 
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CHAPTER III 
ORGANIZING SITUATIONS 
 
 
Aristotle defines rhetoric as the craft of finding the best means of 
persuasion in a given situation. What are the constituents of such a situation? 
Aristotle's answer to that question distinguishes between three kinds of rhetoric, 
each determined by its audience, its purpose, the genres each is associated with, 
the topics it addresses, and its temporal circumstances. Deliberative rhetoric is 
suited to circumstances that call for a choice between attitudes or a decision to 
take action and addresses topics associated with the future, such as lawmaking; 
judicial rhetoric fits those situations when facts must be proven or defended 
against, as in a court, when evidence and the accounts of witnesses focus on the 
past; and ceremonial rhetoric, such as a eulogy, addresses people in the present 
moment with invocations of praise or blame (1.3.1358a-b). Aristotle's idea of a 
rhetorical situation, with its hard distinctions, operates deterministically upon a 
rhetor's and an audience's expectations and the responses. A rhetor bent on 
achieving his or her purpose should align his or speech with the situation, or the 
audience will recognize the disharmony and resist the speaker's intent. 
 This chapter provides an accounting of rhetorical situations in the context 
of organizations. In chapter 2, I discussed the role that organizational rhetoric 
plays in establishing the kinds of interactions and relationships an organization 
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has with its members, with interested outsiders, and with the general public. My 
purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate how organizations rhetorically 
construct situations as the scenes of those interactions and relationships, and the 
purpose of such constructions.  
What Rhetorical Situations Are 
Contemporary rhetorical theorists talk about rhetorical situations in a 
markedly different way from classical rhetoricians. Lloyd Bitzer's keystone 
position, one of the most influential contemporary statements on the idea, 
defines the rhetorical situation as  
 
a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or 
potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if 
discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision 
or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence 
("Situation" 6). 
 
 
Bitzer holds that the situation in which rhetors and audiences find 
themselves is separate from the actors themselves. Rhetorical discourse is called 
into existence by a particular situation: "the existence of a rhetorical address is a 
reliable sign of the existence of a situation, [but] it does not follow that a situation 
exists only when the discourse exists" (2). The rhetor addresses the situation 
when he or she becomes aware of it and is called to respond, and thereby "the 
rhetor alters reality" to produce convergence from divergence so that the 
situation is resolved (4). However, it is necessary to ask whether an actor can 
alter reality unless occupying a position outside of that reality. An altered reality 
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only appears altered if there is a way for us to measure the difference of one state 
of reality from another. In later writings, Bitzer deals with some of those 
objections, but he remains consistent in his assumption: rhetorical situations 
arise from objects, physical and mental, that are independent of the situation's 
observers ("Functional" 28). 
That question aside, if we follow Bitzer's work we can see how a rhetorical 
situation is comprised of more than fitting a speech to a specific occasion. Given 
the at-times normative function of organizational rhetoric, we might ask whether 
or not rhetorical situations, as Bitzer defines them, arise on their own or are 
products of an organization's discourse. Clearly, the answer depends on whether 
we believe that situations exist independently of discourse or instead that 
situations arise from discursive activity and do not appear except as we speak of 
them—which implies that we can construct situations to serve specific purposes. 
Bitzer's model has provoked no small number of critical conversations. 
Mary Garret and Xiaosui Xiao review some of those conversations in their 
argument to include the influence of audience and discourse traditions in the 
definition of rhetorical situation. According to Garret and Xiao, positions critical 
to Bitzer include 
• that the speaker creates the exigency at the heart of Bitzer's model; 
• a modification of Bitzer's model to accommodate its relational structure 
and operation; 
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• the resolution of Bitzer's idealist position with opposing materialist 
positions through the use of Aristotle's topics; 
• a move to shift the idea of the rhetorical situation away from the speaker's 
response to an exigency and toward the position that the rhetorical 
situation is a mutually defining activity that establishes the identity of the 
speaker and the audience; 
• and the addition of factors other than Bitzer's list of speaker, audience, 
exigence, and constraints (31).  
The Object of the Situation 
Even a cursory reading of Bitzer's critics uncovers what I believe is most 
salient about rhetorical situations in the context of organizations: the question of 
emergence or construction. If situations exist independently of discourse, then 
organizational rhetoric is a means reaching consensus. At critical junctures—a 
downturn in the economy, the failure of a key product, the public exposure of a 
critical executive's brush with the law—an organization speaks to its audiences to 
rally support and to find a way forward together.  
However, if rhetorical situations emerge from discursive activity, then 
organizations are empowered to manufacture the exigencies that spur that 
activity. From that perspective, we see that organizations routinely construct 
exigencies and present themselves as the solution to problematic situations. A 
crisis is not required for an organization to rally support for new products, for 
new marketing campaigns, for restructuring, and the like. 
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The distinction between emergent and constructed situations is one of 
motive. Depending on the purpose of its rhetoric, an organization can respond to 
either emergent or constructed situations—it is not limited to one or the other, or, 
for that matter, limited from moving back and forth between the two positions. 
Nor is the organization's construction of situation limited by the level of exigence 
(from benign to ruinous) or limited to which of its constructed situations to 
address. 
In reference to the position that situations emerge from discourse, Richard 
Vatz faults Bitzer's objectivist stance as not remotely reminiscent of rhetorical 
situations: "No situation can have a nature independent of the perception of its 
interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize 
it" (154). Vatz's argument draws from the Chicago School of social theory and its 
interactionist perspective. He is especially hostile to the assumption that meaning 
resides in things, as Bitzer's theory demands. Consider the idea of exigence, 
which Bitzer places at the core of a rhetorical situation. Speaker and audience 
must recognize the specific rhetorical response that fits the situation at hand. 
Such an exigence demands that all of the participants in the rhetorical situation 
share the same perspective on the situation, Vatz argues. Unless we take for 
granted that the participants in a rhetorical situation bring with them and share 
among themselves common meanings for the objects within the situation, we 
have to accept that interlocutors can perceive a situation only in the act of 
communicating about the situation (155-56). 
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With the benefit of Vatz's critique, we might wonder why rhetoric is even 
necessary under Bitzer's formulation, which implies a readymade commonsense. 
If speaker and audience recognize the situation and its rhetorical solution 
because they carry with them knowledge about both, all either needs to do is wait 
for the other to hit upon the fix. There is no need to create commonsense—it is 
already present. If, as Bitzer argues, the meaning of objects is in the objects 
themselves, then meanings do not shift over time or change because of place; nor, 
for that matter, does meaning shift from situation to situation. If it did, 
interlocutors would have nothing to share because they would never have 
anything in common. 
That said, to argue broadly against Bitzer's position is to overlook his 
argument's most potent aspect: Rhetorical situations are inherently problematic 
and demand action. Bitzer himself emphasizes that aspect when in later 
arguments he moves from an idealist position to a constructionist one. Rhetoric 
is a practical interaction between us and our environment, he writes, and the 
ingredients to that interaction are an exigence and a remedy ("Functional" 23). 
Unexpected events force us to respond, to adapt, because the natural world is 
made up of physical objects and mental conceptions. The physical and mental 
worlds are interrelated in complex ways that we design ourselves. Our 
relationship to that environment is marked by the drive to resolve conflicts 
between experience and belief, to balance short-term and long term-actions and 
consequences, and to resolve contradictions in and among belief systems (22-3). 
 
64 
The shift in Bitzer's argument, however, is hardly any shift at all. Bitzer 
uses the term pragmatic to describe rhetorical conditions and encounters. 
However, any connection with pragmatist philosophy is markedly absent from 
his argument. That is unfortunate, as a more pragmatic approach would better 
support his position regarding the relational nature of our place in the world. For 
example, a pragmatist position would ameliorate Bitzer's inclination to assign 
meaning to objects and, instead, would demonstrate how our construction of 
meaning arises from the mediating symbolic actions we use to get on with things 
as participants in the world. Symbolic action is common to human beings. It is 
precisely because of our symbolic actions that we perceive problems and 
recognize rhetorical situations. 
Reluctant to shed his idealist roots, in refining his concept of the rhetorical 
situation Bitzer only transplants those roots into social constructionism. The 
critical attitude he takes toward our relationship to our environment weakens 
under his idealist division of physical from conceptual. As a consequence, we are 
left with an intriguing, empowering paradox: If interlocutors see the same 
situation but it means something different to each of them, how can they 
participate in solving the problem that the situation presents? Alternatively, if 
interlocutors are divided about what a situation means, then rhetoric becomes 
credible as a means of generating a common situational perception—an 
agreement about what problem lies at the heart of the situation (commonly 
referred to as stasis).  
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Against charges of inconsistency, Bitzer admits that an exigence may not 
be immediately recognizable and that it may not be apparent that a situation can 
be modified with discourse. In that case, the rhetor decides to speak because he 
or she perceives the exigence as urgent, and there is a probability that it can be 
modified ("Functional" 26-7). Bitzer is arguing specifically against Vatz, who 
insists that what Bitzer leaves out of his definition of the rhetorical situation is 
the creative capacity interlocutors bring to any situation. While Vatz argues that 
our capacity to invent raises the possibility that rhetorical situations are created 
because they are inseparable from our talk about them, Bitzer constrains creative 
intent to the act of the rhetor's responding to rhetorical situations even if an 
exigence is not apparent to the audience. 
Scott Consigny frames the positions represented by Bitzer and Vatz as 
antimony between deterministic circumstances that control the rhetor, in the 
first place, and, in the latter, an unbounded creativity that somehow frees the 
rhetor of any constraint imposed by time and place. According to Consigny, the 
rhetor's purpose in a rhetorical situation is not to solve a problem but to urge the 
kinds of questions that can lead to a productive formulation of a problem. 
Problems are not to be found in a rhetorical situation (as Bitzer would have it), 
nor are problems solely the rhetor's invention (as in Vatz). Instead, rhetorical 
situations are indeterminate. The exigency that Bitzer calls a recognizable object 
and that Vatz calls an invention is, for Consigny, an incoherence that negatively 
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affects the rhetor and the audience and calls for a response. The rhetor's task is to 
compose order so that the underlying problem becomes available (176-78). 
In describing the tools and the practice necessary to fulfill that task, 
Consigny summons Aristotle's concept of rhetoric as an art; specifically, the art of 
sensing the particularities of a situation and the capacity to apply general 
principles to a situation without relying on a predetermined course of action 
(180). The alternative to Bitzer and Vatz, according to Consigny, is to apply 
Aristotle's topics to the idea of rhetorical situations. The topics are a shared space 
for objective and subjective treatments of the rhetorical situation—an interplay 
between the instrumentality of topics and the "realm in which the rhetor thinks 
and acts" (182). Within the dynamics inherent in Consigny's model, the antimony 
of Bitzer's situation-centric and Vatz's rhetor-centric positions dissipates under 
the influence of common cause (185).  
Does Consigny's argument help us to imagine a rhetorical situation that is 
neither an objective phenomenon nor a discursive invention? In Bitzer's case, 
topics are a field of reference that speakers and audiences draw from to 
characterize an exigence as a rhetorical situation. For Vatz, topics are heuristics 
for establishing the meaning and for communicating the characteristics of a 
rhetorical situation. Consigny's resolution of those opposing positions is 
welcome; however, in the end he does not explain the mechanics that allow 
Aristotle's topics to transcend Bitzer and Vatz's theoretical differences. 
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When it comes down to it, despite varied approaches to the concept of 
rhetorical situations, the core of Bitzer's argument remains largely 
unquestioned—there are situations in which rhetoric is called to do its work. The 
disagreements and refinements surrounding Bitzer's concept ask only what the 
constituents of a rhetorical situation are, according to Donna Gorrell. They do not 
question that there are rhetorical situations (399). Whether we insist that rhetors 
and audiences together recognize an exigence at the heart of a rhetorical 
situation, or whether we believe that in the act of interpretation and composition 
a rhetor invents a rhetorical situation that an audience can recognize, we 
privilege the rhetor's role. If organizations are webs of communicative action, as 
Barnard, Cheney, and others imply, then we should be wary of attitudes that 
highlight the rhetor's actions in relation to the other elements of the situation.  
As Gorrell points out, to emphasize one actor over others is to miss the 
significant interplay among all of the actors in a rhetorical situation (411). To 
illustrate, Gorrell replaces the traditional rhetorical triangle with a Venn diagram. 
Whereas the points of a triangle separate rhetor, audience, and subject, a Venn 
diagram illustrates how these constituents of a rhetorical situation relate to one 
another, sometimes overlapping, sometimes combining, sometimes taking a 
more or less dominant role toward one another (400-2). When considering a 
rhetorical situation, our emphasis should highlight the relational positions and 
roles of rhetors, audiences, and the circumstances of time, place, and other 
constraints inherent in rhetorical situations. 
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Bitzer attempts to circumvent the rhetor-centric position of his model; 
however, even his modified stance continues to separate rhetorical actors from 
the situation in which they find themselves. He calls rhetoric a kind of pragmatic 
communication that operates as a practical interaction aimed at restoring 
harmony to disorder. Wherever we are, Bitzer writes, we are "actively engaged in 
adjusting, responding, overcoming, planning, laboring, making and acting" in an 
effort to adapt our understanding to our experience ("Functional" 22). What is 
important to remember in discussing rhetorical situations, Bitzer continues, is 
that they are comprised of "environmental constituents which form a structure" 
(23). But it is hard to imagine just what kind of structure accommodates the 
dynamics in play during discursive events when Bitzer's model stabilizes 
structure along a line that separates event from actors—exigence from rhetor and 
audience. The exigence is something seen by both, yet Bitzer does not fully 
account for their participation in that seeing. He acknowledges the "influence of 
the individual's creativity in the apprehension of situations" (25); however, he 
steadies himself upon "factual conditions [that are] . . . independent of one's 
personal subjectivity" (28). Based on these claims, structure already exists. We 
have to go beyond Bitzer's words to accept that what he describes is a process-
oriented structure rather than an objective one. This seems to be the only answer 
to how a predetermined structure molds itself to specific situations. But it is an 
answer that generates more questions—about agency, about governance, about 
the phases of a situational process. What other attitude can we take toward the 
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rhetorical situation and specifically what alterations can we or must we make to 
our understanding of it to assist us in bringing that idea into the field of 
organizational discourse? 
Rhetorical Situations in an Organizational Context 
The rhetorical situation in which organizations speak is complicated by the 
fact that organizations operate in a context that is broader than any one 
rhetorical situation. Hoffman and Ford describe how an organization must be 
attuned to what is going on in its environment and the effect that external 
happenings have on its work (11). Using that characterization, organizational 
context refers not only to where and how an organization carries out its work, but 
also to the historical and discursive forces that surround them, infuse them, and 
define them: 
 
All communication is situated in a context. Events or conversations that 
occur prior to an instance of communication have an impact on what is 
said, how it is said, and the meaning that is assigned to it (56). 
 
 
The broad context in which organizations operate makes it difficult to 
discern the specific, controlling event that Bitzer describes as an exigence 
("Situation" 7). Likewise, as I discussed in chapter 2, because it is difficult to 
point to a specific speaker or to a specific audience when considering 
organizational rhetoric, it is hard to identify the agents of change involved in a 
rhetorical situation. To understand how exigence, rhetor, audience, and 
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constraints operate in such a broad focal area, we need an idea of the rhetorical 
situation that operates at the same theoretical level as organizational context.  
One step we can take toward such an idea is to assume, with Keith Grant-
Davie, that rhetorical situations can encompass several rhetors, and that those 
rhetors aren't necessarily singular actors. A rhetor may be composed of groups of 
people. Likewise, when a rhetor speaks to an exigence, that discourse can target 
or meet different audiences with different purposes and different attitudes 
toward the exigence. And finally, we should be attentive to the idea that all of the 
aspects of the rhetorical situation—constraint and even the exigence itself, in 
addition to rhetor and audience—can be plural. To apply the rhetorical situation 
idea in the realm of organizational context, we should account for the interrelated 
interactions that occur between and among multiple rhetors and audiences and 
the dynamics of multiple exigencies and constraints (266). 
An example of how we might analyze interrelated rhetors, audiences, 
exigencies, and constraints can be found in Garret and Xiao's altering of the 
rhetorical situation. By directing our attention away from the rhetor as the 
principle actor in a rhetorical situation, Garrett and Xiao make it possible to ask 
different questions about rhetorical situations. Garrett and Xiao argue that the 
audience, not the speaker, is "the pivotal element" in a rhetorical situation. We 
should regard the audience as an "active entity which is crucial in determining 
exigency, constraints, and the 'fittingness' of the rhetor's response" (30). In 
addition, they write, we should be aware of the "powerful influence of a culture's 
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discourse tradition in shaping both speaker and audience perceptions," and we 
should be more aware of the dynamic nature of rhetorical situations (31). 
Examining the rhetoric inside China during the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 
and 1857-1860, Garrett and Xiao analyze the change in rhetorical situations as 
described by successive government administrations and public intellectuals. 
Despite Britain-friendly concessions granted by treaty after the first war, Chinese 
public rhetoric still positioned China as civilized and the West as barbaric. As a 
result, China did not feel that its privileged position was at risk because it 
regarded the concessions as a way to pacify the barbarians and bring them under 
Chinese control. Warnings that China was surrendering its preeminent place 
among nations were ignored because those remarks fell outside of the historical 
discourse of cultural superiority and so escaped the notice of the intended 
audience (32-3). Those discursive circumstances changed following the second 
war. Commonsense notions about the aims of commercial and colonialist foreign 
powers and about how to deal with them (set limits with treaties and provide 
some trade and profit to appease them) gave way to the recognition that foreign 
forces were disciplined, well equipped, and that the greed of foreign power could 
not be satisfied with well-defined offers of trade and profit. As a result, China's 
vision of itself as ultimately more sophisticated and civilized than other nations 
gave way to reformist attitudes and to suspicions that its culture suffered from a 
moral decline (32-7). China might have avoided its slip into self-criticism and 
reduced its losses from the war had its political and cultural rhetoric evolved to 
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make it possible for its public audience to take a different position toward foreign 
nation states and commercial enterprises.  
Case in Point 
Discourse traditions exert powerful influence on the way rhetors respond 
during rhetorical situations. Further, according to Garrett and Xiao, discourse 
traditions affect whether rhetors and audiences even recognize the exigence that 
calls for rhetorical action. And finally, when rhetors and audiences do recognize 
an exigence, more often than not they construct responses that rely on a tradition 
of discourse rather than on the situation at hand. In thrall to histories of 
experience, to a traditional socio-cultural environment, and to a long-standing 
way of knowing, rhetors and audiences are not so much on different sides of an 
exigence (requiring rhetoric to dissolve the division between them by persuading 
a change in attitude toward action) but rather are cooperative agents working to 
modify the discourse tradition in a way that lets them recognize and respond to 
exigencies and use rhetoric to resolve them on an ongoing, contingent basis (37-
8). 
Rhetorical Situations and Discourse Traditions  
The discourse tradition at the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) rests 
on its identity as innovative, risk-taking, and inventive. In 1999, on the occasion 
of its thirtieth anniversary, CCL commissioned an oral history that was edited 
and published privately as Herding Cats: An Oral History of the Center for 
Creative Leadership. In its earliest years, CCL faced the challenge that many 
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young organizations face: a fledgling identity. It was not a university and wanted 
credibility in academia. It was established as a nonprofit education and research 
institute, but wanted recognition among corporations. The rhetoric in Herding 
Cats invites readers to identify with CCL's image as a renegade, somewhat 
mysterious institute. Employees who worked at CCL since its early days see 
themselves in the book's anecdotes and photographs, identifying with the people 
they were thirty years ago—the organization's originals.  
The rhetoric of Herding Cats connects employees who do not share that 
thirty-year history with CCL's founding members. It introduces readers to CCL as 
a "tapestry of extraordinary people doing extraordinary things" and "a place 
where people have gone off in all directions" (3, 5). What employee, reading this 
text, would not want to be extraordinary or to have that level of autonomy? 
Herding Cats does not explicitly state its intentions, but in allowing readers to 
imagine themselves shoulder to shoulder with the organization's founders, the 
book's epideictic rhetoric moves its readers toward a certain attitude from which 
they can recognize and participate in CCL's ethos. But just what is the rhetorical 
situation that calls for this text? 
The timing of the book's publication is telling. At its thirtieth anniversary, 
one of CCL's two main concerns was the imminent departure of original members 
and the loss of their tacit knowledge. CCL's second concern arose from the 
expansion in executive education services, and especially the growth in the 
number and size of CCL competitors. The exigence of meeting more robust 
 
74 
competition while losing its attachment to its identity as an innovative pioneer 
creates an immediate rhetorical situation: how to instill the self-described 
frontier, can-do spirit of its founders into more recently hired employees.  
The book's epideictic rhetoric works differently from the limited ways 
Aristotle sanctioned for its use. However, as Kennedy explains, ceremonial 
rhetoric can not only praise and blame but can also sustain, teach, and enhance 
cultural values (22). The rhetorical work of Herding Cats transposes a rhetorical 
situation across thirty years and onto an organizational exigence. The exigence of 
credibility and identity becomes a response to an exigence of legacy, 
commitment, and sustainability. The discourse tradition that constitutes CCL's 
identity as innovative and groundbreaking preserves those attributes and, 
through Herding Cats, presses them into its employees.  
Discursive Constructions and Rhetorical Situations  
An organization's discourse tradition affects the way in which it sees and 
responds to a rhetorical situation. But what about the question of how an 
organization constructs a rhetorical situation? These are not exclusive positions—
a discourse tradition can affect how and when organizational rhetors and 
audiences recognize an exigence and become active in a rhetorical situation; that 
discourse tradition can also influence how an organizational rhetor constructs 
exigence and situation to achieve a strategic aim. To demonstrate, consider the 
following example of CCL and how it constructs a situation so that it can respond 
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as an organization whose identity is bound up in the ideas of invention and 
unconventional thinking. 
In its 2011-2012 annual report, CCL draws attention to the continuing 
effect of the global credit failures of 2008 on the kinds of organizations that are 
buyers of CCL's services. At the time of this writing, employment, production, 
and trade around the world have not yet returned to pre-2008 levels. Against that 
backdrop, CCL identifies the exigency of failed leadership. The rhetorical 
situation surrounding that exigence, according to CCL, involves an audience 
seeking answers as to whether there are new solutions that can solve the 
aftermath of the global recession and prevent that situation from reoccurring. It 
is a masterful rhetorical choice: during the global recession, even everyday 
conversations far removed from multinational corporate settings routinely reflect 
on the missteps of political and commercial leaders. 
In response to the exigence of inadequate or failed leadership, the text of 
this annual report addresses "What's Next for Leadership: 5 Big Ideas." CCL 
presents itself as the authority of current thinking in organizational and 
leadership studies. The report's rhetoric assumes that, as Bitzer and others have 
argued, the audience is crucial to the emergence and the amelioration of a 
rhetorical situation. If that is the case, CCL can depend on the report's audience 
also to see the exigence of failed leadership, and it can expect the audience to take 
an attitude toward potential solutions. However, what the text identifies as the 
frontiers of leadership studies and practice does not encompass nor does it 
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survey the field of leadership studies. Rather, the report articulates five areas of 
interest that CCL is pursuing in its work.  
From a rhetorical perspective it is noteworthy that its 2011-2012 report 
does not discuss "what's next for CCL," or some equivalent. The title instead 
makes a broader statement that locates CCL at the peak of the discipline and 
practice of leadership studies, from where it can survey the world around it and 
pronounce what is coming. "What's on the minds of leaders these days?," the 
omniscient text asks (Ryan 2). CCL has in this report set out a rhetorical situation 
in which the exigence of uncertainty arising from economic catastrophe calls for 
different perspectives of leadership. CCL, anchored in its identity as a place for 
new ideas, responds to the situation so as to suggest that the areas of its attention 
are common to the reader's areas of concern. What are the frontiers of leadership 
studies and practice? Why would the audience need to know? The answer, for at 
least some of the audience, lies in how CCL connects itself to the exigence it 
constructs. The exigence of failed leadership exercises its rhetorical power by 
drawing from the very real consequences of a worldwide recession. In turn, the 
CCL report channels that power to create the rhetorical situation for which its 
audience seeks a solution. Insofar as the audience has an interest in staying 
current with leadership ideas because those ideas may solve problems associated 
with global economic retrenchment, CCL wants to define those important ideas—
the next big things—because those are the things that CCL has set as its own 
strategic imperatives. 
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In terms of a discourse tradition that reinforces its identity as an 
innovative pioneer, the report positions CCL as the pre-eminent institute in its 
field, which is a position that can be attained only with next-generation ideas. In 
its beginning, CCL's researchers "were considered an outrageous fringe group" 
(Herding Cats 33). That fringe element emerges in the way that CCL highlights 
and discusses its research agenda in the 2011-2012 report: neuroscience, 
democratizing leadership, network theory, nonprofit entrepreneurs, and the 
amplification of individual performance through coaching.  
In the organizational context, as in any other social context, rhetorical 
situations are a mix of linguistic forces. They are constituted in mutual, discursive 
acts and, because they are embedded in a discursive mix, they are subject to the 
influences that affect and arise from discourse. As an organization responds to 
threats and opportunities, its discourse traditions influence what it and its 
audiences see as a rhetorical situation and what kind of responses they will 
accept. In constructing the situation, the organization's rhetoric engenders 
audience support for the organization's strategic responses. In the last instance, 
invention is not simply happenstance but is purposeful. In the next section I will 
discuss situational purpose in general, and then I will demonstrate one particular 
kind of rhetorical purpose—identity—that rhetorical situations serve when 
generated in the course of organizational rhetoric. 
 
 
 
78 
The Purpose of the Situation 
If we can return for a moment to Aristotle's three forms of rhetoric, we 
note that each form is tied to a specific time. Political rhetoric urges its audience 
to take or refrain from an action under consideration; its focus is on the future. 
Forensic rhetoric is employed to attack or defend a position using different kinds 
of evidence; its focus is on the past. Ceremonial rhetoric, consisting of praise or 
censure, focuses on present (1.3.185a-186b). To these time distinctions Aristotle 
adds telos—the purpose, or the ends, to which the speaker intends to bring an 
audience—as a determining factor in each. Telos relates to the audience's 
interests (1.3.1358b). Telos is embedded in any particular situation as a motive 
for persuasion.1 
Organizations have many purposes for their rhetoric, given their multiple 
audiences and various goals. As an example of what I mean by the purpose of a 
situation, I turn to Tim Kuhn's examination of how organizations create 
situations to deal with issues that affect their operations. The messages designed 
for these purposes can be gathered under the general heading of issues 
management. Kuhn's argument addresses whether or not organizational rhetoric 
related to critical issues constitutes a genre, and his work is instructive in the way 
it reveals the purpose of an organization's attempt to construct a situation.  
Kuhn's structurational approach defines genres as "social institutions that 
are produced, reproduced, or modified when social actors draw on the rules [that 
govern a particular genre] to engage in conversation" (192). Issue management 
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campaigns are decidedly rhetorical in that they are responses to an exigence that 
cannot be solved but only resolved, or managed, for some period of time. The 
tension inherent in an issue reverberates between what is and what should be. 
However, Kuhn cautions, what an issue is and how to deal with it are not always 
the questions to ask. Rather, we ought to examine the manner in which issues 
emerge. Organizations often create issues by calling the public's attention to 
them, and then they offer themselves as a means of resolution (195). 
From the rhetorical perspective, an issue is an exigence. However, Kuhn 
treats exigence much differently than Bitzer, who, we are reminded, places the 
objective exigence at the heart of a rhetorical situation. Kuhn's position is closer 
to Vatz's, which locates exigence in the mutually affective discursive situation that 
arises between rhetors and audiences. More to the point, however, is the strategic 
implication of creating an exigence and giving rise to a rhetorical situation that an 
organization can answer with a specific rhetorical response that an audience 
recognizes as a resolution. Kuhn explains: 
 
Whether the organization attempts to convince stakeholders to pay 
attention to an issue it defines as important or it attempts to manage the 
importance of an issue forced upon it from the outside, the rhetorical 
shaping of meaning is central to any [image management] campaign (195). 
 
 
The situation-constituting agency embedded in issues management meets 
a key requirement of Bitzer's concept: That to say "a rhetorical response fits a 
situation is to say that it meets the requirements established by the situation" 
("Situation" 10). Further, because a rhetor can establish a sense of urgency to 
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stand in for an exigence (7), we can read Kuhn as a demonstration of how an 
organization rhetorically constructs situations. The purpose of that construction 
is to position its audiences to recognize, in a specific way, the specific exigence of 
a situation and to predispose the audience toward an attitude that adopts the 
organization's solution. More often than not, the solution relates to the products 
and services the organization provides or to its identity as the authority capable 
of resolving the situation.  
Case in Point 
Organizations construct situations for many more reasons than issue 
management. One of the most important purposes is the careful presentation and 
management of an organizational identity. An organization's persistent 
characteristics are critical to its operation, reception, and sustainability. An 
organization continually produces messages to influence how its audiences 
experience and respond emotionally to its goods and services and to its behavior 
in the public sphere. Those objects and actions are the core of an organization's 
identity. They are meant to make the organization distinct from other 
organizations, and they are meant to remain consistent over time (Hoffman and 
Ford 119-23). 
Annual reports are public texts with an emphasis on constituting and 
maintaining an organization's identity. I discussed previously how CCL's 2011-
2012 annual report derives from and relies on a discourse tradition that 
emphasizes its identity as a pioneer. CCL's 2010-2011 report demonstrates a 
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corporate identity that is less bound to legacy and closer to what it wants to be 
known for now. The report is an example of how an organization uses a text to 
construct or to bring attention to a situation, the resolution of which depends on 
the organization's characteristics. If a reader recognizes or even acknowledges the 
exigence as presented in an organizational text, it becomes easier for the 
organization to persuade that reader that an organization with just its capabilities 
and reputation can resolve that exigence. 
 The theme for CCL's 2010-2011 report is "rethinking boundaries." If a 
reader is puzzled as to what that means, the issue is addressed at the very start of 
the report. The text cites a survey from IBM, a widely recognized, praised, and 
credible organization, in reporting that working across geographical and cultural 
boundaries is "crucial for driving business performance" (Ryan 1). Directly 
following that remark, the report references a CCL survey with similar findings. 
Presented in close proximity, the statements garner some measure of mutual 
strength and credibility. The report's opening article goes on to create a 
connection with the reader by saying how much CCL learns from organizations 
about what it calls boundary spanning—a practice of working across time zones, 
with different departments within an organization, and with people of different 
backgrounds whose experience generates unfamiliar behaviors. CCL is 
"extremely privileged" to work with "talented women and men," and it not only 
shares its knowledge with them but learns from them at the same time (1). A 
reader—a talented one no doubt—can place himself or herself in the same 
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position, the role of a learning partner who recognizes the difficult circumstances 
of globalization and, with CCL's assistance, adopts boundary spanning as a way to 
resolve them. The report goes on to cite several well-recognized organizations 
with whom CCL has worked, generating more credibility and establishing its 
authority to speak to this particular situation (1). 
 One could argue that the situation that this text describes is not invented 
but is a consequence of globalization and an extant challenge to organizational 
work. In response to that situation, the text outlines approaches and suggests 
practices that people in organizations can use to bolster the organization's 
performance and sustainability. However, while the shadow of globalization falls 
on CCL's activities, the report focuses on the terms boundaries and differences, 
constructing a situation that CCL can more readily manage than globalization.  
One way to characterize the report's rhetoric and to see the motive of 
situation-construction embedded in it is through Burke's dramatistic pentad: act, 
scene, agent, agency, and purpose. In brief, act describes what happens; scene is 
the setting for the act; the agent performs the act; agency refers to the means by 
which (or the tools with which) the agent performs the act; and purpose describes 
the reasons for the act (GM xv). Burke delineates the relationships among the 
terms as resources for guiding analytical methodologies. The pentad terminology 
can be used as "generating principles," and it has an advantage over other 
methodologies in that the terms are by and large "understandable almost at a 
glance" (xv). The pentad's elegant simplicity works for examining the motives 
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embedded in statements because such statements emerge and end within the 
pentad's scope (xv-xvi).  
 In CCL's 2010-2011 annual report, the scene is globalization, portrayed as 
a competitive environment comprised of boundaries and differences, the 
managers profiled in the report are the agents, and the managerial practices 
linked to CCL's concepts of boundary spanning and leading across differences 
provide the agency. One purpose of the report is to present an identity of CCL as 
a global, culturally and psychologically savvy knowledge organization that 
empowers its clients to meet the challenges that boundaries (national and 
psychological, for example) and differences (cultural and ethnic, for example) 
pose to business performance.  
We have one more term, act, to assign. In doing so we shine some light on 
the report's motive, which is not simply to fulfill the purpose of presenting CCL's 
identity in a favorable light or to report on its work. The report also strives to 
ignite an act of identification between readers and CCL's work and identity. The 
fact that most of the report's readers already have an interest in or a relationship 
with CCL does not subtract from the degree of resolve in CCL's rhetorical motive. 
CCL wants to strengthen and reinforce the identification process enacted by the 
report's readers so as to hold onto them as potential clients for its services. If new 
readers respond by identifying themselves with CCL, all the better; however, the 
organization fields a substantial salesforce for the purpose of recruiting new 
clients. The report is not necessary to secure new business.  
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Burke's pentad becomes an even closer examination of the report's 
rhetorical motives if we consider what Burke referred to as the ratios among the 
pentad's five terms. The terms are not simply labels, but constituents of order—
there is cause and effect in their relationships to one another and among them 
that leads to a purpose (GM 15-20). In the case of CCL's 2010-2011 annual report, 
the proportion of agents to the other pentad elements is exaggerated. Of the 
report's 26 pages, 11 of them, or 42 percent, are profiles of various leaders in 
health care, financial services, education, computer network technology, and 
other fields.  
Compare that proportion to the report's emphasis on globalization, which 
is discussed in passing on only four pages—a scant 6.5 percent. That is an 
astoundingly small ratio, given the worldwide financial crisis that, at the time of 
this writing, continues to affect organizations and their members. Agency, which 
is represented by what CCL calls "boundary spanning," occupies 46 percent of the 
report. That is not a surprise, given that in this example agency is tied directly to 
the agents (their actions are described as boundary spanning) and to CCL (in 
particular to the 10-year research project that supports CCL's boundary spanning 
practices and curriculum). In the ratio of scene, agent, and agency, scene plays 
only a minor role. The emphasis falls to the agents and to the agency they 
exercise—the latter as a set of tools and approaches designed by CCL to serve its 
clients. 
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The ratio of act to the other pentad constituents is more difficult to 
measure. With so much emphasis on agents and agency, the report encourages 
the process of identification—whether with the agents or with the agency by 
which they span boundaries. In considering identification as the act, we are able 
discern a motive for this particular piece of CCL rhetoric. Highlighted by an 
emphasis on agents and agency, the report achieves its purpose of emphasizing 
its role in training executives in the skills of boundary spanning, thus enabling 
them to fully exert their agency to achieve positive results for their organizations. 
The successful executives profiled in the report, with whom readers identify in no 
small part because of the skillful narratives that tell their stories, persuade 
readers to take a positive attitude toward CCL's work—especially because that 
work is cast against the constant churn of globalization. By turning the reader 
toward its work, CCL demonstrates an ethos that ensures its credibility and 
sustainability, which is the report's purpose. Readers, acting to identify with the 
report's agents and their agency, recognize the virtue, wisdom, and goodwill 
evidenced by CCL's demonstration of ethos because they, like the agents profiled 
in the report, value those qualities in terms of the benefits accrued in putting 
them into practice. In recognizing that their own ethical stance aligns with CCL's 
stance, readers are more easily persuaded (they more easily identify with CCL, its 
work, and its clients) to trust CCL and its activities, thereby ensuring the 
organization's sustainability. 
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Conclusion 
 It is not beyond imagining that an organization would create the grounds 
for a response so as to control the response to its benefit. As Hoffman and Ford 
point out, "The ability to describe a rhetorical situation and to recognize and 
employ the strategies of organizational rhetoric is central to creating effective 
messages" (114). Advertising, for example, is based on that equation: An 
organization's marketing function creates the urgency of need among the public, 
which responds to the urgency of a manufactured exigence by taking up what the 
situation offers—the use of the organization's products or services as the means 
for quelling the urgency and returning to harmony. This fact doesn't discount the 
inevitable occurrence of exigencies and the roil of situations among historical 
happenstance, environmental events, and other singular events. Analytically, 
however, one can see that organizations can operate in a rhetorical environment 
in which is created a stream of situations that they can address and, further, that 
organizations can constitute the necessary audience for that situation: an 
audience capable of participating with the rhetor in the situation and resolving it.
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CHAPTER IV 
ORGANIZING ETHOS 
 
 
Aristotle describes ethos as one of three rhetorical appeals a speaker can 
make (joining logos and pathos). In practice, according to the Rhetoric, ethos is 
the most effective mode of persuasion of the three: "We believe fair-minded 
people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others]," which makes 
the speaker's "character almost the most authoritative means of persuasion" 
(1356a 8-9). Aristotle goes on to say that a speaker's character does not precede 
the rhetorical situation but arises as a result of his or her discourse. The authority 
and credibility that an audience grants the rhetor is constituted during the speech 
and does not depend on the rhetor's reputation (1.2.1356a 11-12).  
Ethos operates most persuasively when it exhibits three characteristics: 
practical wisdom, virtue, and goodwill. A lack of practical wisdom suggests that 
the speaker does not correctly form his or her opinions; a lack of virtue can be 
seen in a speaker who hides his or her opinions from the audience; a speaker who 
does not give the audience the full measure of his or her expertise demonstrates a 
lack of goodwill (1378a 8-19). A speaker who does not present a strong front on 
all three reduces the chances for persuading his or her audience. In short, an 
effective speaker is credible as an authority, logical in reason, and understanding 
of human emotions and their affects. Which brings us to essential questions: 
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What does it mean to say that an organization demonstrates ethos—that it 
presents and practices wisdom, virtue, and goodwill its rhetoric? Given the 
theoretical uncertainty surrounding speech that is not identified with an 
individual speaker (Cheney ROS 3), what does the concept of ethos tell us about 
what an organization's rhetoric makes possible, and what do audiences take from 
an organization's ethos that encourages them to grant an organization credence? 
One strategy for addressing these questions is to accept organizations as 
contextually bounded; in other words, to speak of an organization as an 
individual rhetor. However, we should remain mindful of the possible missteps 
from that position. To equate groups and individuals as if the latter are fractals of 
the former risks a reliance on ideal forms that can pass from the single to the 
collective without change. Inviolate forms detract from rhetoric's capacity to deal 
with possibilities because no choices become available outside of those forms. 
Further, to equate groups and individuals occludes their binding, reciprocal 
relations—the rhetor's presentation and the audience's acknowledgment—
masking differences and commonalities so as to conceal the rhetorical 
mechanisms necessary to make and sustain the bonds among and between them. 
This chapter gives an accounting of ethos in the context of organizations. 
In chapter 3 I discussed how organizations can construct rhetorical situations to 
persuade audiences that its goods and services make suitable responses to an 
exigency. In this chapter, I give theoretical support for the social aspects inherent 
in the concept of ethos, and then I demonstrate how a social ethos promotes the 
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idea of organizational ethos. Further, I examine how organizations employ ethos 
for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the organization's credibility, 
competence, and concern for community (that is, virtue, wisdom, and goodwill) 
toward the purpose of sustaining the organization.  
What Ethos Is 
 Scholarship into the development of ethos as a concept describes how 
Aristotle arrived at his framework by adapting Plato's insistence that the 
successful speaker will possess good character, be knowledgeable, be willing to 
consider the audience's position in regard to the situation at hand, and be capable 
of adapting to the audience (Sattler 56-7). In adapting his teacher's position, 
Aristotle addresses the limitations imposed by Plato, whose ideal rhetoric may 
suit one-to-one conversation between social equals but is unrealistic for public 
address (Kennedy 15). 
Common sense dictates that arguing from a position of authority is a 
stronger, more persuasive position than simply trusting that your audience will 
take your argument at face value. Michael Halloran calls this the believe-me-
because-I-am-the-kind-of-person-whose-word-can-be-believed argument, 
suggesting that ethos is bound to the character of the rhetor and that presenting 
one's character for the judgment of the audience acts as a persuasive technique. 
When a speaker uses ethos as an appeal, Halloran writes, he or she "will 
construct [the] speech with an eye toward the sort of character it portrays" (60). 
We might read Halloran generously and understand his claim as consistent with 
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the Aristotelian definition of ethos insofar as Halloran says ethos is created 
during the rhetor's actions. However, a close look at Aristotle's definition 
undermines that reading. If we were to construct our speech "with an eye toward 
the character it portrays," as Halloran urges us to do, then we would assume that 
there already exists an ethos (character) to which we can direct our eyes. That is 
not Aristotle's premise. Aristotle says that the rhetor does not use speech to 
present or to clarify an already existent character; rather, the rhetor uses speech 
to encourage trust, agreement, and belief. As conceived that way, ethos becomes 
part of strategic discourse. As Aristotle puts it: 
 
[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in 
such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; . . . And this should 
result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a 
certain kind of person (1.2.1356a 6-12). 
 
Quite simply, an audience that recognizes a stranger in its midst does not 
easily extend the same authority it grants to a member of its community. Ethos 
does not accompany the rhetor like a cultural relic, enveloping the rhetor with an 
authoritative halo. Nonetheless, we should guard against the easy acceptance of 
authoritative demonstrations and recognize, as Craig Smith points out, that the 
Rhetoric does in fact delve into the speaker's reputation. Aristotle's descriptions 
of virtue in Book 2, Chapter 9, for example, to which a rhetor can refer when the 
situation calls for epideictic rhetoric, include many characteristics that an 
audience would know only by way of reputation. Smith argues that in order for an 
audience to understand that a speaker acts from a positive ethos, it also has to 
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understand that the speaker's attributes are positive; in other words, what the 
audience believes are good characteristics must align with what the speaker 
presents as good characteristics (6). 
In regard to reputation, Aristotle works against a reified ethos and instead 
focuses on how the rhetor and audience come to recognize the character and 
stance of the other during a rhetorical transaction. However, if we accept 
Aristotle's claim that ethos arises as part of a rhetorical situation, we still have not 
settled on a way to read his list of virtues that does not define them as the basis 
for reputation. 
Etymological studies of ethos suggest one alternate reading. A body of 
scholarship indicates that the word ethos derives from the Greek terms for habit 
or custom. "In its earliest signification [it] refers to the usages, habits, and 
traditions of one social group as distinguished from another" (Sattler 55). 
Philological investigations into ethos suggest a metaphorical connection to the 
term haunt, connoting an animal's territory—the environment with which the 
animal is associated. According to Margaret Zulick's research, the linguistic 
record shows a use of haunt that evokes character. This metaphor, Zulick writes, 
becomes identified with "the constellation of habits, thoughts, manners, and 
reputation that constitutes a rhetorical subject" (20)2. 
We commonly refer to that cluster of attributes as character. In terms of 
environment and habitation, we can exercise the metaphor for which Zulick 
argues and look at character as the position and attributes with which the rhetor 
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and audience associate with the specific situation that a text or speech 
addresses—the rhetoric must fit the situation if it is to persuade an audience. 
 Critical speculations that link ethos to habit do not avoid confrontation or 
modification. Thomas Corts, for example, argues against a linguistic connection 
between the two. That faulty conclusion, he writes, arises from an imprecise 
transliteration that confuses two similar Greek words, one connoting character 
and the other signifying habit (201). Thorton Lockwood extends Corts's critique, 
not on lexical grounds but ethical ones. To equate character and habit implies 
that one can build character—construct ethos—by means of habitual behavior. 
That position, he writes, overly simplifies Aristotle's intent by separating 
behavior from intellect and implying that one can construct virtue without 
attention to reason. Further, Lockwood argues, while the classical terms for 
ethics, character, and habit may be interrelated, they do not correspond to 
contemporary usage. We can discuss a person's habits (possession) and we can 
also say that a person learned by habit (repetition). Ethos connotes the latter 
sense, Lockwood writes, but Aristotle uses another term, hexis, to signify the 
former (2013).  
 Support for a view of rhetoric as social recognition—that an audience 
identifies with the speaker because they share interests and take a common 
attitude toward situations—comes from Stephen Yarbrough, who argues that 
because of the social nature of discourse, and the temporal nature of social 
actions, ethos can be regarded as a phase of discourse—phase because temporal 
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implies duration, which is necessary to social interactions. We can make sense of 
one another's discourse, Yarbrough argues, only if we can shift our ethical fields 
so that they align in such a way as to allow what makes sense for one to make 
sense for the other; that is, the objects in a common field of action can mean one 
thing to one person and something else to another. In a meadow, (Yarbrough's 
example), the same object (say, a level area of tall grass) would mean something 
different to a farmer, a hunter, and a developer (7). During the ethos phase, 
participants in a field of action move toward a common view of the rhetorical 
situation in which they find themselves. They can accomplish that move only 
when they choose to see things as the other sees them—only when they recognize 
one another as possessing a similar or the same perspective.  
As illustrated in my brief sampling of positions, we find no shortage of 
alternatives to arguments that make an easy linguistic connection between habit 
and character, and we can find many conceptual frameworks for ethos besides 
those that focus on character, ethical development, and textual studies. 
Therefore, we lose little if we set aside the etymological excursion of Zulick's 
argument to focus instead on its exposition of Kenneth Burke's "psychology of 
form" (as expressed in Counter-statement) and how it constitutes identity (or, in 
Zulick's formulation, character). The echo of Aristotle carries through Zulick's 
argument: As the speaker creates and presents an ethos during speech, the 
audience does not recognize that ethos as good or not but identifies its form—the 
forms that Aristotle catalogs in Book 2, Chapter 9, of the Rhetoric. Zulick writes: 
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The calculus of identification is not external, but is embedded in the form 
of the work itself. Therefore, the work not only springs from this 
identification but also reproduces it (25). 
 
 
We can synthesize Zulick's reading of Aristotle and Burke thus: The 
speaker's cognition of form and the audience's recognition of form can be 
explained by a common psychology that results from their experiences in the 
world and the ways in which those experiences are imprinted as habit on their 
actions, symbolic and otherwise.  
Reading Burke, Zulick emphasizes a commonplace theme regarding 
invention: It reveals what awaits discovery. The emphasis is in some respects 
misplaced, relying as it does on Plato's idealist view of invention, which Aristotle 
roundly contradicts. However, if we consider that rhetoric makes it possible for 
consensus and common sense to arise in rhetorical situations, we can trade 
Zulick's dependence on idealist positions for the symbolic mechanisms that 
contribute to consensus and common sense. Burke's psychology of form 
describes just that mechanism, which he identifies as the "creation of an appetite 
in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (CS 31). 
Zulick explains that pattern recognition and invention operate as the same 
thinking process: "The inventor and the audience of any formal expression share 
in its production at the formal level as well as the social level" (25).  
Zulick's argument is intriguing and even enlightening, but we need not 
move all the way to Burke to claim that ethos functions as a public recognition 
rather than as a private statement of identity, such as contemporary notions of 
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self would have it (Halloran 60, 63). Granted, Halloran's argument is troubled in 
its separating intellectual and ethical development, and, most seriously, by its 
misstating Aristotle's definition of ethos. Nevertheless, where Halloran situates 
ethos in its classical environment aligns his argument with Burke's theory: 
Because ethos can be attributed to an individual and to the collective, Halloran 
writes, we can speak of a person's ethos, but we can also talk about an ethos 
associated with a certain type of person or a formal group of people, and even at 
the scale of culture and historical periods (62).  
As the component of rhetoric that, through the mutual actions of rhetor 
and audience, bestows authority, ethos taps into the social flow of group 
communication and expectations—into the habits of response that, in practice, 
become norms of behavior and so are recognized within a community as virtuous 
or not. What I am calling a social flow is consistent with what Yarbrough 
describes as "a set of social relations we assume to hold in a situation" (Inventive 
154). The rhetor's credibility—his or her cognition of the situation and the 
audience addressed—relies on such habits of assumption to indicate the situation 
in which a particular ethos is apt to persuade. In turn, the audience's recognition 
of the rhetor's credibility relies on its attributing to the rhetor an ethos that is 
suitable and at home in the habitat that both the audience and the rhetor 
understand as the situation in which they find themselves. Audience and rhetor 
are members of the same community—whether one takes the position that 
community is generated in practice, such as when interlocutors come together in 
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unique circumstance to address a situation, or that community is the polis, 
classroom, organization, or some other extant social form. 
 Aristotle's list of virtues in the Rhetoric are worthy characteristics and 
available for development. However, given that ethos arises during the rhetor's 
speech, those character traits do not come into play until the situation calls for 
them. Further, the rhetor does not use one trait or another during a speech but 
presents himself or herself as possessing those traits. At the same time, the 
audience makes a judgment about the rhetor's credibility and grants authority 
based in large part on the characteristics it sees the rhetor display. 
Another way to say this is that rhetor and audience make something of one 
another by adapting their attitudes toward one another. To put it in the terms of 
my project, organizations and their members and affiliated publics engage 
rhetorically during particular situations to establish the character of each. Ethos 
either conforms to or deviates from—and so supports or undermines—the intent 
of an organization and its audiences to communicate with each other and among 
themselves, to generate common sense, to maintain common purpose, and to 
promote willing cooperation. 
The Object of Ethos  
A rhetor depends on an audience to complete the ethical transfer of trust 
and belief that engenders persuasion. However, the attributive dependency that 
ethos relies on complicates the way in which it enables persuasive power. When 
Aristotle separates ethos from ideas of essential, durable, universal traits, he 
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challenges the notion of a more or less static identity to which an audience can 
respond. To what, exactly, is the audience attributing fair mindedness, courage, 
or other virtues? Lockwood and others reply that the answer relies on the 
developmental component embedded in Aristotle's concept. Ethos involves 
ethics, the learning and practice of virtue, that manifests in "deliberate choice of 
actions as developed into a habit of mind," while at the same time it "seems to 
refer to qualities, such as an innate sense of justice or a quickness of temper," 
with which a rhetor and audience are by nature possessed and that contribute to 
the choices that each makes (McTavish 68). 
In the rhetor-audience dynamic that constitutes ethos, Aristotle 
synthesizes theory and practice upon the common ground of ethical choice. 
Kennedy explains that, for Aristotle, "rhetoric is a mixture . . . [comprised of] a 
theoretical element and . . . [the capacity] to 'produce' persuasion, speeches, and 
texts" (16). The capacity to produce is not a freewheeling source of invention, 
however. Rather, it is an intentional negotiation made complete by the 
participation of rhetor and audience to reach consensus on the degree to which a 
rhetor's ethos expresses what are, to the audience, communal expectations and 
beliefs. Recognition in this case operates as socially fulfilled expectations. The 
audience agrees that the rhetor's character is positive because it agrees that its 
own character is positive in the same way. In turn, the rhetor must understand 
the audience and its beliefs (Smith 6). 
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Examinations and speculations about ethos have a broad range, opening a 
way to review how ethos relates to organizations. Most importantly, for that 
purpose, critiques such as those discussed move attitudes toward ethos from an 
individual to a social focus. The origin of that trajectory justifies itself from a 
historical point of view, as Aristotle and his contemporaries dealt with issues of 
courts and other public forums that individuals were called to address. The 
rhetorical impetus then was the one speaking to the many, as it is with 
organizations now. 
The recognition of virtue and the consequential granting of authority are 
possible only if we address ethos as a social concept. This seems obvious because 
rhetoric is a social practice and so ethos, as a key rhetorical concept, should 
adhere to the general principles of the governing practice of which it is part. 
Ethos dwells in the rhetor's act of presenting evidence of character so as to be 
more persuasive to the audience at hand, and it dwells in the audience's sanction 
or disavowal of the rhetor's ethos relative to its suitability to the situation at 
hand.  
The rhetor chooses when and how to speak, what kinds of appeals are 
likely to invoke the audience's interest, and by what means to generate a sense of 
wisdom, goodwill, and virtue that makes it possible for an audience to grant 
credibility. In turn, the audience chooses which virtues are evident in the rhetor's 
performance and align with the values of the community of which it is part. In 
both cases, choice is the operating factor. Rhetor and audience make practical 
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judgments and distinctions, relying on the position each takes toward the other 
and toward communal norms. From there each chooses how to align character 
and situation. When the alignment is true, in the sense of being in balance, or is 
close enough to true so as not to be distinct from it, the audience marks its 
recognition by granting the rhetor credibility. 
In contrast to Smith, who turns Aristotle's list of virtues into an objective 
benchmark, Halloran stresses that Aristotle's list indicates the ongoing consensus 
of Athenians as to what behaviors and attitudes are best suited to their 
surroundings and most likely to favor Athens' sustainability during uncertain 
circumstances. According to Halloran, "To have ethos is to manifest the virtues 
most valued by the culture to and for which one speaks" (60). Seen from the 
perspective of Halloran's insistence on a social sense of ethos, Smith's 
interpretation of the virtues listed in the Rhetoric misses the point in regard to 
how cultural norms operate—in classical terms, how rhetors and their audiences 
exercise the values held in common by the polis. Ethos does not exist outside of 
the situation in which it comes into play. Audiences do not recognize a rhetor's 
virtue by referring to a list and comparing that to their observations or to their 
rational or emotional experiences of the speech that addresses them. Instead, 
audiences recognize virtue as those attributes or characteristics valued by the 
community and in doing so take the rhetor as part of that community. As 
Aristotle's list makes clear, socially accepted virtues are traits worth developing 
and they provide the grounds for credibility. 
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Ethos as a communal act, a strategic alignment of choices on the parts of 
rhetor and audience and, further, as an act that draws from social norms to 
promote the potential for persuasive speech, presses Smith to read Aristotle while 
holding an appreciation of the time, language, and philosophical haunts familiar 
to Aristotle, his contemporaries, and his progenitors. That mix, Smith claims, 
anchors ethos to the ways in which language practices of the classical period 
project meaning (2-4). In this respect, Smith takes an attitude toward the social-
ethos position. 
Unfortunately, Smith's structuralist viewpoint (his claim that language 
projects meaning) threatens to supplant the agency required for making choices 
and for participating in the give and take of a social situation. We question claims 
that language projects meaning because (a) a predetermined pool of meaning 
conceals the social mechanisms that produce common sense among 
organizations and their affiliates; (b) a representational view of language imposes 
limits on how organizational members might imagine and generate meanings 
different from those inscribed by the exercise of power, such as hierarchy, 
position, and selection; and finally, (c) a representation-based insistence that 
interlocutors produce language as a container for ideas (words carry meaning) 
hinders organizational members' capacity to modify their beliefs so that they can 
move from one course of action or an attitude to another in the face of change. 
Nonetheless, Smith's appeal to situated ethos can be useful insofar as it 
synthesizes some of the arguments supporting the idea of ethos as social practice 
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and social site. A sense of language and meaning as a social tool, which we 
employ in specific circumstances to establish relationships with the objects of our 
attention, becomes important to our understanding the rhetorical mechanics at 
play in organizations. 
Ethos in an Organizational Context 
Ethos is of singular importance to the success or failure of organizations. 
Consider, for example, Aristotle's claim that an audience is likely to believe a 
speaker's argument if it believes that the speaker can be trusted. Likewise, 
organizations foster a positive ethos to strengthen the organizing ties among and 
between organizational members, affiliates, and customers. Hoffman and Ford 
place organizational ethos under the concept of organizational credibility; 
organizational ethos relies on competence and community. The public's 
recognition of an organization's positive ethos and its subsequent grant of 
credibility largely depend on (a) how well an organization balances the cost that 
accrues to the community of which it is part against the benefit it brings to that 
community; and (b) the competence the organization musters to achieve that 
balance (27). 
Organizational credibility, so dependent on ethos, becomes readily 
apparent during times of crisis. Tim Kuhn's example of issues-management 
rhetoric describes the discourse that organizations employ in response to external 
pressures, such as an environmental disaster or new regulations. As Kuhn writes, 
an organization manages such issues by framing them in language that presents 
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the organization as ideally suited and skilled to deal with such unexpected 
circumstances. Central to issues-management rhetoric is an organization's 
identity, which operates in terms of an organization's "enduring character" (199) 
that "develops over time in a dialectical relationship between the organization 
and its stakeholders" (200). 
 In Kuhn's work, the term identity substitutes for ethos. However, I want 
to be careful here to acknowledge the distinction between those terms. Ethos, as I 
have described it, is the alignment of the rhetor with community values and the 
audience's recognition of those values in the person of the rhetor, which results in 
the audience's granting authority and making the rhetor's case more plausible. 
Identity, on the other hand, and in the social sense, refers to an association with a 
group as a way of making oneself distinct from other groups—the quintessential 
we-versus-them arrangement.  
Hoffman and Ford acknowledge that organizational ethos accommodates 
reputation in ways that Aristotle's concept of ethos did not. Organizational 
rhetors, they write, can draw from and build on an inherent credibility, or they 
can use organizational credibility in reciprocal transactions in certain situations 
(26-7). A similar kind of divide occurs when an organization's identity is defined 
as a set of enduring characteristics. Kuhn's definition works against Aristotle's 
emphasis on how ethos is generated in the discursive dynamic between rhetor 
and audience. If a rhetor generates an ethos suitable to the circumstances the 
rhetor and the audience are in, and if ethos does not depend on reputation but on 
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a strategic alignment with accepted community virtues, then it becomes difficult 
at best to say exactly what characteristics endure outside of the polis of which the 
rhetor and audience are part. 
Case in Point 
As I wrote in chapter 3, CCL describes its enduring characteristics as those 
of an innovative, risk-taking, inventive organization. Beyond indicating a set of 
characteristics, however, CCL's ethos links to a long-standing discourse that 
continually renews the organization's origins. That discourse presents CCL to its 
audiences and to its members as a research pioneer and the creator of solutions 
for business problems.  
CCL ethos as a research pioneer is captured in its self-published 
Unconventional Wisdom: A Brief History of CCL's Pioneering Research and 
Innovation. That work tells the story of H. Smith Richardson, the inventor of 
Vick's VapoRub. Richardson was a small-town pharmacist whose home remedy 
grew to become the Vick Chemical Company. Richardson was concerned about 
the sustainability of his business. Because of his company's origins, he was 
especially interested in why so many family businesses fail when passed from one 
generation to the next. Vick Chemical Company profits were used to create a 
foundation, which in turn funded the start of CCL. CCL's origins are found in the 
attempt to answer Richardson's question about why organizations fail (Glover 
and Wilson 4). 
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However, CCL's origin story is not the summation of the organization. 
Rather than a static text, the story continues a rhetor-audience relationship to 
support the ongoing social recognition of its pioneer, risk-taking ethos. The 
organization often repeats its origin story to itself and to public audiences. For 
example, a mural that adorns one hallway of CCL' headquarters in Greensboro, 
North Carolina (USA), presents the story to visitors and to the managers who 
come to CCL (fig. 2). Befitting the thirtieth anniversary that commissioned it, the 
mural tracks CCL's development from 1970 to 2000. It highlights the opening of 
satellite campuses, the growth in the number of staff, and the rise in the number 
of organizational leaders with whom CCL has interacted (and, presumably, 
positively affected). Not only does the mural communicate CCL's identity to the 
building's visitors, its placement along one of the building's main corridors 
creates a frequent reminder to organizational members about CCL's identity. In 
addition, a permanent archive in CCL's special library makes available artifacts 
related to the organization's beginnings, from newspaper reports, to 
photographs, to objects such as an original flask of VapoRub (fig. 3). These 
installations— the mural and the archival library—invoke an audience that 
recognizes CCL's ethos as an experimental pioneer that "meets the needs of 
business and, ultimately, all organizations" (Glover and Wilson 5). 
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Figure 2. The Public Mural at CCL. The mural narrates a story of a pioneer 
that grows steadily in its influence on organizations.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Artifacts of CCL's Origins. The display contributes to the 
constitution of CCL's organizational ethos of pioneer and thought leader.  
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Invoking an audience as a rhetorical strategy is described in Walter Ong's 
1975 study about the relationship between a composition and its audience, 
specifically the differences between the audience for speech and the audience for 
text. Ong claims that texts, unlike speech (and in contrast to ANT), do not 
address an audience but instead define a role for readers. Ong argues that this 
perspective is necessary to understand how communication works if we do not 
accept what I have previously identified as Shannon's model of communication. 
That model of moving "corpuscular units of something labeled 'information' back 
and forth along tracks between two termini," Ong writes, only works if we believe 
that the audience for written text and the audience of spoken word are alike and 
only differ in that the audience for a speech is immediate and visible, and the 
audience for a text is not (910).3 
The invoked audience concept lends explanatory power to the way that an 
organization's texts and other rhetorical artifacts constitute an audience that can 
participate in the social recognition required for an organization's sustainability 
and credibility—an audience that can contribute to the development of 
organizational ethos. However, CCL's ethos does not rely only on CCL's ability to 
invoke a specific audience through rhetoric, as depicted in a mural or catalogued 
in a library's special collection. Its ethos continually develops and shows itself in 
CCL's contemporary communications: an organization comprised of 
groundbreaking research and innovations. In chapter 3, I discussed a specific 
situation in which CCL established an identity that gave it credibility with 
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academia and among businesses. The ethos CCL established then has become an 
enduring set of characteristics that it continues to develop in league with its 
employees, clients, and other publics. 
For example, consider CCL's ethos as demonstrated in the text of its 
annual reports from 1999 to 2012. A most telling example involves CCL's first 
Distinguished Alumni Award, created in 1999. The award's first recipient, U.S. 
Army General Norman Schwartzkopf, is well known in the public sphere for 
leading the 1991 Gulf War military campaign. By associating itself with 
Schwartzkopf, CCL strives to establish authority and competence. CCL's 
capabilities create the ideal place for positing models of leadership that influence 
the field of management studies and the work of managers (Annual Report 1999-
2000 9). Marking its thirty-year anniversary, CCL's president writes that CCL 
"helped revolutionize the way leadership is understood and developed" 
(Alexander 3). In regard to community, the second aspect of organizational 
credibility, CCL's 1999-2000 report highlights its work with hundreds of teachers 
and principals and other educators in several states. Its work with educational 
and other nonprofit organizations is made possible by the partnerships that CCL 
creates as a clearinghouse for innovative ideas (Annual Report 1999-2000 2, 8-
9). 
In subsequent annual reports, CCL continues to demonstrate an ethos 
whose origins can be found in its earliest artifacts. For example, it is a "pioneer" 
that ventures into "uncharted lands, always moving forward" (2000-2001 3). It 
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demonstrates credibility by noting that newspaper and magazine journalists look 
to CCL as "one of the media's foremost sources on leadership" (2002-2003 19). 
Later, it reinforces claims to credibility by reporting that the Financial Times 
ranks it as one of the top 10 executive development programs in the world (22). 
These statements appear alongside testimonials from past attendees and among 
profiles of successful leaders who cite CCL as an influence on their work. All in 
all, its series of annual reports consistently catalogs CCL's enduring 
characteristics and socializes an ethos of credible authority, of a knowledge 
pioneer and caretaker of knowledge, and of a participant in local and global 
communities. 
The Purpose of Ethos 
Rhetors who display an ethos that audiences accept positively increase 
their ability to persuade. In organizations, the same purpose prevails. However, 
an organization's persuasive purpose may be not only to encourage different 
attitudes or actions but to sustain the characteristics with which it is publically 
identified. Here, we return to the question posed previously in this chapter, 
slightly modified: For what purpose does an organization demonstrate ethos, 
which Aristotle attributes to the demonstration of wisdom, virtue, and goodwill? 
In regard to wisdom, for example, a commercial organization might spend 
part of its resources to periodically survey its customers so that it knows what 
practices they consider virtuous. In response, the organization works to meet 
those expectations, and to the degree it is successful its customers regard its 
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ethos as positive. The opposite example might be the banks, mortgage brokers, 
and local lenders involved with the 2008 credit market collapse and subsequent 
ruinous recessions around the world. None of the organizations along the entire 
transaction chain can claim wisdom. In the face of limited personal capital, 
lenders and buyers generated and acted on unwise beliefs that ignored 
commonsensical and historical evidence regarding economic speculation. Their 
lack of wisdom discounted the interdependency of globalized capital, the 
insecurity of financial holdings leveraged many times over, and the simple, on-
the-face-of-it principle that all investments carry risk. In an indication of how the 
public accepts the ethos of financial institutions, a June 2014 survey from the 
polling firm Gallup measured the public confidence in banks at 26 percent. That 
compares to a 62 percent confidence rate for small business ("Confidence"). 
In regard to virtue, one can imagine an organization that engenders trust 
among its members, its community, and the public. Such an organization builds 
trust from its deeds within and outside of itself. It treats its members, customers, 
clients, and vendors fairly and ethically because it does not want those publics to 
believe that they are being cheated, misled, or otherwise exploited. When the 
organization's publics believe the organization treats them fairly, that belief 
aligns them with the organization's ethos. As a result, the public remains loyal to 
the organization, which benefits the organization and the community—close and 
distant—by contributing to economic and social stability.  
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An organization possessing goodwill should want to provide products and 
services, conduct research, or engage in other activities specific to its field that 
are mindful of the public, specifically of its customers and clients and in broader 
terms mindful of its important affiliates, such as suppliers, dealers, shareholders, 
regulators, and the like. A cosmetic company specializing in natural skin care 
products will practice non-animal product testing, for example, demonstrating 
goodwill insofar as it believes the public benefits from that practice. Provided an 
organization demonstrates a socially recognizable ethos, its members and other 
affiliates organize themselves in a manner that exceeds transactional 
arrangements.4 They take a common stance, which allows them to work 
collectively to address problems, to innovate, and to thrive. Opposite to this 
sustaining effect are the temporarily shadowed practices that shun wisdom, 
virtue, and goodwill. An organization's willful inattentiveness to ethos amounts to 
replacing mutually constitutive practices with unilateral positions based on 
hierarchical power, disciplining technologies, and the contemporaneous erosion 
of social mores. 
 As an example, consider the 2010 mine disaster in Montcoal, West 
Virginia. Twenty-five miners died more than 1000 feet underground in a 
methane explosion. Subsequent investigation reported that the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration—the federal regulatory agency that polices mine safety in 
the United States—had issued 515 safety violations to the Massey Coal Company, 
owner of the Montcoal mine. Almost 50 of the citations pointed to ventilation and 
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escape plan problems. Massey's CEO, Don Blankenship, was quoted as saying 
that being cited for violations was just part of doing business as a mining 
company ("Peril" para. 5). It's not beyond imagination to say that the families of 
miners who work for Massey do not recognize goodwill or virtue in Massey's 
ethos as constituted in the words of its CEO. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the grounds of social ethos, its constitution in 
organizational rhetoric, and the purposes to which organizations put it to use. 
Individual rhetors demonstrate virtue, wisdom, and goodwill to establish 
credibility and strengthen their persuasive purposes. Similarly, organizations 
demonstrate an ethos of credibility, competence, and community to invoke an 
audience's participation in establishing specific kinds of interactions and 
relationships with the organization. Organizations continually communicate 
ethos to ensure that their publics recognize them as a set of enduring 
characteristics. The dynamic between the organizational rhetor and its audiences 
exerts a stabilizing power and contributes to the organization's sustainability.  
The audiences invoked by an organizational rhetor recognize the ethical 
stance that the rhetor takes. As the audience aligns with the virtues demonstrated 
by an organizational rhetor, it grants credibility to the organization. In the 
previous chapter I discussed the construction of rhetorical situations to serve 
specific organizational purposes. Chief among those purposes, in terms of 
organizational rhetoric, is to define the conditions under which an organization 
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presents its ethos. The rhetor's demonstration of ethos must be attuned to the 
time and place of a rhetorical encounter so that it might be recognized by the 
audience. That recognition is different from the rhetor's and the audience's 
mutual recognition of the rhetorical situation; however, in each case, recognition 
helps to constitute the social form through which rhetor and audience can 
interact in meaningful ways. 5 
The dynamic of demonstration and recognition that operates between the 
poles of rhetor and audience makes persuasion more probable. As the public 
encounters a rhetorical situation and recognizes organizational ethos, the stage is 
set for it to identify common interests. Persuasion, as an alignment of interests, 
becomes more probable. This is the stage upon which identification operates, and 
that is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V 
ORGANIZING IDENTIFICATION 
 
 
We live in times when the rhetoric of governments, corporations, and 
other organizations far outpace the capacity of contemporary, deliberative publics 
to serve as hubs of ethical action. A simple scan of our environment reveals a 
landscape of diffuse interests and organizational order where divisions and 
allegiances mix, shift, and drift into transitional patterns. Global 
institutionalization and corporate nation-states erase the ethical boundaries we 
rely on to define the values we can claim, aspire to, and recognize in one another. 
Anthony Giddens describes this state of things as a "time-space distanciation," in 
which localities are shaped by distant events and forces. The state, the 
corporation, and the city disconnect social relations and reconfigure them as 
symbolic tokens and expert systems (Consequences 19-22).   
When we engage organizations in discourse, as organizational members, 
interested citizens, legislative bodies, and so on, what rhetorical mechanisms do 
they and we deploy to reach consensus? In the corporate circumstances we find 
ourselves in, how does rhetoric persuade and why? Are Aristotle’s proofs of ethos, 
logos, and pathos adequate explanations, or do we look for something beyond 
them to operate rhetoric’s deliberative function? My answer to those questions 
draws from Kenneth Burke’s concept of identification. Briefly stated, 
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identification is Burke’s remake of persuasion. It augments the deliberate design 
of Aristotle’s proofs to explain our desire, which we are often not aware of, to 
identify with one social group or another ("Rhetoric—Old and New" 203). Burke 
grounds identification in the perceived shared interests among interlocutors (RM 
20). Identification’s explanatory power gives insight to the purpose and methods 
of the rhetoric with which institutions and individual citizens engage one 
another. As one pair of investigators puts it, "We find ourselves in the paradoxical 
position of declaring our essence, our uniqueness, in large part by expressing 
affiliation of identification with various organized groups, many being employing 
organizations" (Cheney and Tompkins 4). 
This chapter examines identification in the context of organizations. Given 
that identification operates as a rhetorical theory, I will offer some examples of 
the rhetorical practices involved in producing identification as persuasive power. 
Specifically, I will look at identification as the rhetorical process that connects 
people to organizations and organizations to them. 
In the chapter 4, I discussed organizational ethos and its role in producing 
credibility and sustainability. If ethos enables social recognition and makes 
rhetorical situations possible, as I have argued, then what is the role of 
identification? Does identification extend ethos, or does it transform it? How 
does identification relieve organizations, their members, and the public from the 
divisions that separate them? What role does identification play in the discourse 
between organizations and their members that makes it possible for them to 
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adopt mutually constitutive and interdependent positions, without requisite 
consensus?  
Burke’s Identification 
Burke works outs his identification concept across several years and 
books. During that effort, he looks upon identification from various points of 
view—ranging from a refinement of classical rhetoric’s theories of persuasion to a 
process of symbolic interaction that constitutes and is constituted by social 
forms, such as class. In the first instance, Burke argues that while the rhetorical 
canons and the proofs of ethos, logos, and pathos remain relevant to current 
affairs, from our post-Cartesian perspective they are incomplete in that they do 
not explain all modes of persuasion. Burke encourages us to change how we 
understand persuasion, its motives, and its purposes. As applied to contemporary 
circumstances, identification adapts Aristotle's art of discovering and using the 
best means of persuasion in a given circumstance.  
 
If I had to sum up in one word the difference between the "old" rhetoric 
and a "new" (a rhetoric reinvigorated by fresh insights which the "new 
sciences" contributed to the subject), I would reduce it to this: The key 
term for the old rhetoric was "persuasion" and its stress was upon 
deliberate design. The key term for the "new" rhetoric would be 
"identification," which can include a partially "unconscious"" factor in 
appeal. ("Rhetoric" 203) 
 
A more specific definition of identification occurs early in RM. 
 
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are 
joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when 
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their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded 
to do so (20). 
 
 
In other words, it is easier to persuade someone if that person believes that 
his or her interests are the same as or very similar to yours. Or, to pursue Burke’s 
line, if person A identifies with person B, then we can agree that A is persuaded to 
take B’s position toward a given situation in that they have the same interest in 
taking that position.  
Burke describes identification as different from persuasion—less 
stylistically designed, having the capacity to work without our being aware of it—
but no less effective in arousing an audience's emotions or in reaching a decision. 
However, even though Burke offers identification as a replacement for 
persuasion, he does not sever its connection to the classical form. The concept of 
identification is a development of rhetorical theory, not a departure from it. 
According to Burke, we find an inkling of identification in the idea that rhetoric 
deals with opinion, not with truth—truth in the sense that a statement can be 
tested scientifically or in some other way. Audiences can be swayed to action 
based on opinion, Burke reminds us. As Aristotle demonstrates, a rhetor that 
links his argument to traits and behaviors that his audience admires can often 
encourage his audience to transform that admiration into agreement (RM 54).  
Aristotle paid particular attention to that phenomenon by articulating 
topics, or relationships, from which rhetors can draw to create effective 
arguments (Rhetoric 1.3-15). Knowledge of the topics provides rhetors with the 
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means for expressing an argument in ways that are familiar to audiences. The 
topics are of a general (common) and a specific (special) sort. For example, a 
rhetor may fashion an argument around the common topic of whether or not 
something happened. And the rhetor can depend to a great degree that the 
audience addressed shares the rhetor's understanding of what it means for 
something to have happened or not (1.3.1359a).  
However, rhetors must also consider (and make effective use of) the 
special way the relationship manifests in specific situations and as part of one 
rhetorical genre or another. For example, in judicial rhetoric the purpose to 
which the common understanding of whether something happened (Did the 
plaintiff suffer an injury?) is different from the purpose the same understanding 
fulfills when applied in ceremonial rhetoric (Was there a battle in which the 
honoree performed heroically?).  
Ed Dyck's analysis of the topics (and the debate surrounding them) is a 
helpful guide for understanding how rhetors might use them to compose a 
persuasive argument. In particular, Dyck's explication of one particular common 
topic, less and more, demonstrates how topics derive from a broadly understood 
relation. In a particular situation, and in line with the suitable genre, rhetors 
draw on the audience's general understanding of that relation to form the specific 
logical implication at the heart of the enthymeme, "the most important of the 
specific means of persuasion" (106).  
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In brief, Dyck uses less and more as an exemplar to  walk the reader 
through different stages of analysis, beginning with the proposition that this 
particular common topic expresses a binary relationship. The rhetor can combine 
the audience's understanding of that relation with other relations and predicates 
to construct if-then statements. In one example, Dyck uses the Rhetoric to 
describe how the general less-more relationship can generate several if-then 
statements dealing with the property and measurement of good: "'If one of two 
things is an end, and the other is not, then the former is the greater good'" (108; 
1364a).  
Dyck calls if-then statements "deductions of some kind" (109), which leads 
him to discuss enthymemes and, finally, the relationship of the topics to 
enthymemes and their role in constructing them. However, most relevant to my 
discussion here is Dyck's general point about the topics as relations. Enthymemes 
work, he argues, by substituting a relation expressed as a topic for the if-then 
structure of the syllogism: "An enthymeme is a syllogism in which one or more 
premisses may be probable and a topos replaces implication" (111). 
It is not the point of my discussion here to report the proofs that Dyck 
establishes to support his argument. Rather, the point is to emphasize (1) the 
claim that the topics are relations, (2) those relations manifest differently 
according to the parameters Aristotle established for his three genres of rhetoric, 
and (3) the rhetor and the audience share an understanding of those relations, 
either generally or as part of a specific situation. As I turn back to Burke, I want 
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to hold on to the perspective of shared understanding, particularly in the case of 
identification, which leans heavily on a shared understanding of how things 
relate and on the constitution of those relationships as the making of social form.  
Burke's treatment of Aristotle's topics is markedly less developed than 
Dyck's analysis or, for that matter, those analyses set out by the theorists that 
Dyck cites. In terms of understanding how identification works, Burke writes, we 
should understand the topics as rhetorical devices that perform a function. They 
are not window dressing but are "a survey of the things people generally consider 
persuasive" and common methods of persuasion matched to particular situations 
(RM 56.) As tactics, expression, and other stylistic strategies, the topics work to 
persuade audiences and form the core of identification (RM 56-7).  
However, Burke's treatment of Aristotle's topics is worth a closer look, 
despite his narrow claim that they "derive from the principle of persuasion" (RM 
56). After all, Burke calls identification the key term of the new rhetoric, 
connoting its "partially unconscious" workings, compared against persuasion, the 
old rhetoric's key term, with its "stress [on] deliberate design" ("Rhetoric" 203). 
Burke's brief on the nature of the topics only sets the scene for his thesis on how 
we use them as tools for achieving identification—the alignment of interests. 
Burke provides several examples of how Aristotle’s special topics align interests. 
He calls it an attitude of "collaborative expectancy" brought on by "purely formal 
patterns" (RM 58). [I will return to Burke’s ideas of form and discuss them more 
fully and in a different context in chapter 5.] We are reminded of the children’s 
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tale, which begins, "for want of a nail the horse was lost, for want of a shoe the 
horse was lost" and continues in that vein until an entire kingdom falls. As soon 
as we grasp the pattern of the verse, our mind chases ahead and we "have the feel 
of collaborating in the assertion," Burke writes (58). In that collaboration lies 
identification, the joining of interests, the participation that Aristotle captures in 
his idea of the enthymeme.  
A present-day example from organizational rhetoric is General Electric’s 
(GE) television commercial, "Childlike Imagination - What My Mom Does at GE." 
The commercial’s audience watches a series of fantastic images: planes with 
wings like birds, trees that nod to passing trains, moonlight-powered undersea 
fans that produce energy. A young girl’s voiceover narrates the scenes, describing 
them as things her mom does while working at GE. As viewers, we are transfixed 
by the fantastic images and the captivating sense of fantasy, imagination, and the 
all-things-possible responses they generate. By the end (if all goes by plan), we 
are participating in the fantastic world GE makes possible and taking delight in 
the girl’s descriptions. The commercial’s pattern of imagery, its nearly 
recognizable, hauntingly familiar soundtrack, and its charming voiceover invites 
us to adopt the girl’s imagination as our own. Our interest in the possible, as 
framed in this commercial presentation, aligns with hers. We are left anticipating 
what other fantastic things are coming, and in the best circumstances (for GE) we 
attribute our delight to the company who makes our enjoyment possible. 
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Aristotle’s special topics are persuasive rhetorical tactics based on 
principles that do not rely on logic or facts, Burke writes, but on the evocation of 
a response from an audience. Among those principles is the principle of 
identification: "[T]he translation of one’s wishes into terms of an audience‘s 
opinions [is clearly] an instance of identification" (RM 57). 
In addition to linking identification with Aristotle’s topics, Burke also 
argues that the classical concept of ethos enables identification as social 
recognition and as the key component of effective rhetoric: 
 
You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, 
gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your way with 
his. (RM 55) 
 
 
The social recognition that Burke alludes to depends upon hierarchies, and 
in particular the hierarchies of social classes. The principle of hierarchy, he 
argues, operates only when different ranks (higher or lower, before or after) 
accept the "principle of gradation itself." Each rank universalizes that principle to 
transcend division even as it emphasizes difference (RM 138).  
In RM’s second section, "Traditional Terms of Rhetoric," Burke argues for 
identification as an augmentation to classical proofs. He examines a variety of 
texts to illustrate that although classical rhetoricians focus on the common idea of 
persuasion (influencing others to act or to take a position toward a proposed 
action), their theories vary widely. Ross Wolin uses his reading of this section to 
suggest that Burke recognizes that the divides separating competing views—
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divides that we can trace to Plato’s disagreements with the Sophists—pits the 
authority of facts against the deliberation of moral action (189-90). In response 
to the impasse he has created for us, Burke argues in RM and elsewhere that an 
accomplished presentation and recognition of credibility, a rational 
argumentative structure, and a skilled delivery that excites the audience’s 
passions are not the only persuasive tools at the rhetor’s disposal. Biological, 
psychological, and social motives—both intentional and unintentional—are also 
active in accomplishing persuasion.  
Burke grants that identification can be as deliberate as persuasion, such as 
the case in political speeches when campaigners make themselves out to be just 
like the audiences they address. This deliberative notion of identification is 
largely sympathetic to Aristotle's ethos and pathos. However, identification works 
not only as a process of persuasion but also as an end to itself. For example, 
Burke writes, when people long to identify with one group or another, they do not 
necessarily act in response to an external provocation but may be acting on their 
own volition—without consciously persuading themselves. Idealistic motives, he 
explains, also produce identification. Whether in response to the persuasion of an 
external agent or as the unconscious process of pursuing an ideal, the rhetoric of 
identification mitigates the division separating the individual person from the 
group ("Rhetoric" 203). Once we enter the identification process, Burke writes, 
we enter the realm of transformation. Here, individual identity can align itself 
with others, with groups, and even with concepts. Whereas a single rhetor is one 
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voice, when several voices are brought together, each with its own assertions, and 
the voices act on one another in "cooperative competition," the ensuing dialectic 
can produce a view of the situation that is greater than any single perspective 
(203). Burke’s evocative phrase brings to mind Barnard’s description of an 
organization as a "system of consciously coordinated activities." Might we not 
also use Burke’s phrase to evoke a sense of the organization as rhetor, one voice 
from many?  
Before we jump to an answer, however, we might first articulate the 
difference between identification as Burke is using it and identification in its 
psychological sense. Both uses imply a sense of self that relies on our allegiance to 
an external agent. In Attitudes Toward History, Burke makes a careful 
distinction between the two. Identification provides a rhetorical identity when it 
fashions a group of two or more people from individual interlocutors. The 
psychological sense of identification, in comparison, is a therapeutic concept. It is 
also a flawed view, according to Burke, because it stems from a predilection in the 
natural sciences following Descartes to separate individuals from their 
environments. As a result, psychological identification posits that identity is 
specific to each individual person. Even after contemporary psychological 
investigations have repeatedly demonstrated the weakness of that position, Burke 
writes, positivist perspectives engender profound power; so much so, that it’s 
common to pathologize views of identity not centered on the self. The cure to 
psychological trauma, according to this school of thought, is to separate us from 
 
124 
malevolent identifications that cause us problems (263-4). But in fact, Burke 
writes, identification is not pathological and it cannot be eradicated with medical 
treatment nor with any other treatment. On the contrary, we cannot participate 
in human activity without identification. "One’s participation in a collective, 
social role cannot be obtained in any other way," Burke argues. "‘Identification is 
hardly other than a name for the function of sociality" (266-7)6. 
Identification moves beyond the three classical proofs of persuasion by 
embodying our most powerful dialectic: alienation and belonging. Humans 
evolved as a social species. The species does not survive, let alone thrive, without 
the capacity to support individual members of the group. It is worth noting that 
Burke’s distinction relies on that individual-group polarity (a dialectical move we 
find often in Burke’s work). At no time is identification separated from the 
dialectic of division and unity. After all, Burke writes, if we "were not apart from 
one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim [our] unity" 
(RM 22). 
Burke worked out his concept of identification against a background of 
historical situations and with various perspectives from which he analyzed 
human behavior as shaped by and as a response to those situations. Identification 
refers to our establishing relations with things outside of ourselves, to 
constituting social forms, to a transformative device or process, and to a 
materialistic link to economic systems and to property.  
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The rhetorical view of identification and the psychological view of it are 
each a remedy to separateness and alienation. Both senses of the term are 
constituents of division and both account for an adaptive sense of social 
connection (PLF 26-30, 77). Those commonalities can cloud our understanding 
of Burke’s idea, and it is important to focus on his distinction. Psychology 
attempts to heal patients from the disease of identifying with bad actors by 
disconnecting them from that association and reconnecting them with what it 
defines as their authentic identities. In contrast, identification in the rhetorical 
sense subsumes the differences among individuals (ATH 263). In other words, it 
transcends differences. Burke’s calls that outcome consubstantiality—association 
of self in relation to others (RM 20-3).  
Dennis Day describes consubstantiality as a common sense that 
interlocutors develop during identification. Day argues that identification 
manifests in consubstantiality in part because, in Burke’s usage, consubstantiality 
is itself drawn from a specific conception of substance (207). Classic philosophy 
regarded substance as an act, Burke writes, and so people acting together 
constitute a particular approach to living that they share through their common 
ideas, attitudes, images, and so forth. That sharing makes those people 
consubstantial (RM 21). When identification achieves consubstantiality, it does 
not unite two entities as selves in the psychological sense but unites them in the 
substance of common ideas, similarities, and social practices. For example, 
differences between Muslim and Christian have the potential (even if at the time 
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of this writing there is little chance of realizing it) to give way to the 
consubstantiality that believers are human and that both religions are 
Abrahamic.  
Day’s insight is significant in recognizing the capacity of Burke’s 
conceptual framework to explain identity as essential to our being while avoiding 
the essentialisms of identity claimed by positivist psychology. The substance of 
identification is social; identity is not formed nor is it maintained in isolation 
from others or from the environment. Identity is realized only as a relationship 
between the self, others, and the world. No matter the depth of our shared ways 
of knowing, however, our relationships with others and with our environment are 
not enough to make us consubstantial with them—for that we need to experience 
identification, which we accomplish with rhetoric. 
Identification does not immediately subsume all differences, however, as 
evident in the continuing malice separating some Muslims from some Christians. 
However, the point of identification is not to compare two or more people or 
groups as objects. According to Burke, identification aligns one interlocutor’s 
cause with another's interests. If pure identification existed there would be no 
need of persuasion because contrasting interests would never intersect. But 
because we identify with different interests, we negotiate the intersection of those 
interests with rhetoric. (Or, to use our organizational terms, we willingly 
cooperate).  
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Burke urges us to read identification as the dialectic of division, not as the 
process of constituting responses to the consequences of division. Just as the 
concept of substance operates by the axiom of P is both P and not P, so 
identification and division recursively constitute and define one another. The 
result of their oscillating dynamic brings remedy to separateness and alienation; 
it makes change possible by enabling an adaptive sense of social connection (ATH 
268-9). Burke's dialectic reveals identification as a contingent, renewable process 
that fosters adaptability and change to produce consubstantiality. Identification 
remedies alienation by constituting a shared response, no matter how transitory 
that consubstantiality is. Without such adaptive means to address the social 
divisions among us, negotiation and common sense would prove elusive.  
The Object of Identification  
Since Burke first articulated identification as a modern rhetorical concept 
on par with the classical treatment of persuasion, scholarly treatments have 
probed, compared, and extended the concept in tests of its theoretical suitability. 
In his explication of Permanence and Change, for example, Timothy Crusius 
helpfully puts his hands on the essential aspects of Burke's critical position: 
interpretation over positivism, the inseparable nature of mind and body, symbols 
as tools and language as a distinctive tool that brands the human being as 
different from other animals, the public and irreducible nature of language that 
demands a social understanding of humans, and the assertion that we cannot 
regard language as an objective instrument but only rhetorically—and so we come 
 
128 
to understand humans, the language users, rhetorically as well (455-56).7 Where 
does identification fall in this mix? We can draw its coordinates from Burke's 
allegiance to the symbolic. Burke's interest is not in studying symbol systems, 
Crusius writes; rather, his interest is in the idea that the use of symbols implies 
motive. For Burke, motives are not static, objective, or necessarily rational 
objects that we manipulate. Motives are interpretive acts, outcomes of language 
(458-9). 
We get a glimpse of Burke's preoccupation with motives and their 
symbolic expression—and a peek into identification's germination and its final 
object—in an unpublished, untitled paper recently discovered in his personal 
library. That paper shows Burke responding to contemporary critical 
conversations in psychology and language studies—specifically behaviorism and 
semantics. James Zappen, the text’s editor, argues that Burke’s article shows that 
he has already made the social turn, drawing inspiration from the work of George 
Mead and others ("On Persuasion" 333). From the standpoint of social 
psychologists such as Mead, communication creates community. Burke gave 
identification a key role in that constitutive relationship, presenting identification 
as the counterpart of division and suggesting, therefore, that identification is an 
inescapable piece of social forms—from communities to religions, from the 
political to the commercial (RM 19-20). 
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Identification and Association  
Burke’s identification-division dialectic is a prime rhetorical driver. We 
might ask, however, how the tension between those poles moves interlocutors 
beyond their very different experiences to consubstantiality. Those of us skeptical 
of universalist appeals desire to ground Burke’s ideas in material concerns. We 
might, for example, look at the ways in which Burke summons the biological 
imperative of symbolic action and the response of the body to such action, such 
as detailed by Debra Hawhee. In attending to bodies in motion, Burke creates 
another of his dialectical formations, which he uses to escape essentialist and 
constructionist formulations. As an alternative, Hawhee writes, he develops a 
theme of bodies as rhetorically created but imbued with action and motion (1-11). 
Action and motion imply potential for change. Bodies move in space (physical 
and social); they are not static subject positions. Action arises from our motives 
to make those moves. We might say the same for identification, which allows us 
to move among multiple identities (a churchgoer, a software engineer, a parent). 
Here again Burke’s attention falls to social forms and their rhetorical origins. 
Positivism concerns motion as dialectic concerns action (RM 184). Change, the 
transformative rise to ultimate order, relies on association—ourselves with one 
another, with social forms such as organizations, with the superstructures that 
support our social identities. 
Association and its hierarchical power play an important role in how 
Burke conceptualizes identification. When we associate with one entity or 
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another, we turn away from other associations, creating rhetorical opportunities 
from that separation (Wolin 180-1). One person or one class or one nation 
associates with something different from what other people, classes, or nations 
associate themselves with. Such differences are the divides of the universal 
rhetorical situation—we cannot speak of identification without also speaking of 
separation. However, we are reminded that we are not limited to a single 
identification; we can shift among multiple corporate identities (RM 184). I 
believe one way to locate the mechanics of identification is to look at how the 
process is enabled by our associating with, among, and between disparate fields 
of interests. 
To develop the theme of identification as a function of association, we 
draw from Christine Oravec’s analysis of Burke's "Priority of the Idea," which 
appears in A Rhetoric of Motives. She argues that identification operates 
dialectically between the ideas of our individual agency and the historical context 
that surrounds each of us. Identification does not isolate human agents from the 
situations they find themselves (176-8). I agree, and I am suggesting that 
identification is the mechanism inherent in the individual-context dialectic. We 
cannot divorce Burke’s ideas about association from his ideas about identity, 
Oravec writes, which means we cannot separate the associative function from the 
identification process (180-6). Association enables identification as part of the 
process leading to consubstantiality, which dissolves difference in a shared body 
of ideas, images and everyday practices.  
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Oravec’s reading gives us an idea of how association enables the 
identification process. It is helpful for us to know what counts as an association in 
Burke’s framework: Burke distinguishes between three types of associations, 
which relate closely to the vocabularies he describes elsewhere in RM as positive, 
dialectic, and ultimate:   
1. Mechanical: At this level association produces reflexive responses. These 
are reactions we can describe from the perspective of behavioral 
psychology. Burke's example is of a child who, hearing the sound of a 
hammer, imitates a carpenter's actions. 
2. Analogical: Association at this level consists of transferring the principles 
of one field to another. The underlying principle remains universal but 
manifests differently, depending on the field in which it operates. We see 
such associations in managerial studies when authors describe 
organizations as biological, mechanical, or cultural systems. Management 
scholars apply the principle of interdependent parts found in biological 
systems and mechanical systems as a heuristic for understanding an 
organization's strategy, its responses to crisis or competition, its capacity 
to sustain performance, and so on.  
3. Ideological: This level of association connects a universal idea to practices 
that appear as manifestations of that idea. Ideological association differs 
from analogical association in that its principles are prior to the field, 
whereas analogical associations apply the principles of one field to 
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another. Ideological association, for example, might apply the principles of 
capitalism across private, public, commercial, and nonprofit organizations. 
These types of organizations serve different constituencies, and one 
evaluates their effectiveness in different ways. When we hear a politician 
claim that "government should run like a business," for example, he or she 
is associating capitalism’s profit motive with all organizations. The 
rhetoric of that statement disguises the different measures of success for 
corporations and for government. The latter measures success by how well 
it serves its public, whereas a corporation’s success concerns how much 
profit it creates for its shareholders (RM 133-5)8.  
In regard to identification, I believe that we can assign an explanatory 
power to association. However, we might first question whether the identifying 
subject (as a unique identity) possesses the power to associate or has only the 
power to perform, normatively or not, within cultural and historical situations.  
Burke’s ideas about identification and association suggest an answer to 
that question. Identification works not only as persuasion, but also gives us an 
interpretive method that accounts for unconscious and ideal motives as well as 
overt ones. Burke writes that with identification as our heuristic, we can not only 
analyze the ". . . dialectical element in the structure of a social hierarchy, [but we 
can also] disclose the cohesive motives implicit in the thought of oneself as a 
participant in it" ("On Persuasion" 336). Association is a practice we engage in 
only because we understand that in rhetorical situations we participate as 
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interdependent interlocutors and do not occupy our positions as rhetors or 
audiences—even though we can invoke or assume those roles when we come to 
grips with our circumstances. Our participation is less about persuading others 
than it is about the associations we make from experience. It is by association 
that we establish an attitude toward our situation: How does our situation makes 
us react emotionally, physically, intellectually? Is our situation like other 
situations with which we are familiar? 
We can gain another fruitful perspective onto the nature of identification 
as an organizing process by reading Burke’s ideas about association within the 
frame of Frederic Jameson’s definition of ideology. Jameson’s discussion takes 
place in terms of literary criticism and is not specific to rhetoric. Further, for 
Jameson, privileging language, as Burke does, is "little more than a received idea 
or unexamined presupposition" (508). However, we might consider ourselves 
practicing what Burke calls "perspectives of incongruity," a metaphoric approach 
to investigation in which different categories of classifications are juxtaposed to 
shake free from the limits of one perspective and to generate a different one (PC 
89-90). Specifically, we might use Jameson’s perspective on ideology to examine 
Burke’s perspective on association to create a material way to think about 
consubstantiality and persuasion—the path to and the outcome of identification.  
Jameson describes ideology as a "mediatory concept" and "an imperative 
to re-invent a relationship between the linguistic or aesthetic or conceptual fact in 
question and its social ground" (510). Ideology does not anticipate sociological 
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stereotypes. It does not simply pass judgment but rather reframes the questions 
at the base of critical analysis. The usefulness of the ideology concept, Jameson 
writes, is that it exposes the problem at hand and makes it necessary to reinvent 
that relationship to formulate a critical response to the problem (510-11). 
Burke’s notion of ideological association acknowledges the pre-existing 
principles from which ideology works, while suggesting that those principles 
manifest in different practices. When it comes to notions of the self and, as a 
correlative, to identification, ideological association sets the stage for a 
transformational move to consubstantiality. The transcendent medium in which 
that move occurs is the symbolic—specifically the use of language that Burke 
regards as our distinguishing feature.  
Jameson charges that promoting the symbolic act—language use in 
particular—separates that aspect of human behavior from its materialist context 
because it "brings into being that situation to which it is also, at one and the same 
time, a reaction" (512). In other words, the context we produce with language 
paradoxically examines that context from the outside, when, in Jameson’s view, 
the content of our language has to draw the very context it speaks to "into itself to 
give it form" (512). That, Jameson says, is the great divide. (he actually calls it the 
"initial fall" to signify the profound loss of meaning under which we labor). The 
divide is "a breach between text and context, [from which] can only spring 
mechanical efforts to reconnect what is no longer an organic whole" (513). 
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Burke’s answer, as we might expect, is to reframe that breach as a 
dialectic, which reveals the associative principle enabling identification. He does 
not claim that situations exist before we use language to address them or that 
situations are illusions (what Jameson calls "extra-contextual"). For Burke, 
neither of those positions is possible without the principle of the symbol, which 
precedes any agonist perspective we might adopt toward them: "Insofar as each 
[text and context] performs its function, they are no more at odds than the 
stomach and the liver of a healthy organism" (RM 137). In response to any claim 
that separates language from context, Burke emphasizes that the "context of 
situation" (a phrase he borrows from anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski) 
applies to all expression—literary or rhetorical—because the situation can only be 
known to us symbolically. 
 
All such rhetorical concerns with the extraverbal circumstances of the 
verbal act, treated as an aspect of its meaning, are in the positive order of 
vocabulary, and have their grounding in the conditions of sensory 
experience (the realm of sensory images and concepts). But they also deal 
with relations and situations—and since these often require rationalized 
interpretations, we here move toward the dialectical order. (RM 206) 
 
 
 Even the simplest mechanical association relies on a system of signs, 
Oravec reminds us. If we describe a person as temperate, there must be a person 
we refer to who acts temperately. At the analogical level, we might associate that 
temperate person with the larger category of moderation. Analogical associations 
occur not only between people but also between areas of interest. One person’s or 
group’s concerns can be associated with those of another person or group. At the 
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ideological level of association, a single concern governs action across fields of 
interests. For example, the temperate person who practices moderation might 
embrace a moderate perspective toward political choices (184). None of Burke’s 
three association types operate in isolation and none is exclusive. They relate to 
one another as dialectical strategies, a rising spiral of symbolic activity we use to 
bind categories and diffuse difference. Associations that cross categories are 
necessary for identification.  
Burke’s model of association explains the symbolic, natural way in which 
we cross the divides that separate us from the material world, from each other, 
and that cut between groups and between ourselves and the organizations with 
which we affiliate. His association thesis moves us closer to understanding our 
rhetorical motives for dialectically constituting identity as identification of and 
identification with, Oravec writes (183-6). 
Identity and the symbolic action from which we construct it are 
constituents of the associations we perform as social actions—recursive and not 
always intentional actions that we share in the process of identification for 
purposes of unification. Or, to put it another way, our associative acts put into 
play the principles that, to a lesser or greater degree, join individual interests in 
consubstantial concerns. As Oravec writes, "Language is the strategy of 
transcendence by which the unification of subject/object, self/other, . . . and 
individual/collective can occur" (186). 
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People are not always aware of the motives that drive their use of symbols 
to create associations among themselves and with social groups. They do not 
need to be. However, they are aware of their positions in a social order, and their 
use of symbols supports and arises from those positions. People become and 
mark themselves as community members because the language they swim in 
makes the social possible. Whereas classical rhetorical canons speak to our overt 
use of symbols to persuade, identification satisfies our yearning for the group—a 
symbolic channel for motives that we might only dimly suspect. 
Identification and the Motives of Social Order 
We generally want to associate ourselves with corporate entities—with 
bodies larger than our own. As a result, we constitute identity from a chain of 
associations. Institutional identity (corporate, political, religious) and individual 
identity (defined as one’s identification with other people, groups, organizations) 
are bound to one another. Class stratification, dominant and subversive power, 
economic variances, and other forms of division remain amid the unifying bonds 
of identification. We desire order, writes Burke. We recognize the principle of 
hierarchy, and we accept the idea of order because we accept the universal idea of 
gradations. Our acceptance is not merely a ranking of relationships higher and 
lower or before and after. Burke writes: The hierarchy of social order "is complete 
only insofar as it works both ways" (RM 138). The consummate rhetorical motive 
is grounded in the social form itself, not in competing interests, differences, or 
advantages (276).  
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Our desire to identify with something other than ourselves, and to 
recognize others as identified with something other than themselves, motivates 
us to associate ourselves with ideas that operate at a level that transcends 
difference. In mutual recognition and alignment of interests, we find what is 
common among us. Identification ebbs and flows between alienation and 
belonging, and social forms such as organizations arise when collective interest 
takes form by means of association. Here we find Barnard’s "willing cooperation," 
one of the characteristics of organizations. Burke's expresses that idea differently, 
not from the perspective of the group's characteristics but from the perspective of 
the individual person's motivations to associate, identify, and cooperate: "He 
identifies himself with some corporate unit . . . and by profuse praise of this unit 
he praises himself" (ATH 267)9.  
Our desire to bond with one another and with groups across social barriers 
(which, in Burke’s dialectic, are barriers we create in the very act of bonding) 
creates a strong call for rhetoric as a way to achieve the object of identification: 
social order. We get a feel for social order, Burke writes. It is not totally 
sociological (RM 183-7; 200). Order does not present itself to us as an object with 
which we associate. Order is itself comprised of principles that are in play before 
our experience of order. The notion of order is bound up in our symbolic 
interactions, and especially in our use of language (and rhetoric). We use symbols 
as tools to conduct a process of identification that leads to consubstantiality—the 
association of ourselves with others. 
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The motive toward rhetorical action, writes Burke, is not only to persuade 
but also to create cooperation. Our rhetorical action requires "the use of language 
as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to 
symbols" (SS 188). This is symbolic action unmoored from the positivist plane, 
negotiating situations as relational and contingent, rising from mechanical, 
analogical, and ideological associations. Rhetoric is not simply a conditioned 
response, a language gesture, according to Burke. It assumes social structure (RM 
188).  
Identification in an Organizational Context 
Our motivation to associate constitutes social order such as we find in 
organizations. We employ mechanical associations when we name our roles, we 
employ analogical associations when we determine our roles in relationship to 
other organizational roles, and we recognize the idea of order itself because of 
pre-existing principles—most especially the principle of hierarchies. For example, 
the discourse of management acknowledges the contributions of workers to the 
system while also enforcing the hierarchical power of management to control 
workers.  
It sounds somewhat obvious to say that we identify ourselves with others 
and with social forms such as clubs, organizations, political parties, religious 
orders, nation states, and so on. After all, Barnard’s classic definition of the 
organization implies that people voluntarily join organizations and surrender 
some measure of their individual interests in return for the benefits of 
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association. Further, Barnard’s definition suggests a dialectical push and pull, 
which Burke diagrams thusly: "Corporate identity must be of a two-way sort" 
(ATH 265), he writes. A person engages the process of identification to make 
himself or herself greater than he or she is alone, while the organization extends 
and sustains its identity through its members and beyond systems boundaries:  
In terms of the dynamics of organizational identification, Mary Ann Glynn 
provides a useful perspective on the support that organizational studies give to 
Burke’s claim. Although much of the field’s literature classifies identification as a 
natural, universal attribute, Glynn’s research suggests that different people need 
to identify in different ways. Her reading aligns closely with Burke’s theoretical 
claim: People with a high need to identify are looking for something bigger than 
themselves as part of their search for meaning, she writes. Organizational 
identification helps people make sense of their environment, and it also 
maintains the identities people construct as sensemaking activities (238-41).  
Glynn’s examination captures the oscillation between organizational 
identification expressing itself through individual members and organizational 
members extending themselves by means of the organization’s social capital: 
"Individuals typically experience ambivalence in the process of identification; 
they become torn between dual needs for organizational inclusion and individual 
distinctiveness," she writes (241).  
In contrast to how their individual members conceive identity, how do 
organizations view their own identity? According to research by Albert and 
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Whetten, an organization’s identity is often questioned in the face of critical 
situations. At those times, an organization often looks beyond its strategy and the 
information at hand to develop a response based on what its discourse describes 
it to be and what its discourse describes as its aspirations. In practice, they write, 
organizational identity operates as a loose set of ideas, a framework for decisions 
and actions (264). Such a framework—normative organizational practices, 
distinctive organizational practices, and social legitimacy—gives shape to the 
organization’s enduring characteristics as perceived by members, affiliates, and 
the public (Kuhn 200; Hearit 2).  
However, the usefulness of identity and identification goes beyond their 
strategic value. Most organizations cannot rely any longer on top-down 
management to engage workers. Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton point to 
contemporary developments toward "flatter" infrastructures that make it more 
difficult for organizations to use institutionalized means to perpetuate 
themselves. "Increasingly, an organization must reside in the heads and hearts of 
its members" (13). That is an especially difficult challenge for contemporary 
organizations, according to these authors, because of the growing use of 
transactional employees compared to permanent ones: "The notion of 
identification with and loyalty to one's employer, workgroup, or occupation may 
seem quaint, even naive" (14).  
For various reasons, corporate loyalty is no doubt weaker than in times 
past. However, we note that these authors mix economic arguments (contracted 
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versus permanent workers) with rhetorical ones (living in the hearts and heads of 
workers). The shape of organizations undoubtedly changes in response to their 
environments. They may flatten their reporting structures, or they may form a 
matrix, to name two shapes often mentioned in business magazines and books. 
Corporate practices may also change in the face of shifting economic climates, 
but those changes do not vacate the principle of hierarchy, which precedes those 
changes. When workers recognize and accept that principle they make 
organizations possible—whether or not economic forces contribute toward their 
attitudes. Although he does not say explicitly, Burke’s treatment of identification 
is in part a guard against attributing identification-specific agency only to 
organizations, even for actions that sustain them. The rhetorical agency of 
organizational members and affiliates to identify with and so sustain 
organizations plays an equal part in adapting to a changing environment. 
That said, we are quick to acknowledge that organizational rhetoric—such 
as that carried out by managers in various texts such as newsletters, memos, 
annual reports, and employees handbooks—contributes to the identification 
dialectic. It is altogether natural that organizational rhetoric aims to persuade 
and address organizational members and outside constituencies. As Cheney 
writes, "persuasion is inherent in the process of organizing" ("Rhetoric of 
Identification" 144). Each of us chooses which organizations to identify with, for 
how long, and how to juggle multiple identities. Organizations encourage those 
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identifications. In the resulting mix of interests, choice, and action, organizations 
spend substantial resources to encourage their members to identify with them.  
Sustainability, and even the notion of organization itself, rely on our use of 
language to recognize social forms, to mark ourselves as participants, and to 
continually construct those forms to enable our participation. We are the symbol 
using animal, and language runs through us and through the organizations we 
associate with and back through us again in the ongoing identification-division 
dialectic. Organizations, like other social forms, are dynamic. Likewise, to a 
number of contemporary scholars, identity is a "temporary, context-sensitive and 
evolving set of constructions" (Alvesson, Aschcraft, and Thomas 6). Burke's 
dialectic captures the reflexivity of those constructions—the identification with 
and the identification of, as Oravec refers to it (180). We identify ourselves with 
others, with groups, with corporations, and with other social forms because our 
use of language socializes us to do so. At the same time, because our social 
interactions (such as those we experience in organizations) are embodied in our 
use of language, the texts and the speech we produce and engage with prompt our 
recognition and our sustaining of social forms. Without social form, we have no 
common space in which to align interests. Without constituting a shared interest 
in things, we are without sociality. At the scale of an organization, identification 
becomes a process for creating sustainability—engaging members in carrying out 
organizational interests as they would their own.  
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Case in Point 
Cheney’s 1983 methodology creates useful guidelines for analyzing 
rhetorical instances of identification in organizations. Broadly speaking, Cheney 
arranges Burke’s identification-division dialectic between the poles of association 
and disassociation. The former describes an identification founded on similarity, 
and the latter describes an identification founded on alignment against a third 
party. Along that range, Cheney sets out three identification strategies (strategic 
in the sense of operational instruments and not in the sense of motives, which 
Burke treats as potentially unintentional or unconscious). From either the 
associative or the dissociative perspective, identification occurs as an alignment 
of interests. Cheney’s three strategies are (a) common ground; (b) antithesis; and 
(c) the assumed "we" ("Rhetoric of Identification" 147-9). Using Cheney’s 
method, I will examine these identification strategies as facilitated by CCL in 
several of its formal communications.  
Identification of Common Ground 
CCL’s employee handbook gives us ample opportunity to see how an 
organization establishes common ground as an inducement to identification. The 
handbook begins with statements about CCL as an organizational entity and the 
provider of the handbook, which serves as an orienting, informational text for 
new organizational members. Following that introduction, a section attributed to 
CCL’s president describes what it calls the "Center community," which is 
comprised of CCL staff. Curiously, the discussion maintains separation between 
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the organization and its members in its claim that "We are proud of our staff." As 
a result, ambiguity shades the handbook’s rhetoric. Does the "we" refer to the 
consubstantial pairing of organization and its members (a "Center community") 
or to CCL as an organizational rhetor who adopts the royal "we" as a sign of 
division—a signifier of hierarchical authority.  
However, faced with that ambiguity, we remind ourselves that corporate 
identification works both ways, according to Burke. He supplies an example in 
the form of the magazine editor, who exercises the power to accept or reject 
manuscripts—not merely as the representative of the magazine, but as the 
magazine itself. The editor makes "vague reference to his membership in an 
institution," Burke writes. At the same time that editors claim membership 
(albeit vaguely), and hide behind a group identity (such as when "the editors" 
reject a manuscript when in fact it is an individual editor), they are quick to "‘cash 
in’ on the privileges of such an identity" (ATH 266).  
CCL invokes similar transactions. Its employee handbook ends by inviting 
the reader—a new CCL employee—to be a member of the Center community. We 
might ask about the motives of that invitation, because the organization has 
already selected the reader for membership. Readers can deselect themselves by 
declining employment; however, the benefits of identification are clear to 
workers who agree to become community members and who manage to hold on 
to their corporate identity. One former employee tells a story in which he and 
another CCL member stopped at a beer garden in the Alps on the way to a client 
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meeting. The two men drank their beers and fell into a conversation about CCL. 
In that "absolutely remarkable" setting, the story goes, the two of them "thought 
how fortunate we were to be working for this organization" (Herding Cats 72). 
The benefit from organizational identification contributes not only to the 
organization’s sustainability, but makes otherwise elusive experiences a 
possibility. From such a position, persuasion becomes relatively simple. 
Identification by Antithesis 
For the last several years, workers in CCL’s marketing department have 
compiled dossiers that describe the state of the field in which CCL operates. Like 
any successful organization, CCL routinely analyzes its position relative to its 
competition and to the environment in which it operates. The "Market Trends 
and Forecast" reports induce identification by constituting an us-versus-them 
situation. At the macro level, for example, economic and political forces influence 
CCL’s capacity to sustain itself at a level its board of governors considers 
sufficient. The 2013 report, for example, describes the continued stall of Europe’s 
economic recovery as a test of CCL’s ability to withstand the fallout from the 
2008 global recession. The report also names acquisitions and mergers as 
threats. As competitors become bigger and acquire new capabilities, CCL’s ability 
to distinguish itself becomes more difficult, threatening its identity. Neither of 
these examples overtly connects the organization with its members; however, 
both induce identification by calling out threats that CCL shares with its 
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members. Against these common threats, the organization’s interests and those 
of its members become consubstantial. 
Identification in "We" 
CCL’s inclusive use of "we" as an identification tactic occurs, in addition to the 
employee handbook and other places, in the values statement it communicates to 
its members (who regularly share it with nonmembers). The statement consists 
of four elements. 
1. Our work serves society. 
2. Our mission and our clients deserve our best. 
3. Our organization will be a good place to work. 
4. We do our work with regard for one another (Barron SS3).  
 This list illustrates how CCL includes itself in honoring the same values as 
its members. However, we might argue that CCL’s highest priorities are found in 
specific objectives and in the strategy it formulates to achieve them—much like 
other organizations. That is not to say that CCL’s values statement is a 
mystification or a distraction. CCL uses its values statement to signify that it is in 
league with its employees when it comes to practicing and defending common 
values. Further, the values statement is carefully worded to be consistent with 
CCL’s strategy (as in the phrase "clients deserve our best") and its plans for global 
expansion (as in the phrase "our work serves society"). As an organization, CCL 
does not have the agency to fulfill those values. That work falls to its members, 
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and CCL persuades them to take up that work when identification occurs between 
it and its members as a result of the inclusive "we." 
 An organization’s use of the inclusive "we" can sometimes cause confusion 
between rhetor and audience. For example, CCL’s website describes the 
organization’s impact this way: "CCL annually serves more than 20,000 
individuals and 2,000 organizations. . . " ("Quick Facts" para.5). That statement 
is clear enough; however, the next sentence mixes the objective reference to 
CCL’s organizational identity with the identity of its working members: "We 
funded 255 scholarships at a value of more than $1M" and "our knowledge was 
disseminated to nearly two million people" (para. 5). The knowledge referred to is 
the work of CCL researchers and its teaching faculty. CCL’s strategic use of 
identification in "our" and "we" appropriates that knowledge labor, which the 
organization markets as a commodity. CCL’s website does not attribute 
authorship to these claims(the company’s media contact is identified, but the text 
is not attributed to that worker). Without naming a rhetor, the audience may 
assume that the text emerges from a community of individual contributors. But 
in fact the text is the voice of an organizational rhetor, who is accessible only 
through a process of identification that makes the organization consubstantial 
with its members and thereby shares in their authorial agency.  
Identification and Its Organizational Purpose 
 Organizations continually work to persuade employees to act in the 
corporation’s interests and to sublimate personal interests. Employees will often 
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give away the authority of their own identity in a bid to make common purpose. 
What Barnard has called a "willingness to cooperate" (qtd in Hoffman and Ford 
5) we see in the purpose of identification as induced by organizations. When 
members agree about the aim of their work and agree to surrender their 
autonomy, consubstantiality arises. In terms of identification, Cheney explains, 
much of an organization’s rhetoric aims to convince employees to align their 
interests with its own ("Rhetoric of Identification" 158). One purpose for 
organizational rhetoric is to help workers align themselves with corporate goals. 
Any organizational member can identify with the organization without 
prompting; however, organizational rhetoric often plays a role in making that 
shift in allegiance imaginable, achievable, and even desirable. Once identification 
achieves its consubstantial outcome, organizations can operate under the 
principle that its workers will be more open and less skeptical toward its 
decisions and communications. By stating its values, goals, and strategies (what 
Cheney calls the organization’s own collection of identifications), organizations 
initiate a process that its members and its other affiliates complete when they 
adopt those identifications as their own (146-7). 
 When organizations and their members (as well as organizational affiliates 
and the public) make themselves consubstantial, organizations achieve the 
willing cooperation that marks formal social structures. Cheney and Tompkins 
describe willing cooperation as commitment, which they argue is tightly 
interrelated with identification. Identification refers to the substance of the 
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relationship between organizations and their affiliates, they write, and 
commitment refers to the form that those relationships take. In terms of its 
relational substance, identification is both operational and conceptual. We see 
evidence of the former sense when a decision maker in the organization chooses 
an action that best promotes what he or she perceive as the organization’s needs. 
Conceptually, they write, identification refers to a process of association (1-2). 
 In keeping with Burke’s assertion that identification is a process bound up 
in our symbolic interactions, Cheney and Tompkins describe it as "attuned to the 
ways one’s talk about him/herself becomes him/herself" (6). They reiterate that 
organizations produce and reproduce identity "through the conversation of 
shared interests" (6). Their position opposes views of identity as independent of 
acting subjects, as a collective’s essence, or as the recognition of collective agents 
(6).  
Identification’s importance to organizational sustainability becomes 
markedly clear if we pair that process with commitment—an important concern 
of contemporary organizations, which in most cases no longer hire workers for 
long-term jobs that tend to encourage loyalty. Cheney and Tompkins show that 
identifications are necessary to form commitments, which can vary in emphasis 
and change over time. Further, they align themselves with Kanter to argue that 
commitments go beyond situational obligations—they become obligations to 
social systems. As such, commitments do more than signify loyalty to an 
organization. In acts of consubstantiality, commitments suture the gap between 
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the needs of an organization to meet the demands of the system and the tendency 
of people to, in Kanter's words, "orient themselves positively and negatively, 
emotionally and intellectually to situations" (499). In other words, identification 
moves organizational members out of the perspective of isolated situations and 
into an intense connection to durable social forms. When common interests 
support actions and beliefs among individuals and organizations, the dynamic of 
identification supports a sustainable relationship that benefits both. 
Conclusion 
The process of identification extends the social recognition of ethos. Ethos 
connotes a steadfast and predictable position that proves persuasive to audiences 
because it establishes credibility. When circumstances change, however, ethos 
may lack adaptive capacity because it is tightly connected to a community’s 
identifying traits that it attributes to virtue, wisdom, and goodwill. 
By means of associations, identification transcends social differences and 
makes it possible for interlocutors to align their interests. Aligned interests equal 
persuasion, in Burke’s calculation, making identification a powerful source of 
dynamic social orders. As an adaptive measure, interlocutors engage the ongoing 
constitutive process of identification to manage multiple identities in 
unpredictable circumstances, aligning interests as the situation warrants.  
We might think of identification as setting anchor in the shifting currents 
of postmodern organizational life. The anchor may be temporary, but it is enough 
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to create a resting point. From there we take our bearings before negotiating the 
next set of coordinates.  
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CHAPTER VI 
ORGANIZING FORM 
 
 
This chapter examines the role of rhetoric in discursive practices that 
reproduce social order, such as we find in the form of organizations. By social 
order I mean a persistent field of relationships that constitutes and is constituted 
in a network of interpretive and communicative action. As social order persists, 
we take it to be a durable, more or less permanent social form. As a context of 
interests, positions, and associations, social forms arise from and are recognized 
in everyday acts of language. 
The social form of organizations is emergent, according to organizational 
theorist Karl Weick. His sensemaking theory depicts order arising from a process 
of reviewing and comparing past experience with present circumstances. 
Organizational members enact sensemaking to align their sense of self with their 
environment and to justify their decisions as those best suited for given 
circumstances. Sensemaking is comprised of seven properties. 
1. It is grounded in the construction of identities, which are 
"constituted out of the process of interaction" (Sensemaking 20). 
2. Sensemaking is retrospective, in that we know an experience only 
when we look back on it (24-6).
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3. Sensemaking is enacted; our actions construct the environment in 
which sensemaking occurs (30-2). 
4. Sensemaking is social (38-40). 
5. Sensemaking is an ongoing process (43). 
6. Sensemaking operates through cues, which Weick describes as 
familiar structures we use as scaffolding for interpretation (49-51). 
7. Sensemaking is "driven by plausibility rather than accuracy" (55).  
According to Weick's theory, making sense of situations depends quite a 
bit on how we interpret the way that others dealt before with similar situations. 
Their actions are captured and formalized in texts, carried as assumptions and 
tacit knowledge, and continually renewed in conversations. When we talk about 
an organization as a social form, Weick writes, "we are referring to an abstraction 
that has already been carved out and named." Discourse is neither formalized nor 
constantly in flux. Rather, it moves between these poles, a structured formation 
in one instance and a flowing cloud in another ("Bias" 407)10. 
Rhetoric and Social Consequence  
Weick’s sensemaking dialectic of conversation and text and Burke’s 
identification dialectic of division and unification treat the oscillation between 
the poles of the respective theories as energizing a process that makes common 
sense (Weick) and transcends difference (Burke). One outcome of either process 
is organization, a social form marked by a persistent field of interest and 
constituted in discourse.  
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Because sensemaking involves comparing present experience to past 
experience, it is worth asking whether reflective comparisons such as those 
actually produce the consensus for action that Weick cites. How does a review of 
the past illuminate the present? What role does discourse play in sensemaking?  
Weick does not make a case for actor-network theory (ANT) playing a role 
in sensemaking, although his treatment of conversation and text is reminiscent of 
the Montreal School. However, whereas sensemaking emphasizes the means by 
which human agency constructs circumstances as a retroactive act (when 
confronted by a new situation, human actors look back on previous experiences, 
theirs or someone else's), ANT emphasizes a nonessentialist agency inseparable 
from a network of human and nonhuman actors. ANT considers texts actors; 
sensemaking theory regards texts as records of experience.   
As Allard-Poesi points out in a summary of Weick's theory, the core of 
sensemaking remains a paradox: The theory attempts to create an objective body 
of knowledge and attitude from the study of subjective phenomena (169-71). 
Sensemaking is "created and situated in the micro-practices of interactions, 
conversations and coordinated between people" (170), Allard-Poesi writes, and 
the theory’s explanatory power relies on objectifying the tension between 
experience and interpretation. Sensemaking theory shifts organizational analysis 
from group dynamics to individual interactions, including linguistic ones. But 
curiously, Allard-Poesi notes, that methodological shift has not generated further 
deliberations into what it means to use social constructionist theories, such as 
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sensemaking, to analyze agency, deliberation, interpretation, and consensus in 
organizations (170). 
Rhetorical theory provides an alternative explanation of the social 
mechanisms at work in organizations. For example, consider Burke’s concept of 
terministic screens, which proposes that the language we use to define a situation 
limits the ideas we can have of the situation, our descriptions of the situation, and 
the questions we can ask of the situation (SS 114-25). Thus, terministic screens 
erect boundaries within which social forms take shape and operate. Some 
quarters have labeled Burke’s terministic screens as constructionist, casting into 
doubt whether the concept can refer to anything so material as organizations or, 
for that matter, social forms. Paul Stob describes charges of constructionism as 
overlaying Burke’s ideas with critical approaches that were not developed at the 
time Burke was writing (130). For example, Stob writes, some critics have applied 
the social constructionist label to Burke’s view that we understand our world 
socially and share it symbolically, through language. Still other theorists point to 
Burke’s attitude toward knowledge as constructed, not described, by language 
(130-31). 
Burke’s intense focus on symbolic activities and the structures that emerge 
from them certainly suggests a social constructionist at work. From that 
perspective, the reality of our social environment is not natural but discursive, 
Stob writes. However, "we apply [the label of social constructionist] retroactively, 
meshing together [Burke’s] intellectual milieu with our own" (131). Stob’s 
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observation does not dismiss constructionist claims on Burke’s theories as 
anachronistic, of course. We continually develop interpretive frameworks 
through which we revisit texts we previously understood differently under 
different circumstances. The danger in labeling Burke’s work as social 
constructionism, Stob notes, is that in doing so we conceal the historical situation 
from which Burke writes and which presses him toward a specific critical 
vocabulary. We might read Burke’s terminology as that of social constructionism, 
Stob writes, but Burke’s conceptual frameworks are rooted in the pragmatist 
tradition and in the psychological theories of William James (133-34). 
David Blakesley calls Burke’s work an investigation into "how interpretive 
frames exploit the resources of terminology to direct the attention and form the 
attitudes that motivate action" (71). We can see Burke’s aim clearly expressed in 
A Grammar of Motives, writes Blakesley: "'What is involved when we say what 
people are doing and why they are doing it?'" (xv, qtd in Blakeley 77). Burke does 
not focus his theoretical concerns so much on the nature of social forms as he 
focuses them on the question of how language works and the consequences if its 
use (which include social classes, the forms in which we arrange them, and the 
positions in which we arrange ourselves). 
Burke acknowledges the influence of an unwitting agency that acts 
automatically to the symbolic cues of social context (RM 27). However, I do not 
believe that we can pick up on those cues or make sense of context without a 
terminological framework. Our terministic screens do not necessarily create 
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specific situations, even rhetorical situations, but they do influence the responses 
we use to make sense of the situations we find ourselves in. The situations we 
encounter, rhetorical and otherwise, and the responses we make to them 
constitute social consequences that can persist as social form. We do not have to 
adopt a constructionist approach to account for social persistence. However, we 
can use the constructionist perspective as a speculative lens and bring into sight 
some useful tools for analyzing the constitutive, rhetorical mechanics of social 
form.  
Persistence of Form 
In using the word persistence, I do not claim that social forms are 
collections of essential properties that we can objectify as knowledge and as 
targets of discovery. I do not believe that we can separate the objects of our 
attention from the language we use to name them. However, neither would I 
claim that nothing persists from the fluid, discursive interactions in which we 
continually engage. Our past experience with organizations allows us to recognize 
organizations—we know one when we see one. 
We also know an organization when we make one. But as Ron Mallon 
rightly insists, there is nothing special (or interesting) in the claim that discourse 
(what he calls "human social and linguistic activities") causes things to be or to 
persist (1.3 par. 3). That routine claim forms the main support of social 
constructionism. Substituting a constitutive position for a constructionist one 
generates a more interesting set of problems: We know an organization when we 
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make one because the language we use to make an organization is the language 
we use to recognize an organization.  
We do not find self-formed organizations, if by organizations we mean 
what Barnard means: "a system of consciously coordinated activities of two or 
more persons" (qtd. in Cheney 3). We can only make organizations and agree that 
we have done so. It is not a secret, nor is it a recent insight, that we can (and we 
do) observe social order in nature and often use it as a metaphor for social 
groups, such as organizations. For example, consider these lines from 
Shakespeare: "for so work the honey-bees,/Creatures that by a rule in nature 
teach/The act of order to a peopled kingdom" (1.2.188-9). Or, more 
contemporarily, see Gareth Morgan's cataloging of the images often applied to 
organizations, such as machine, organism, brain, and so forth (13, 54, 73). 
Although an organization may have analogic predecessors, it does not have 
natural ones. It has only the social form we provide as we make sense of specific 
situations, and that social form enables us to recognize it as a social form. An 
adaptation of John Searle’s description of a cocktail party makes the point: A key 
element of an organization is that we think of it as an organization (33-4). 
Social constructionism privileges personal or impersonal agency, but a 
constitutive approach locates agency in the relationship between and among 
interlocutors—we and our texts exert agency. As an example of what I mean here, 
see Castor and Cooren’s ANT-oriented investigation into how problem formation 
in organizations relies on the communicative actions of actors—but not the actors 
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we might expect. They argue that the agency behind communicative acts, in an 
organizational context, cannot be attributed only to human agency but is a hybrid 
of different agencies. The agents involved in organizational problem solving 
include not only human actors but also "other entities that appear to compose 
and structure this world—machines, documents, organizations, policies, 
architectural elements, signs, and procedures, to just name a few" (573). The 
social form in these circumstances encompasses the recognition of activities 
(such as solving organizational problems) and the duration of the activities 
themselves as a debate among several agencies (571-2). We might recognize that 
debate as rhetorical. It occupies space in the form of co-located actors, and it 
involves time in the continuing to and fro of deliberative actions. 
It is at first difficult to see the advantage that Castor and Cooren’s 
perspective holds over any number of other images with which we characterize 
organizations. We might question, for example, how they discuss agency’s 
inherent intentionality. They agree that humans have intentions. However, they 
also insist that nonhuman actors can also act with intention (defined by the 
authors as the ability to act and make a difference). The artifacts of organizational 
life—documents, machinery, the workspace arrangements and so on—exert an 
agency of their own. Documents tell organizational members what to do, for 
example. Machines signal when they require maintenance, as in the case of a 
photocopier that asks for a new toner cartridge. "Intentionality is a relational 
phenomenon, which means that there is as much intentionality in a text, a tool, 
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or a machine as there is in the human brain" they write (574). Organizations are 
hybrids of different agencies, human and nonhuman (572-4).  
Treating organizations as hybrids of agencies seems no more difficult (and 
no less misleading) than regarding them as machines, organisms, or brains. In all 
cases, we are working from terministic screens, which Morgan captures in his 
examination of the folly of metaphor in organizational studies. He describes a 
paradox in which "each metaphor opens a horizon of understanding and enacts a 
particular view of organizational reality" (417). Morgan is not describing social 
construction but selective attention. While the metaphors we choose can 
highlight different aspects of organization, he writes, 
 
the use of metaphor implies a way of thinking and a way of seeing that 
pervade how we understand our world generally. . . . [M]etaphor exerts a 
formative influence on science, on our language, and on how we think, as 
well as how we express ourselves on a day to day basis (4). 
 
 
It is difficult to imagine, as Morgan does, how metaphors exert a 
"formative influence" on language separate from the language we use to create 
metaphors. We cannot separate our views of organization from the metaphors we 
use to describe organizations. So we come back to Burke's focus on symbolic 
action. We see through a terministic screen.  
A more fruitful way to consider Castor and Cooren’s hybrid-agency 
perspective is to notice how its emphasis on situation and duration signifies an 
ongoing process, not a stable point in time and space. The circumstances of 
recognizing a problem and the duration of interacting agencies are markers 
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toward which we can direct critical attention. Hybridity conjures the sense of a 
dynamic mixture. Social forms require dynamic forces to generate and to 
perpetuate themselves as social forms. Agency (or intent, or motive, or 
communicative action such as rhetoric), is a mechanism of persistence. 
Intentional action is at once part of the social form of organizations and, as a 
concept of ongoing constituting interaction, it supports the organizing of that 
social form. 
Rhetorics of Form  
Other than influencing the questions we can ask of a situation and how we 
might describe a situation, terministic screens also prepare us to communicate. 
The point of Burke’s terministic screen concept is not to analyze how we 
construct a social world with language but to explain what people are doing when 
they say they are doing things. Terministic screens do not construct our world but 
orient us to it. Orientation implies location and a relationship (hiking cross 
country, for example, we orient ourselves to a landmark to stay on track), explain 
Sarah Mahan-Hays and Roger Aden. Rhetoric comes into play when we develop a 
strategy for dealing with the situation toward which we are oriented—we develop 
an attitude. Terministic screens are as much a consequence of our experiences as 
they are a perspective on our experiences. They orient us to our environment and 
they provide the selective terminology that "reflects our attitude" (35).  
The selective attention we give to a situation, how we set ourselves in 
relation to that situation, and our decisions on how to respond to that situation 
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frame our experience—they do not construct it. The fact that we have different 
views of the world is not because we construct it differently but because our 
attention is selective, because we peer through a terministic screen to choose one 
focus at the expense of another. As Burke puts it, experiences become meaningful 
(we enact sensemaking) because the language we use "selects certain 
relationships as meaningful" (SS 130). Elsewhere he writes: 
 
However important to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has 
experienced firsthand, the whole overall picture is but a construct of 
symbol systems (LSA 5). 
 
 
Social forms require collective symbols. To share our experiences and to 
participate in the constitution of those forms, we draw on a common use of 
symbols and common meanings. We would be wrong to read Burke as a 
structuralist in this regard, however. Burke looks past constructions to find the 
consistently evoked human experience (SS 32). It is the constancy of experience 
that binds individuals to the collective through the rhetoric of form, a concept 
Burke works out in Counter-Statement: "Form is the creation of an appetite in 
the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (31). The 
manner in which appetite is created and satisfied operates at the emotional level, 
not the conceptual level. Burke describes how an artist, a playwright, or a 
composer uses form to allow his or her audience to anticipate what is to come. 
The audience’s anticipation can be satisfied, delayed, or denied by different forms 
(31, 45-51). The reason that an audience can anticipate and the reason that a 
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rhetor can summon and satisfy an audience’s appetite can be found in universal 
patterns of experience, Burke explains, "which seem to arise out of any system of 
living" (171). Universal experiences are those that all of us are capable of having if 
not otherwise disabled; for example, hate, sadness, and hope (149). Drawing from 
those universal experiences, which are individuated along lines of the rhetor’s 
choosing, the audience participates with the rhetor in the constitution of form. 
As social forms constituted in the habits of discourse, organizations are an 
especially rich target of attention for rhetoricians interested in how social 
structures sustain themselves. However, we might fruitfully push against the 
premise that rhetorical interactions form structures that persist in memory and 
in organizations as cultural expectations, laws, beliefs, and so on and ask: What is 
the nature of that structure, the object of its form? How does rhetoric reveal, 
exercise, and perpetuate social form in specific circumstances and contexts, such 
as those of organizations? What purpose is served by the rhetoric of form, beyond 
the evocation of experience? What are the discursive processes that constitute 
social forms such as organizations, and how do those processes operate to sustain 
organizations over time? 
To get at the rhetorical mechanisms inherent in the process perspective 
adopted by Castor and Cooren, I turn to three more or less discourse-aware 
perspectives on social form: dialectical, dialogical, and structurational. Each of 
these theoretical perspectives helps us to see just what it is that discursive acts 
organize. I believe that we can apply these three conceptual frameworks to an 
 
 165   
analysis of organizational rhetoric as constituting and sustaining organizations as 
durable social forms. As Weick points out, there is a limit to using an objective 
analysis to explain how organizations work. The role language plays in 
constituting organizations cannot be overstated. Even though organizations 
devalue talk over action, "conversation is the action in organizing" ("Bias" 405).  
For Weick, the ways in which we make sense of our organizational lives (or make 
sense of any experience) can be regarded as a continual process of comparing our 
interactions with others and with our environment with past experiences.10 
Reading Weick’s theory, Allard-Poesi concludes that shared ideas and common 
understandings are not necessary to generate organization. All that is required is 
the kind of social recognition that permits the members of organizations to 
predict one another’s behaviors (171-4). I also believe this to be the case. 
Rhetoric, as I have been using the term in this project, is a constitutive discursive 
process. It draws on social recognition and the alignment of interests during 
specific situations to constitute the social forms with which we associate, 
including organizations. When rhetoric—ours and an organization’s—persuades 
us toward alignment and commitment, it constitutes order from the potential and 
the probable. Out of that order, we design solutions, fashion tools, and arrive at 
answers. As these things continue to be useful, the organization persists. 
Dialectical, dialogical, and structurational theory each describes the dynamic 
processes that shape organizational rhetoric as a social form. 
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Burke’s Dialectics of Social Forms 
I argued in chapter 4 that ethos works as social recognition, supporting 
credibility when rhetors and audiences see in one another common values and 
attitudes (common in the sense that values and attitudes are recognized 
collectively as useful). Identification extends credibility, generating unity through 
association and bridging divides between and among us— aligning our interests 
directly, analogically, or ideologically. Interlocutors, whether individual or 
collectives (such as the organizations with which most of us affiliate), promote 
and establish situations that call for rhetorical action. The social recognition 
constituted as ethos finds expression in Burke’s identification dialectic of 
division-unity, generating order in the form of classes, roles, positions, and so 
forth. Identification is not a passive outcome of interaction but is an outcome that 
perpetuates order among those interactions—an active outcome of rhetorical 
motives. "From the standpoint of rhetoric," Burke writes, "the implanting of an 
ultimate hierarchy upon social forms is the important thing" (RM 191). The 
ultimate rhetorical motive is embedded "in the persuasiveness of the hierarchic 
order itself" (276).  
Hierarchy and Organizational Form 
As hierarchy is equivalent to division, our rhetorical motive always is to 
bridge those divisions and so take advantage of an identity that surpasses our 
individual positions. Our motive is to promote social cohesion, recognizing it as 
the best outcome of our social interactions. We can express our motives overtly, 
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as in political speeches, and we can act automatically on our motives, as when 
accepting the principle of hierarchy as a natural outcome of classifying and 
cataloging our experience. 
Hierarchical order persists while ethos and identification illuminate and 
support common understanding between rhetors and their audiences. In Burke’s 
view, common understanding is tantamount to a consensus about our place in 
the social order, an acceptance of the principle 
 
whereby all classes of beings are hierarchically arranged, [each one] 
striving towards the perfection of its kind, and so towards the next kind 
above it, while the strivings of the entire series [strive towards] the end of 
all desire(RM 333). 
 
 
As participants in social forms, such as organizations, we re-enact the 
principles of order on which social structures rest. Institutions often represent 
those structures as organizational charts, demographic targets, idealistic 
marketplaces, competitor profiles, and in other ways. In organizations, such 
formal representations share space with immediate but no less defined social 
structures such as cliques (often bounded by functional areas, such as assembly 
line versus design workers), classes (workers or supervisors, for example) 
communities (managerial or executive ranks, for example), and lifeworlds (work 
and home, for example). In each of these manifestations, the principle of 
hierarchy supports the social forms within which we act our lives, or at least parts 
of our lives. 
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Although we readily recognize hierarchy as an arrangement of social 
positions, the idea that it arises from rhetorical motives is less easily observed. 
For example, Thomas Diefenbach’s comprehensive theory of hierarchy as the 
"direct and unequal relationship between individual actors" does not account for 
rhetorical motives or, for that matter, any kind of discursive force as a 
contributor to social forms (7). In his theory, hierarchy does not rely on rhetorical 
motives, repeatable behaviors, recursive agency, or other explanations that are 
often conceptualized as the discursive mechanics that organize social form. 
Diefenbach’s conceptual model places some actors in dominant social positions 
and others in subordinate social positions. Dominant-subordinate relationships 
form the heart of social groups, including organizations, he argues. We accept the 
dominant-subordinate relationship as normal, and we even prefer it over other 
kinds of relationships because of the benefits associated with the hierarchy that 
the relationship produces. For example, while hierarchy limits the power of 
subordinates in organizations, it also protects subordinates from the whims of 
their superiors (2-5). 
Diefenbach's aligns his realist position with sociology’s interactionist 
school (social groups are best understood as the aggregate of individual 
interactions, which should be the focus of sociological investigation). However, 
notwithstanding his focus on the binary dominant-subordinate relationship, 
Diefenbach’s theory begs the question of just how that relationship forms in the 
first place. Instead of working out that problem, Diefenbach originates the 
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relationship in pre-formed conceptual schema, which he calls mindsets: the 
interests, identities, emotions, and moral character of actors in a given hierarchy. 
He argues that social actors participate and perpetuate the divided nature of 
hierarchy—it is ingrained in their social perception of the world around them and 
shapes how they make sense of that world (6).  
Diefenbach does not say, however, how mindsets manifest as practice or 
come to be ingrained. What happens to the discursive interactions between 
dominant and subordinate social positions? What happens because of those 
interactions? Can we really simplify the dynamics of hierarchy to notions of 
discipline and power without a careful examination of the mechanics that 
energize that power? If we follow Diefenbach’s model, we soon trip its 
deconstructive trigger: his approach to understanding organizational 
sustainability—the persistence of organizations as social forms—relies on systems 
and institutions more than it relies on symbolic interactions. It is, in the end, 
nothing more than a restatement of sociology’s group-dynamic methodology. 
When Diefenbach places power and discipline outside of interpersonal 
interactions to illuminate the hierarchy’s persistence, his theory demonstrates its 
incapacity to open itself to dialectical analysis. Although his focus on two social 
positions invites a dialectical stance, his theory's uncritical acceptance of 
hierarchy as the relationship between dominant and subordinate actors limits the 
ways in which it can explain the motives that people have for identifying with 
social forms such as organizations. As close as he comes is to describe a process 
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he calls "boundary crossing." In that process, the subordinate class exercises 
some level of freedom from the hierarchy when it acts within its own boundaries 
to mediate the actions of dominant organizational actors. Subordinate actions 
include language acts, and they carve space out of the hierarchy for their 
performance. As those actions repeat, Diefenbach writes, they become seen as 
routine behavior. Boundary crossing actions (creating and repeating acts to 
constitute space for agency) institutionalize the dominant-subordinate 
relationship as "abstract organizational order" (7). 
Clearly, any action taken by either class in Diefenbach’s model confines 
itself to the hierarchy established by the dominant-subordinate binary. That 
makes Diefenbach’s boundary crossing different from Burke’s idea of hierarchy. 
Burke’s formulation holds that, in a hierarchy, social mobility and defenses 
against it are not necessarily governed by the dominant class exercising discipline 
against non-normative acts. Rather, the ultimate rhetorical motive is embedded 
"in the persuasiveness of the hierarchic order itself" (RM 276). To successfully act 
on our motives to change or maintain our hierarchical position, we must abandon 
the division of dominant and subordinate for the unity of the hierarchical 
principle.  
Burke informs our understanding of organizations by focusing our 
attention on psychological and sociological assumptions about behavior, 
performance, and action embedded in discourse. Those assumptions (terministic 
screens) are different from the assumptions at work in a realist (Deifenbach) or a 
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constructionist (Weick) approach. The dialectical energy of Burke’s rhetorical 
theory permits a situated, adaptive approach to the rhetoric of form. The 
discursive process in play between dominant and subordinate positions 
(identification) produces a hierarchy common to both positions—it is a process 
that operates associatively on the level of principles to create and sustain the 
social form of organizations.  
"The hierarchic principle itself is inevitable in systematic thought," Burke 
writes (RM 141). The constitution of hierarchies make social order seem natural, 
which helps to explain why Diefenbach takes them as a preconceived binary of 
dominant and subordinate power. Order implies a series of increases or 
decreases, according to Burke, which he describes as sharpening into 
classifications (RM 141). Burke’s conceptual frame and his close examination of 
motive, deep hierarchical structure, and socially-embedded symbolic action are 
important counterparts to constructionist and realist approaches to the 
organizing of social form, such as sensemaking and the dominant-subservient 
binary. Sharing our experiences with others dramatizes the function of 
identification as a mutually interpretive act—the heart of persuasion and the 
rhetorical constitution of social form. 
Dramatism and Social Form 
Organizational scholars often use the terminology of drama—roles, actors, 
scripts, and so on. Usually, they use those terms to describe standing 
relationships rather than to analyze dynamic social processes, such as rhetoric 
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(Kärreman 89-90). Burke's dramatism refers to much more than labels for actors 
and roles and social transcripts. Burke uses his pentad—his five-part model of 
dramatism—to answer, "What is involved when we say what people are doing and 
why they are doing it" (GM xv)? He argues that a worthwhile answer requires 
language that does not "avoid ambiguity, but . . . that clearly reveals the strategic 
spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise" (xviii). The pentad—act, scene, 
agent, agency, and purpose—marks those strategic points and, for Burke, it is 
well-suited to explain human behavior. The pentad forms the nucleus of Burke’s 
grammar of motives. We can apply the grammar to the social relationships that 
generate ambiguity (or division, using the language of A Rhetoric of Motives) to 
reveal why people do the things they do and why others describe those people 
and what they do in certain ways.  
In terms of the pentad, acts are significant in their difference from 
motions. While an object can be put into motion, an act requires us to define, 
mediate, and motivate. We are free to act, and we have a will to act—unlike an 
object, which can respond with motion only when acted upon (SS 9). Scene is the 
situation in which an act takes place—the container for the act. The agent is the 
person who acts, and agency describes the mechanisms by which a person carries 
out an act. Purpose is the reason for the act.  
Burke acknowledges that we can and often do disagree with one another 
about the use of the pentad’s terms. We might disagree about who took action, for 
example, or for what purpose, or, as we have seen with Bitzer’s concept of the 
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rhetorical situation, we can disagree about the scene in which the action occurs 
(GM xv). However, Burke’s pentad does not simply restate classical rhetoric’s 
concept of stasis (an agreement between interlocutors about the central issue 
under debate). We can use the pentad to understand the rhetorical motives 
behind how people act in particular circumstances and how their actions are 
described. In short, the pentad maps social relationships. Additionally, the 
pentad is an analytical tool for establishing how the different elements of social 
life relate to one another and in what proportion. In any given situation or for any 
given act, motive determines the proportion of scene, act, agency, purpose, and 
act and so affects the presentation and the reception of what is being done in 
those moments and how we are to talk about it. Within the scope of a social form, 
such as an organization, we can use Burke’s pentad to show how the 
interpretation and mediation that occurs among social classes (e.g., supervisors 
and workers, executives and managers) as they come to grips with one another is 
a dramatic performance (39). 
Barbara Gray and Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart, building from the work of 
Goffman and Bourdieu, call those dramatic performances in organizations "class 
work," which they define as "interpretive processes and interaction rituals that 
organizational members individually and collectively take to manage cross-class 
encounters" (671). The authors define class work as both representative and 
constitutive: "Through class work individuals are both conforming to class rules 
and also reinforcing the class distinctions that give rise to them" (671). 
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Gray and Kish-Gephart emphasize that social interactions are not free 
from hierarchical influence. Social class (a group identified with specific 
properties, such as gender or economic status) is different from organizational 
status (levels of deference related to position). It is usual that the formal 
hierarchy in organizations grants status based on position. A person higher in the 
company enjoys more influence that one in a lower position because the higher 
position establishes relationships that are different from those established in the 
lower positions. Class divisions work differently from how a hierarchy of 
positions works, write Gray and Kish-Gephart. Class differences affect status in 
organizations because they affect expectations about performance. For example, 
they write, women can be judged less competent than men on the basis of gender. 
Class work sets people’s perceptions about one another and so creates and 
maintains the hierarchy in which some classes become influential while other 
classes remain less so (672-3).  
In terms of social form, the salient part of Gray and Kish-Gephart’s class-
work model explains the transformation of single encounters into 
institutionalized ones. The class-work model incorporates Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus, which he describes as a "system of structured, structuring 
dispositions, . . . an acquired system of generative schemes" that manifest in daily 
practices (LP 55). Habitus enters the organization as class differences, Gray and 
Kish-Gephart write, specifically as differences in social and economic capital. The 
practices that enact habitus are reflexively embedded in the roles that people 
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perform at work and they shape the legitimizing forces in organizations to "enact 
normative control" and "reinforce the subjectification of individuals" to justify 
"the extant hierarchy . . . within organizations" (677).  
For example, consider an organization in which male members of the 
executive team (the highest class in terms of social and economic capital as 
measured outside of the organization) dress formally in suits and ties. Other 
organizational members dress less formally—well enough to meet the company 
standards but comfortable enough to suit their tastes and budgets. The 
organization's norms about dress mark classes, distinguishing those people with 
social and economic power from those without it. If a low-level employee adds a 
tie and jacket to his wardrobe, that action marks identification with his superiors. 
To put oneself on the path toward the executive class in our fictional 
organization, one first dresses the part—that is the norm, and by abiding by it our 
staff member adds to its institutionalization. 
Not all organizations share the same norms, of course. A startup tech 
company may have no norms about dress, for example. Other organizations 
display a tremendous degree of egalitarianism, in which workers at all levels 
engage one another as equals. However, even in these examples, class work 
occurs between individual organizational members. Barbara Ehrenreich's book, 
Nickel and Dimed, provides us with an example. To conduct the research for her 
book, Ehrenreich conceals her identity to get hired into low-wage jobs for the 
purpose of reporting on the workers, the jobs, and the personal lives at that level 
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of the American economy. One of her conclusions is that the managerial 
authority foisted on low-wage employers enforces the class structure. Employers 
must distrust the social class from which they hire, she writes, because otherwise 
there would not be the "perceived need for repressive management and intrusive" 
requirements such as drug testing (212).  
According to Bourdieu, habitus is "embodied history, internalized in 
second nature" (LP 56) an "open system of dispositions" subject to experiences 
which modify or reinforce its structure (133). Burke approaches the same 
perspective on social forms: "The idea, or underlying principle, must be 
approached through the sensory images of the cultural scene" (RM 137). But 
whereas Bourdieu questions the authenticity of interpersonal relations, 
describing them as "only apparently person-to-person relations and the truth of 
the interaction never lies entirely in the interaction" (291, n6), Burke's focus on 
the pentad—with its agent and other components—does not question the 
authenticity of social interactions. 
Although Burke recognizes the power of ideology to discipline and control, 
he focuses on the individual motives for associating different classes through 
ideological means. In Burke’s framework, we do not need an ideology to limit 
choice and attention and attitude. All we need (and what we cannot separate 
ourselves from) is language and the symbolic activity it supports. Hierarchies are 
embedded at least partly in our terministic screens, which establish (among the 
other results I discussed previously), how different social classes view their 
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common situation. Terministic screens operate selectively, and through them we 
determine which of our experiences are most meaningful to our positions in the 
hierarchy (SS 115-19). Out of language—and in the grasp of terministic screens—
we fashion hierarchical order that "creates frames of acceptance and rejection of 
authority" (33). Terministic screens are unavoidably discursive; they influence 
and are the consequences of the symbolic tools we use to share experiences, while 
simultaneously restricting our experience to that which is in our field of 
attention.  
Given how terministic screens operate, we can use Burke’s pentad to see 
more than motive and circumstance. The pentad makes the relationships in 
rhetorical situations explicit. We can use it to show how we think about our 
actions and the actions of others and what kinds of questions we might ask about 
those actions. One might argue whether the acceptance of hierarchy is an 
outcome of a power struggle (Diefenbach) or an outcome of performance (Gray 
and Kish-Gephart). One might also ask if either of those concepts manifests as a 
willingness to set aside self-interest for institutional interest (as in Barnard’s 
definition of organization). Can either concept describe the confluence of 
interests evident in organizational life as anything other than the organization’s 
cooptation of individual power? Burke’s dialectic recognizes the paradox at the 
heart of those questions: Organizations wield power and discipline over their 
members, and organizational members identify with organizations as a means of 
extending their own power. The principle of hierarchy, as Burke puts it, works 
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transcendentally, making an ultimate order of individual attitudes and 
organizational discipline. It is that order that we take as the social form of 
organization. Our relationships within social fields are the sources of dialectical 
encounters. During those encounters we create and use symbols to share with 
others the meaning we make of our experiences. Burke argues that social groups 
form around this collective use of symbols (SS 32). Further, Burke emphasizes 
that order is not synonymous with norms but is better regarded as a means of 
disseminating authority: "Such mutuality of rule and service, with its uncertain 
dividing-line between loyalty and servitude, takes roughly a pyramidal or 
hierarchical form" (PC 276). Figure 4 illustrates the form that class division takes 
as each side of the division strives toward ultimate order. 
Burke’s dramatism removes us from realist assumptions about psychology 
and constructionist assumptions about representation and interpretation, giving 
us another way to examine the rhetorical interactions that support social forms. 
In the move toward ultimate order, interlocutors transcend class divisions and 
other differences to unify in the organizational hierarchy with which they 
identify. Many contemporary organizations refer to their structures as "flat," 
"matrixed," or as other alternatives to hierarchies, but whatever the label, 
hierarchy persists. Burke's dramatist methodology shows action in context. 
Entering a situation, Burke writes, we move from terministic screen (orientation) 
to motivation (constituting a unified view). We discern situations using the 
language we have developed in everyday life. Situations entail a web of 
 
 179   
interpretative elements—signs, meanings, and so on—that do not necessarily 
match with each other but which we must bring into our understanding so that 
we can act in the way that benefits us most and harms us least. That motiveforms 
the context for symbolic action (SS 126). When we join our interests with the 
interests of others, and when we match our symbolic actions with the actions of 
others, we establish commonality and constitute a persistent social form—a scene 
for action, agency, and purpose.  
 
Figure 4. Dialectics of Social Form. Adapted from Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of 
Motives (Berkeley: U of Calif. P, 1950; print; 187). 
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Bakhtin’s Dialogics of Social Form 
In chapter 2, I discussed the conceptual challenge posed by our naming 
organizations as speakers. It is difficult to assign a single voice to an organization, 
given the problem of identifying just who is doing the speaking and who is 
sanctioned to speak. Whether we are listening to an executive, a public relations 
staff member, or a line worker, we must ask: How is that speech an organization's 
speech? Organizations identify themselves as single entities and as collectives of 
like-minded people, and they often use "we" interchangeably with their corporate 
names when speaking from those positions. Burke’s dramatist method examines 
the relationships that, through dialectical exchanges (which he labels rhetorical), 
form consensus and support hierarchical social forms.  
However, alternatives to dialectic emphasize different dynamics to account 
for the multiple voices at work in organizations. Bakhtin’s dialogical approach 
examines the constitutive dynamics of multiple voices. Whereas dialectic puts 
one side against another to seek synthesis, a dialogical perspective does not 
require that divisions become unified but considers all positions to operate 
simultaneously. In dialogical terms, the rhetorical organization is a hybrid of 
voices, all of which influence and are influenced by language enacted over and 
over in specific circumstances.  
All speech is run through with the speech of others (heteroglossia), 
explains Bakhtin. In a plurality of voices, which Bakhtin calls polyphony, unitary 
language does not arise dialectically; rather, unity occurs when one voice imposes 
 
 181   
limits on the others. Order is not a transcendent unity but a polyphonic 
unification at the ideological level. In this polyphonic mix, the norms of a 
discourse are generated (DI 270).  
Dialogism emphasizes a view that the forces that create social form cannot 
be separated into language and relationships. As Simon Dentith observes, "There 
is no stopping place . . . for dialogic interactions, other than the social 
relationships within which dialogue is constituted" (324). Assessing the agonistic 
relationship between Bakhtin’s theories and some rhetorical criticism, Dentith 
summarizes the core of the dialogical method thus: 
 
What governs the to and fro of linguistic interaction are the social 
dispositions of the speakers, while these social dispositions are themselves 
realized, in part, through language (315).  
 
 
Along those lines we might recognize a connection to Burke's principle of 
hierarchy, which is also dependent on our recognizing not only the principle itself 
but our place relative to the places of others in the hierarchy. 
Heteroglossia and polyphony appear at odds with rhetorical practice 
because they depart from rhetoric's relationship to dialectic. And in fact, Bakhtin 
argues that heteroglossia does not apply to rhetoric, referring to the latter as 
double-voiced (speaker and audience), not multivocal or polyphonic. In 
comparing rhetoric to the literary language of a novel, for example, Bakhtin 
argues that rhetorical texts are not "fertilized with the forces of historical 
becoming that serve to stratify language" and are only echoes "narrowed down to 
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an individual polemic" (DI 325). Therefore, although a speaker can make use of 
others' voices, that speech is not heteroglossic because it remains fixed by the 
speaker’s words and by the response of the audience. 
Nevertheless, Bakhtin himself gives us a way around what he calls 
rhetoric's fixed, monological voice. His conception of speech genres offers a 
model of how linguistic practices lend themselves to the discursive structure of 
social context. Speech genres comprise the language of individual utterance (the 
basic unit of language, in Bakhtin’s theory), and they are composed of thematic 
content (conditions and goals), style (selection of linguistic resources), and 
compositional structure (ordering). [One cannot help but think of rhetoric's five 
canons when reading Bakhtin's list.] Speech genres come in two types: primary 
speech genres are those of everyday speech; secondary speech genres are more or 
less complex representations of primary speech genres, such as one might find in 
a novel (SG 60-7).  
For example, many of the staff members at CCL are either researchers or 
trainers (there is crossover, but in general, staff member roles are defined by 
these two broad categories). Speech genres support the work of the respective 
groups. Most of the researchers have advanced degrees in sociology and 
psychology, talk of "theory" and "the literature" and "journals" and otherwise 
mark their roles with academic phrases. Post-doc students who take temporary 
research positions at CCL quickly understand how to contribute to the group's 
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conversations because they share in the speech genre and bring it with them from 
their own academic training. 
Many CCL trainers also have advanced degrees and certifications in 
education, counseling, and business. They use phrases like "client work" and 
"solutions" to signal their roles as "client-facing" faculty. Trainers are often in 
contact with the sales group, which is responsible for proposing services in a bid 
for business. Because the groups share speech genres, their back and forth 
communication proceeds with little trouble—they are "on the same page."  
Across CCL in general, scores of acronyms serve as a shorthand list of 
organizational activities: OE for open enrollment, CCL's public programs; LOI for 
one of CCL's business simulations; LDP for the flagship leader development 
program, and so on. (The number of acronyms is so great that new employees are 
often given a list of them so that they can understand what their colleagues are 
saying.) Knowledge of those acronyms marks one as a CCL insider who is more or 
less capable of talking about CCL's work with other organizational members. 
Through the speech genre of CCL acronyms, organizational members can discuss 
complicated issues about the business, no matter their role.   
In terms of supporting social forms, Bahktin writes, speech genres mark 
social classes—they accumulate ways of being (scholarly or business-oriented, for 
example), perspectives (theoretical or practical), and interpretive approaches 
toward the world (academic research or client interactions). Speech genres 
identify group members and distinguish groups from one another, 
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acknowledging and sustaining organizational structure. Speech genres may be 
close cousins to terministic screens, but where the latter press the limits imposed 
by specific uses of language, speech genres extend talk and texts through a 
polyphonic process. In Bakhtin's formulation, genre isn't a template or a means 
of categorizing the use of language, nor is it defined by purpose and audience. 
Rather, genre is an assemblage of cultural practices. Among its cumulative results 
are embedded semantic forms associated with those cultural practices (SG 5).  
By locating cultural practices in speech genres, Bakhtin maintains 
openness to social context, writing that culture can't be enclosed or objectified: 
"The unity of a particular culture is an open unity" (SG 6). Openness suggests a 
permeable boundary in constant contact with what lies outside of any particular 
social form; therefore, it implies the ever-present potential for change (social 
forms are subject to change by the same rhetorical actions that constitute them). 
Further, he writes, language is not a carefully tuned system we bring to bear on 
disordered experience. Language is "ideologically saturated" as a cultural 
practice, and it operates as a perspective out of which we might create the best 
chance of mutual understanding (DI 271). Bakhtin's ideological approach to 
discourse differs markedly from Burke’s identification process and his claim to 
symbolic action. In Bakhtin's theory, a speaker is always using the voices of 
others as his or her own. The audience recognizes speech genres as class markers 
and responds accordingly—recognition determines position and attitude as 
supports of social form. In Burke, each speaker and audience is an agent acting in 
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a specific situation with purpose, and social form stabilizes as their interests 
align. 
Bakhtin's speech genres operate similarly to other social practices that, 
through repetition, bind up time and space as recurring situations so that they 
become familiar to us—routine. At any historical moment, Bakhtin says, each 
generation at each level of society possesses a language that crosses space and 
time (DI 276). That is, the language of each social class is at once situated in time 
and space and also moving in time and space. He writes: 
 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular 
historical moment in a socially specific environment cannot fail to brush 
up against thousands of living dialogical threads. . . . The utterance arises 
out of this dialogue as a continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it (276-77). 
 
 
Evidence for Bakhtin’s claim lies in the fact that languages of different 
epochs coexist simultaneously in specific contexts: for example, the volume of 
Emerson’s essays on my night table. Each language, in or out of its time, speaks 
from a particular viewpoint. The dialogic interplay between speech genres across 
space and time reflexively weaves the situations we find ourselves in while also 
refilling the reservoir of speech that is available for our use (DI 289-91). Writes 
Bakhtin:  
 
A common unitary language is a system of linguistic norms. But these 
norms do not constitute an abstract imperative; they are rather the 
generative forces of linguistic life (270). 
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In addition to speech genres, Bakhtin locates two other generative forces 
at play in the open field of linguistic action he describes. A centripetal force 
exercises normative power that produces a homogenizing, hierarchical influence 
on language, Bahktin explains. As a counter to that normative power, a 
centrifugal force exercises a dispersing power that travels through and energizes 
everyday speech (DI 425). Figure 5 depicts the dialogical binding of social form. 
 
 
Figure 5. Dialogics of Social Form. Adapted from Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres 
and Other Late Essays (Austin: U of Texas P, 1986; print, 60-102; and The 
Dialogic Imagination (Austin: U of Texas P, 1981; print; 425). 
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The dynamic constituted by those two forces provides the necessary, continuous 
The dynamic constituted by those two forces provides the continuous energy that 
supports social forms by making available the language we use to recognize them. 
Giddens' Structurational Social Form  
The third theoretical perspective I want to apply to the problem of rhetoric 
as constituting and sustaining organizations as durable social forms is Anthony 
Giddens’ structuration theory. Unlike the theories from Burke and Bakhtin, 
structuration theory is not overtly focused on discourse. However, the theory 
aligns with discourse theory and rhetorical theory in interesting ways. Because 
structuration theory originates in sociological studies rather than in rhetorical or 
communication studies, this section of the chapter will map some of the common 
terrain that Giddens’s specific theory of sociology shares with rhetorical theory. 
That common ground will give us another vantage point from which to make 
inquiries into the role rhetoric plays in reproducing persistent social forms such 
as organizations.  
Giddens offers structuration theory as a third way of social theorizing that 
works beyond the discipline's traditional theoretical binary of interactionism and 
systems theory. Structuration theory adopts a different stance from systems 
theory that privileges the analysis of groups over individuals. Structuration 
theory also parts company with interactionist theory’s social-psychological 
emphasis on individual activities that join in action under specific conditions of 
time and place. In his view, neither of those theoretical approaches fully accounts 
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for the organized social context that simultaneously constrains and enables 
activities that constitute the persistent process of organizing those activities (see 
fig. 6). Structuration theory views human activity as recursive and dialogical—not 
just the result of individual experiences or the product of totalizing social 
mechanisms. Like other social activities that Giddens discusses, rhetoric does not 
arise from single actors, but is "continually recreated by them via the very means 
whereby they express themselves as actors" (2). 
 
 
Figure 6. Structuration Process. Adapted from Anthony Giddens, The 
Constitution of Society: Introduction of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: U 
of Calif. P, 1984; print; 16-28). The actions, rules, and resources practiced by 
agents in a recursive process structure social form. 
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Structuration theory has not been widely adopted into rhetorical studies, 
perhaps because Giddens denies language a unique significance among social 
practices. However, Stephen Collins and James Hoopes read Giddens in a way 
that counters that resistance. Giddens is not hostile or indifferent to rhetoric, 
they write. It is important to understand that, in his work, social structure and 
language are not constitutive of one another and they are not separate things; 
they are aspects of the single practice of situated human action. The meaning of 
language cannot be separated from objects in space or from objects in time; 
therefore, we ought not to focus on the use of words but on using words (637-41). 
If we look for structuration theory's relevance to discourse, we find its first 
hint in Giddens’s naming signification as one of three structural dimensions to 
social systems (domination and legitimation are the other two). Each dimension 
relies on a specific theoretical domain for explaining social phenomenon and is 
expressed through symbolic action. When people engage in social interaction 
within a dimension—when they communicate—they draw from interpretive 
schemes that comprise their tacit knowledge about the situations they find 
themselves in and which they reflexively apply (Constitution 30-1). 
Giddens speculates that the most basic question of social theory is the 
question of how order comes to be: What is the means by which social relations 
transcend individual experience? Both conditions are durable, and each operates 
in a separate but connected time frame. Institutions operate on a long-duration 
timescale, whereas the individual experience of day-to-day activities evaporates 
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along the irreversible path of a person’s lifespan (34-5). What connects the two, 
Giddens explains, is a duality of structure. 
 
The reversible time of institutions is both the condition and the outcome of 
the practices organized in the continuity of daily life, the main substantive 
form of the duality of structure (36). 
 
 
With Giddens’s position in sight, we can sharpen our focus on rhetoric's 
role in constituting that duality of structure. Giddens does not privilege language 
over other human activities. However, he does account for the discursive 
component of social context and, in particular, communication as it coordinates 
social interactions. Discourse plays a role in almost any encounter, whether it is a 
verbal explanation or a choice in clothing style. Think of all the regulating activity 
surrounding conversations: there are standard openings and closings, there is an 
expectation that conversations occur between or among more than one person, 
and so on. From an interactionist perspective, talk exemplifies the agreement by 
which individual people come together and "sustain matters having a ratified, 
joint, current, and running claim upon attention" (83). This is exactly the kind of 
regulating activity we see in organizations: Organizational members talk to 
recognize one another as such, to reach consensus about what action to take in a 
certain situation, and to position one another in the organizational hierarchy 
based on class identifiers (such as clothing and speech genres). During these 
moments, people exhibit discursive consciousness, which Giddens defines as the 
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capacity of people to talk about social conditions and in particular about the 
conditions under which they act (374).  
Giddens’s structuration theory (Burke’s and Bakhtin’s theories as well) 
takes discourse beyond information exchange and moves us closer to 
understanding its capacity to form alliances and community, extending them to 
constitute the institutions that so often define contemporary life. In addressing 
not only social form, but also duration, Giddens connects our daily acts—
including discourse—to the continuation of social form (structure). Under 
Giddens’s formulation, actions are performed by knowledgeable human beings 
who understand a great deal about the conditions under which they live and the 
consequences of their daily practices (as much and more than any social theorist 
studying their habits understands them). If asked, people can usually explain the 
reasons for their actions (they possess a discursive consciousness). Their daily 
practices are routine in nature, and as they go about their lives they contribute to 
the sustainability of social life across time and space. This matrix of deeply 
embedded routines amounts to a persistent organization of joint activity that 
Giddens defines as structure (16-21).  
According to Giddens, the two most consequential structural properties 
are rules and resources, which he defines as "techniques or generalizable 
procedures applied to the enactment/reproduction of social practices" (21). Rules 
and resources form, sustain, terminate, and reform routine actions, 
"hierarchically organized in terms of the time-space extension of the practices 
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they recursively organize" (17). In other words, the persistent social forms that we 
constitute in our routine, daily practices also normalize those practices and 
accommodate new ones, thereby sustaining those forms (281-84). Formalized, 
persistent social forms such as organizations remain durable and extensive in the 
routines of their members and affiliates (see fig. 7). We might note the proximity 
of Giddens' view to Burke's rhetoric of form, in which expectations are set and 
either met or denied in the course of an audience's participation with the rhetor.  
 
 
Figure 7. Structuration of Social Form. Adapted from Anthony Giddens, The 
Constitution of Society: Introduction of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: U  
of Calif. P, 1984; print; 1-40). 
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Giddens’s model avoids positioning structures and agents as a dichotomy. 
Instead, structuration positions the agent-structure relationship as mutually 
constituting, with each component holding the other in common (16-17). 
Mutually informative and responsive agents and structure comprise the duality of 
a persistent field of relationships, or social form. 
We might ask whether rhetoric, because it is addressed and purposeful, 
matches the description of a routine structurating activity. Certainly, rhetoric is 
no less routine than the unconscious acceptance of the hierarchical principle 
(Burke) or the development and dissemination of speech genres (Bakhtin). 
Burke’s model of dramatism applies: Rhetoric’s intentionality—its motive—can 
be evaluated as an act in a scene performed by actors, whose agency constitutes 
and continues social form. Like other actions we take, rhetorical action 
determines our position in a field of relationships (among other outcomes) as we 
engage with others. We can describe those engagements as the dialectic of 
identification, as the connecting fiber of speech genres, or as the routine  habits of 
discourse. We can use rhetoric with awareness, or our rhetorical actions can 
emerge from what Burke calls "principles of autonomous activity" (RM 27). In 
either case, we find rhetoric's role not only possible but necessary to organizing 
the structural components (hierarchies, classes, and social order, for example) 
and the durable form of organizations.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Organizations, whether commercial, private, corporate, governmental or 
nonprofit, are social forms for coordinating and directing activity toward selected 
purposes. Barnard’s definition of organizations as "systems of consciously 
coordinated activity" (qtd. in Cheney 3) implies a central role for discourse in 
building and maintaining organizations because organizational members cannot 
easily coordinate their activities without communicating. Further, organizations 
cannot align the activity of their members or garner support from its other 
affiliates without their willing cooperation, which requires persuasion. And 
finally, as with other social forms, organizations cannot be sustained unless 
coordination and cooperation are maintained over time. Insofar as coordination, 
cooperation, and duration imply discourse, they imply specific kinds of 
discourse—one of those is rhetoric. Over the course of this project, I have traced 
the trajectory of a rhetorical process by which organizations take and sustain 
form. That constitutive process bridges the divide between individual 
organizational members and the collective with which they affiliate themselves. 
As a starting point, we grant that coordination, cooperation, and duration operate 
interdependently. Barnard confines these attributes to a closed system that 
governs what enters, exits, and is processed within an organization (including 
discourse). A closed system theory handily explains the structure evident in
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organizations, but it also isolates that structure from the same forces with which 
it interacts. However, alternative views of structure can also account for the 
organizational attributes of coordination, cooperation, and duration.  
In this project I have used a framework of rhetorical theory to describe an 
ongoing, recursive process of social action. To differentiate that approach from a 
closed systems approach, I appeal to the idea of an open system that sustains 
itself through contingent and negotiated actions of interrelated actors. Whereas a 
closed system isolates itself from its environment, an open system can account 
for the changes and the adaptability that sustainable organizations exercise in 
response to ever-changing circumstances. Philip Anderson has described an open 
system as "interconnected components that work together" and that "exchange 
resources with the environment" (217). Rhetorical theory is one way to explain 
not only how coordination and cooperation are maintained over time, but how 
discursive interconnections work as an exchange of attitudes, positions, and 
beliefs. Central to my position and to this project is the relationship between 
situation, ethos, and identification and the social consequences of that 
relationship. 
In general, the study of discourse provides more than adequate theoretical 
space for us to consider the social applications and implications of language; for 
example, the constitution of organizations as social forms. However, I believe 
rhetorical theory offers a more targeted consideration of how discourse 
constitutes the close affiliations and general attitudes that we recognize as 
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organizations. Recognition is, of course, a social phenomenon. We cannot 
recognize our environment without first establishing a relationship to it—in fact, 
I would say that recognition is relationship. Within the parameters of my study, 
social recognition manifests as ethos. According to Aristotle, ethos is created 
during rhetorical encounters. Rhetors make use of ethos as the most effective 
rhetorical proof, given its capacity to promote credibility, trust, and authority as 
cornerstones to persuasion. This project relies on the premise (and on others) 
that rhetor and audience create ethos between them, rather than the rhetor 
presenting an ethos and the audience predisposing itself to the rhetor's 
representation. From that premise I join with other theorists in contending that 
ethos emerges from how the rhetor and audience recognize in one another 
characteristics that each attributes to credibility and authority, thus engendering 
trust and easing the way toward persuasion. It is easier for us to take the side of 
someone we know than of someone we do not. 
To press my argument further, we can consider the process and the 
outcome of social recognition (ethos) in light of Burke's theory of identification. 
Our taking the side of another, our adopting or empathizing with another 
person's perspective—these are important components to the willing cooperation 
and coordination defined by Barnard and others as crucial to organizations. 
According to Burke, we can think of identification as persuasion. In my view, we 
can think of identification as persuasion because identification extends the 
capacity of ethos as a rhetorical proof. As we can describe ethos as social 
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recognition among rhetors and audiences, we can describe identification as Burke 
intends: a process of aligning interests. That alignment begins with a shift in 
perspective, with the recognition that one's interests are the same as or largely 
similar to someone else's. In terms of organizational rhetoric, alignment 
reinforces willing cooperation and coordination and supports the durability of 
the organization as a social form.  
We remind ourselves here that an open system capable of hosting ethos 
and identification is not a freewheeling, undefined phenomenon. Social 
recognition and the extension of that recognition to the alignment of interests are 
specifically situated responses. From my perspective, we can use the located 
nature of ethos and identification as coordinates in our examinations of 
organizational discourse. A collection of such points, each defined in time and 
space, suggests the structure we observe in an open system. The identification 
process promotes ethical changes that allow agents to move from one point to 
another in the system and to respond sensibly to changing relationships. In this 
way, the ethos-identification relationship, in the context of the situation, 
generates a continuing pattern of expectation and response that links specific 
situations in a chain agency and symbolic interactions—what we might call a 
"logic of experience."  
In organizations, constancy of experience is under continual pressure 
because, unless the organization's ethos and the ethos of its members and other 
interested affiliates support one another, and unless the path from social 
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recognition and identification remains clear, cooperation and collaboration 
cannot unify nor remain so. Assertive, common organizational proclamations 
such as vision statements and "branding" lack ethical proof. Such communication 
asserts organizational identity, but it does not foster mutual recognition. Nor do 
these examples of what Gary Olson calls a "rhetoric of assertion" open a way 
toward overcoming the natural division between the organization, its members, 
and its other affiliates (9). As a result, when an organization collectively or its 
members individually confront a situation for which answers don't come easily, 
the tools for change are absent. Under those circumstances, organizations and 
their members fall back on traditions of discourse, planning strategies for the 
future that match the paradigms of the present.  
Rhetorical situations are not limited to objective exigencies that demand 
resolution, however. As constituted in discourse, rhetorical situations can be and 
are invented and manipulated. Organizational rhetoric is an especially adept 
means of framing situations as part of a persuasive strategy. An organization's 
rhetorical motive may be to express its identity or to suggest itself as the answer 
to a dilemma or to a more dramatic conflict, for example. However, an 
organization may also desire to control how ethos emerges between it, its 
members, and the public. In that case, the process of identification may fall under 
the spell of ideology or culture rather than promote an alignment of interests. The 
consequences of such an arrangement threaten organizational sustainability. 
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Purchases and Gains 
Organizations can function as and often perform as exceedingly skilled 
rhetors. Whether governmental, educational, private, or commercial, 
organizations seek to persuade many different audiences, including 
organizational members, regulators, the press, and legislatures. All organizations 
are sites of social activity and discourse, within which their affiliated members 
assimilate diverse experiences. In the ideal circumstance, willing cooperation 
subsumes individual differences to promote coordination.  
From an open-system perspective, the linkages between situation, ethos, 
and identification interact as active, constituting components of discourse. From 
that point of view, what gains come from applying rhetorical theory to 
organizations? For one, we gain a means to emphasize the pragmatics of 
organizational discourse. As Boje, Oswick, and Ford put it, our concerns as 
rhetoricians are "the actual or potential effects of messages, especially those that 
are not abstracted from their social contexts" (81). To analyze organizational 
discourse is not to embark on a new critical endeavor, of course. Scholars 
continually investigate the rhetoric of propaganda, of commercial purpose, of 
image and identity among organizations of all kinds. Still, as I have in this 
project, we might ask specific questions about the effects of messages in the 
context of organizational discourse; for example, how does organizational 
rhetoric produce the effect of sustainable social form?  
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Obviously, organizational sustainability must be maintained—it is not a 
passive outcome of organizational activities, discursive or otherwise. To 
appreciate the mechanism of organizational permanence we can and should look 
not only at the functional attributes of organizations or only at how statute and 
marketplaces attribute judicial and economic power to organizations. In addition 
to those examinations, we should also look at the rhetoric produced in and by 
organizations and observe how it works to sustain them.  
Given that my project views sustainability as an effect of rhetoric, I would 
emphasize that this effect is complementary with other institutionalized 
practices, such as strategic planning and execution (which, I would argue, are 
also rhetorical). Organizational sustainability manifests in part in rhetoric. 
Consequently, it (1) influences perceptions and attitudes toward situations; (2) 
creates recognition, cooperation, and common sense across time and space; and 
(3) enable willing cooperation between and among organizational members, the 
organization's interested affiliates, the public, the state, and other audiences.  
Considerations of Our Present Stance 
Rhetorical theory goes beyond theories of information exchange and 
moves us closer to understanding how the human capacity to form alliances and 
community extends to constitute the institutions and affiliations that are 
predominant markers of contemporary life. In this project, rhetorical criticism 
interrogates assumptions about ethos at the site of organizations to claim its 
relationship to identification. Whether worn as a public mask or propelling a 
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deeply structured discourse, an organization’s rhetoric shapes the experience of 
the rhetors and audience affiliated with it. Rhetorical criticism that disavows 
simple communication models, functionalist assumptions, and social 
constructionist ideologies helps to describe the social forms and discursive 
actions of organizations, embedded and practiced in daily practice and in 
strategic (or autonomous) motives.  
Such grand claims demand theoretical support that explains the 
relationships and the processes inherent in them. However, in the end, it is not 
the theory that we find necessary but the insight into the motives and attitudes of 
organizations, given their powerful and influential roles as rhetors. In terms of 
sustainability, organizations do not thrive, or even survive, only because of or in 
spite of their goals and results. Organizations thrive in part because rhetorical 
motives and actions intertwine individual members and the collective body in a 
mutually beneficial relationship that perpetuates itself for the time that those 
benefits endure. More than any other purpose, organizational rhetoric seeks to 
persuade organizational members and other audiences of the durability of that 
benefit. The institutionalized social form we know as an organization (with the 
practices, norms, beliefs, and interpretations it embodies) depends on how 
successfully an organization persuades. Armed with that understanding, one 
might better operate coordinate, cooperate, and communicate in and among 
organizations to seek the best response to the complex dilemmas of our 
contemporary circumstances.
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1 One might also include kairos, the opportune time for a rhetorical act, because 
it accounts for another aspect of context to consider when composing a text or 
delivering a speech. As Kinneavy and Eskin demonstrate, despite Aristotle’s 
neglecting to specifically define the term as he defined other technical aspects of 
rhetoric, we should consider how the concept buttresses Aristotle’s definition of 
rhetoric as a "specific act in a concrete case" (133). Rhetors and audiences are 
situated. For example, we use very different rhetoric, and we use rhetoric 
differently, when we object to a zoning law at a city council meeting as compared 
with trying to avoid a confrontation when we accidentally tap the bumper of the 
car in front of us during rush hour. That said, a critical treatment of kairos and 
its operation in organizational rhetoric would divert this project from its focus on 
ethos and identification, and such a study would likely demand a book of its own 
to sort out conflicting views on the very idea and how each interrelates with the 
others and does or does not illustrate the function of time and opportunity in 
organizational rhetoric. 
 
2 Zulick’s postmodern terminology envelops rhetor and audience in the 
subjectivities inherent in poststructuralist discourse. However, her text does not 
discuss issues of power—a central issue in the postmodernist perspective. Given 
that absence, I choose to read her use of "subject" as referring to that cluster of 
attributes we more commonly refer to as "character." 
 
3 Anthony Giddens theorizes the consequences of instantaneous global 
communication as "time-space distanciation," which he argues produces 
profound social effects by binding time and space as objects that are subject to 
cultural exchange (17-21). The implication of Giddens’ theory on audiences 
suggests a fruitful area of study, outside the scope of this project. 
 
4 There are many reasons besides ethos that influence people to join and stay with 
organizations, of course. Gainful employment is necessary for thriving in 
capitalist states, for example, and some people are subject to mandatory military 
service. These brief samples will suffice to dispel a suspicion of naiveté.    
  
5 Organizational credibility is not the only path to sustainability. During the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, for example, British Petroleum’s credibility 
suffered deeply, and the organization’s 2012 annual report described a $118b 
profit. 
 
6 Contemporary views of identity for the most part take a psychological approach, 
although there are many different explanations for its form and function (as a 
narrative or as a heuristic, for example). The social sense of identity I refer to 
here is based on social identity theory, developed by Henri Tajfel and John 
Turner. The reader is directed to the Works Cited for a full reference. 
 
 203   
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
7 We note in Crusius the irony of Burke's intellectual positions. Burke famously 
wrote from a critical perspective outside of the borders imposed by academic 
disciplines. He "moved with apparent ease in and out of all sorts of intellectual 
communities, but he claimed none in particular" and distanced himself from 
disciplines that would take him as their own (450). It seems the proponent of 
identification sought not to be identified with any one critical movement nor any 
one discipline. 
 
8 We find a more dramatic iteration of ideological association in Michel 
Foucault’s tracing of the principle of discipline discursively manifest in schools, 
prisons, and factories. 
 
9 Note the biological imperative: In this case what Susanne Langer speculates as 
twin processes of individuation and involvement. The former process enables 
individual members of a species to react to their environment in specific ways, 
and the latter contributes to the species’ sustainability (118-9). Similarly, 
identification is an individuating process in terms of hierarchy, and a process of 
involvement that sustains the principle of hierarchy. As Burke writes, "In being 
identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself. [H]e is 
both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with 
another" (RM 21). 
 
10 Weick’s sensemaking equation, in which present experience is interpreted with 
past experience, shares a view with what Pierre Bourdieu calls habitus: "the 
durable and transportable systems of schemata of perception, appreciation, and 
action that result from the institution of the social in the body" (LP 126-7). 
Weick's theory posits that sensemaking is neither formalized nor constantly 
forming but is in flux between present and past. Similarly, Bourdieu insists that 
while habitus develops out of our history of encounters (we read current 
experiences against prior experiences), it is an "open system of dispositions" that 
are subject to those experiences, which modify or reinforce its structure (133). 
For both theorists, the open nature of an interpretive field implies a web of 
relations, not a contained set of balanced forces. However, neither theorist 
invests in the idea that we determine our position in the field with rhetoric, filling 
the space among those relational connections and constructing the context in 
which we engage with others. 
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